remain outside his control. Gaza, as former British prime minister David Cameron observed, is an “open-air prison.”1 Th e Israeli warden is in charg
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e Israeli warden is in charge. In the popular imagination confected by state propaganda, and dutifully echoed by everyone else in authority, Israel is almost always reacting to or retaliating against “terrorism.” But neither the inhuman and illegal blockade Israel imposed on Gaza nor the periodic murderous “operations” Israel has unleashed against it trace back to Hamas rocket fi re. T h ese were Israeli politi-cal d
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tary (self-defense). Of course, if Gaza “would just sink into the sea” (Nobel Peace Prize laureate Yitzhak Rabin),2 or if it unilaterally surrend
show annotationchecks out; comes from the book, yet I can’t find the original source of the quote or where Rabin said it.
ny people held in bondage. Th e notion that enhanced fi reworks emanating from an anthill could, in and of themselves, infl ect state policy of one of the world’s most formidable military powers is laughable —or would be, were it not for th
show annotationFrom 2001 to 2015 there were 12,338 rocket attacks and 6,500 mortar attacks that left 33 dead and 1971+ injured in Israel (prior to 2005 most of the attacks were against Israeli targets in the Gaza Strip.)
Between October 7 2023-January 9th, Hamas fired 14,500+ rockets. Interestingly, these “enhanced fireworks” routinely fall short killing Palestinians. In the first couple weeks of the October 7th conflict, the IDF said more than 550 rockets had fallen short.According to Human Rights Watch: “Human Rights Watch has previously reported on rockets that have misfired and struck areas in Gaza. Research citing data released by the Israeli military has suggested that between 10 to 20 percent of rockets launched from Gaza have failed. Data on the overall numbers of projectiles (for example, rockets and mortars) fired as well as their success or failure rates are estimates and should not be considered precise.”
References:
Rocket & Mortar Attacks Against Israel by Date
Palestinian rocket attacks on Israel - Wikipedia
IDF claims over 550 rockets fell short in Strip since outbreak of war | The Times of Israel
s more notional than real. Th e World Bank reported in 2015–16 that Gaza “is now dependent for about 90 per cent of its GDP on expenditures by the Palestinian Government, the United Nations and other external remit-tances and donor projects.”4 No doubt, those who compiled th
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nd most of them capitulated to I sraeli diktat.5 But if Gaza survives, it’s becau
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a distinctively evil crime. Readers will be able to judge for themselves whether this depiction is naïve or whether the documen-tary record bears it out; whether this writer is partisan to Gaza or whether the facts are partisan to it; whether Gaza poses the challenge of competing “narratives,” or whether it poses the challenge of disengaging its innocence from the skein of lies concealing it. It might be politically prudent
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. a c k n o w l e d g m e n t s f igu r e 1. White phosphorus attack. © UNRWA 2009 .p a r t o n e Operation Cast
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vard UniversityTo Gaza,The Truth Th e massacre of innocent people is a serious matter. It is not a thing to be easily forgotten. It is our duty to cherish their memory.m a h a t m a g a n d h i Preface x iAcknowledgments x
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remain outside his control. Gaza, as former British prime minister David Cameron observed, is an “open-air prison.”1 Th e Israeli warden is in charg
show annotationLegit
ing the remain-ing 44 percent.1 In the war that ensued aft er passage of the resolution, the newly born State of Israel expanded its borders to incorporate nearly 80 per-cent of Palestine. Th e only areas of Palesti
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Mediterranean Sea on the west. Approximately 250,000 Palestinians driven out of their homes during the 1948 war fl ed to Gaza and overwhelmed the indigenous population of some 80,000. Today, more than 70 percent of G
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pulation of some 80,000. Today, more than 70 percent of Gaza’s inhabitants consist of expel-lees from the 1948 war and their descendants, and more than half of this overwhelmingly refugee population is under 18 years of age; Gaza has the “second-highest share of people aged 0 to 14 worldwide.” Its current 1.8 mil-lion inhabitants are squeezed into a sliver of land 25 miles long and 5 miles wide; it is among the most densely populated areas in the world, more crowded than even Tokyo. Between 1967, when the Israeli
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Gaza a uniquely exploitive regime of “de-development.” In the words of Harvard p
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shooting until war resulted.” T h e “policy of trapping Nasser into war was hammered out between [David] Ben-Gurion and Dayan.” T h e predicate of their indirect
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oke the back of the resistance.6 In December 1987, a traffi c accident on the Gaza-Israel border that left four Palestinians dead triggered a mass rebellion, or intifada, against Israeli rule throughout the occupied territories. “It was not an armed rebellion,”
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on the White House lawn. Israel intended via the Oslo Accord to streamline the occupation by removing its troops from direct contact with Palestinians and supplanting them with Palestinian subcontractors. “One of 6. Ann Mosely Lesch,
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chief of staff Moshe Dayan “ wanted war, and periodically, he hoped that a given retaliatory strike would embar-rass or provoke the Arab state attacked into itself retaliating, giving Israel cause to escalate the shooting until war resulted.” Th e “policy of trapping Nasser
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avoid sparking IDF attacks”; “Egypt generally sought tranquility S e l f - D e f e n s e • 5
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fi eld hostilities in 1949, Egypt kept a tight rein on the activity of Fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) in Gaza. But in early 1955, Israeli
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9.S e l f - D e f e n s e • 7 the meanings of Oslo,” former Israeli foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami observed, “was that the PLO was … Israel’s collaborator in the task of stifl ing the intifada and cutting short … an authentically democratic struggle for Palestinian independence.” 8 In particular, Israel cont
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sordid tasks of occupation. “Th e idea of Oslo,” former Israeli minister Natan Sharansky acknowledged, “was to fi nd a strong dictator to … keep the Palestinians under control.” 9 “Th e Palestinians will be bet
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ttlement of the confl ict. Th e summit collapsed in mutual recrimination. But which side bore primary
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ty for the aborted talks? “ If I were a Palestinian,” Ben-Ami, one of Israel’s chief negotiators at Camp David, later commented, “I would have rejected Camp David as well,” while Israeli stra-tegic analyst Zeev Maoz concluded that the “substantial concessions” Israel demanded of Palestinians at Camp David “were not acceptable and could not be acceptable.” 11 Subsequent negotiations al
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hem with reservations.12 In January 2001, parleys resumed in Taba, Eg yp t. Although both parties 8.
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r been closer to agreement,” Prime Minister Barak unilaterally “called a halt” to these negotiations, and as a result “the Israeli-Palestinian peace process had ground to an indefi nite halt.”13 In September 2000, amid the dipl
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diplomatic stalemate and aft er Israeli provo-cation , Palestinians in the occupied t
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. Like its 1987 precursor, this second intifada was at its inception over-whelmingly nonviolent. However, in Ben-Ami’s words
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gly nonviolent. However, in Ben-Ami’s words, “Israel’s dispropor-tionate response to what had started as a popular uprising, with young, unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed with lethal weapons, fueled the [second] intifada beyond control and turned it into an all-out war.”14 It is largely forgotten that th
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is largely forgotten that the f i rst Hamas suicide bombing of the second intifada did not occur until fi ve months into Israel’s relentless bloodletting. Israeli forces had fi red on
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l’s relentless bloodletting. Israeli forces had fi red one million rounds of ammunition in just the fi rst few days of the uprising, while the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed during the fi rst weeks was 20:1 .15 In the course of the spirali
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ation Hot Winter” (2008).16 In the warped memory of Israeli president and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shimon Peres, however, this period was “another mistake—we restrained ourselves for eight years and allowed [Gazans] to shoot thousands of rockets at us … restraint was a mistake.”17 13. Morris, Righteous Victims, p
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ed Israel to sour on the Strip. “If only it would just sink into the sea,” Rabin despaired.18 In April 2004, Prime Minist
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of a Palestinian state.”19 Israel subsequently purported that it was no longer the occupying power in Gaza. However, human rights organizations and international institutions rejected this contention; the fact was, in myriad ways Israel still preserved near-total dominance of the Strip. “Whether the Israeli army is ins
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“it remains in control.”20 I srael’s own leading authority on international law, Yoram Dinstein, aligned himself with the “prevalent opinion” that the Israeli occupation of Gaza was not over.21 Th e received wisdom is that the
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t i o n c a s t l e a d its actual objective. If Israel’s goal was, as Ben-Ami pointed out, to groom a class of Palestinian collaborators, then Oslo was a stunning success for Israelis. Indeed, not just for them. A lo
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ies to the 1993 agreement, suggests what loomed largest in the minds of Palestinian negotiators: whereas four full pages are devoted to “Passage of [Palestinian] VIPs” (the section is subdivided into
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nds.22In a telling anomaly, the Oslo Accord stipulated a fi ve-year interim period for so-called confi dence building between the former foes . Contrariwise, when and whe
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whole of the Egyptian Sinai.23 A half decade of confi dence building did not insert itself in the Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Th e barely disguised purpose of
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e Israeli-Egyptian negotiations. Th e barely disguised purpose of Oslo’s protracted interim period was not confi dence building to facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian peace but collaboration building to facilitate a burden-free Israeli occupation. Th e operative premise was that
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erative premise was that aft er growing accustomed to the emoluments of power and privilege, the stratum of Palestinian benefi ciaries would be averse to parting with them ; however reluctantly, they woul
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t meted out the largesse and “aff orded them signifi cant perquisites.”24 Th e transition period also
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heir loyalty. By the end of the Oslo “peace process, ” Israel could count among its m
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t past and would not settle for presiding over a South Africa–like Bantustan . Once he passed from the scene
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a South Africa–like Bantustan. Once he passed from the scene in 2004, however, all the pieces were in place for the “Palestinian Authority” implanted in the occupied territories to reach a modus vivendi with Israel. Except that it was too late. In 2006, disgusted by years of o
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ion that was widely heralded as “completely honest and fair” (Jimmy Carter).26 Privately, Senator Hillary Clin
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y Carter).26 Privately, Senator Hillary Clinton rued that the United States didn’t rig the outcome: “we should have made sure that
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lity that the Islamic movement “ was evolving and could evolve still more.”28 But Israel immediately tightene
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could evolve still more.”28 But Israel immediately tightened its siege, and “economic activity in Gaza came to a standstill, moving into survival mode.”29 Th e United States and Eu
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r a t i o n c a s t l e a d noose was tightened around Hamas alongside the people of Gaza, it was because they did as told: they participated in democratic elections. T h e unstated subtext, ignorance
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hich cost Gaza dearly, was that Hamas was obliged to lose. Th e UN special rapporteur on hu
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tions imposed in modern times.31 Th e impetus behind this ruthless economic warfare targeting “a freely elected government of a people under occupation” was to ensure Hamas’s failure so as to discredit it as a governing body.32 Th e Islamic movement was calle
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redit it as a governing body.32 Th e Islamic movement was called upon simultaneously by Washington and Brussels to renounce vio- lence, and recognize Israel as well as prior Israeli-Palestinian agreements.33 Th ese preconditions for inte
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n eff ect, Western pow-ers were “setting unattainable preconditions for dialogue” with the Islamic 31. John Dugar
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D e f e n s e • 13movement.35 “Hamas’s success in the Palestinian elections of January 2006,” a 2014 study concludes, could have augured a peaceful political evolution, “but only if the active interference of the United States and the passivity of the European Union had not sabotaged this experiment in government.”36 In 2007, Hamas consolidated
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his experiment in government.”36 In 2007, Hamas consolidated its control of Gaza aft er foiling a coup attempt orchestrated by Washington in league with Israel and elements of the Palestinian old guard.37 “When Hamas preempts [a putsch],” a senior Israeli intelligence fi gure later scoff ed, “everyone cries foul, claiming it’s a military putsch by Hamas—but who did the putsch?”3 8 Although reviling Hamas as
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tightening the screws on Gaza.40 In June 2008, Hamas and Israel entered into a cease-fi re brokered by Egypt, but in November of that year Israel violated the cease-fi re. It carried out a lethal border raid on Gaza reminiscent of its 1955 cross-border attack. Th en and now, the objective was to provoke retalia-tion and thus provide the pretext for a massive assault. Indeed, the border raid proved t
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V-aided remote-controlled guns. On the other side, Hamas42 launched several hundred rudimentary rockets and mortar shells into Israel. On 18 January 2009, Israel de
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support during the attack. A resolution laying full culpability on Hamas for the ensuing death and destruction passed unanimously in the Senate and 390 to 5 in the House.44 But overwhelmingly, internation
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h public opinion) recoiled at Israel’s assault on a defenseless civilian population.45 In 2009, a United Nations H
show annotationJust said Hamas was launching 1000s of rockets
was clear that, in the words of Israeli columnist Gideon Levy, “this time we went too far.”46 Israel offi cially justifi
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stand even superfi cial scrutiny . If Israel wanted to avert Hamas rocket attacks, it would not have triggered them by breaching the 2008 cease-fi re.48 It could also have opted f
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i cer told the Crisis Group, “Th e cease-fi re options on the table aft er the war were in place there before it.”4 9 If the goal of Cast Lead was t
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the invasion. Overwhelmingly, Israel targeted not Hamas strongholds but “decidedly ‘non-terrorist,’ non-Hamas” sites.50 Th e human rights context fu
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claim of self-defense. Th e 2008 annual report of B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) documented that between 1 January and 26 December 2008, Israeli security forces killed 455 Palestinians, of whom at least 175 were civilians, while Palestinians killed 31 Israelis, of whom 21 were civilians. Hence, on the eve of Israe
show annotationJust said that Israel targeted civilian sites, not Hamas yet killed a good proportion of Hamas to civilians
ed war of self- defense, the ratio of total Palestinians to Israelis killed stood at almost 15:1, while the ratio of Palestinian civilians to Israeli civilians killed was at least 8:1 . In Gaza alone, Israel kil
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at least 8:1. In Gaza alone, Israel killed at least 158 noncombatants in 2008, while Hamas rocket attacks killed 7 Israeli civilians, a ratio of more than 22:1. Israel deplored the detention by
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ans, a ratio of more than 22:1. Israel deplored the detention by Hamas of one Israeli combatant captured in 2006, yet Israel detained some 8,000 Palestinian “political prisoners,” including 60 women and 390 children, of whom 548 were held in administrative detention without charge or trial (42 of them for more than two years).51 Its ever-tight-ening noose ar
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Th e blockade amounted to “collective punish-ment, a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”52 In September 2008, the World
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orld Bank described Gaza as “starkly transform[ed] from a potential trade route to a walled hub of humanitarian donations.”53 In mid-December, the United Nat
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s (OCHA) reported that Israel’s “18-month-long blockade has created a profound human dignity crisis, leading to a widespread erosion of liveli-hoods and a signifi cant deterioration in infrastructure and essential 50. Report of the Independent F
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c a s t l e a d services.”5 4 If Gazans lacked electricity for as many as 16 hours each day; if Gazans received water only once a week for a few hours, and 80 percent of the water was unfi t for human consumption; if one of every two Gazans was unemployed and “food insecure”; if 20 percent of “essential drugs” in Gaza were “at zero level” and more than 20 percent of patients suff ering from can-cer, heart disease, and other severe conditions were unable to get permits for medical care abroad —if Gazans clung to life by
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s for medical care abroad—if Gazans clung to life by the thinnest of threads, it traced back, ultimately, to the Israeli siege. Th e people of Gaza, OCHA con-c
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se-fi re was broken by Israel, didn’t Palestinians have a much stronger case than Israel for resorting to armed self-defense? 54. United Nations Offi ce
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Mediterranean Sea on the west. Approximately 250,000 Palestinians driven out of their homes during the 1948 war fl ed to Gaza and overwhelmed the indigenous population of some 80,000. Today, more than 70 percent of G
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l the 1955 Israeli raid on Gaza, the “overriding concern” of Egypt “in its rela-tions with Israel was to avoid sparking IDF attacks”; “Egypt generally sought tranq
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ound to an indefi nite halt.”13 In September 2000, amid the diplomatic stalemate and aft er Israeli provo-cation, Palestinians in the occupied territories once again entered into open revolt. Like its 1987 precursor, this second intifada was at its inception over-whelmingly nonviolent. However, in Ben-Ami’s words, “Israel’s dispropor-tionate response to what had started as a popular uprising, with young, unarmed men confronting Israeli soldiers armed with lethal weapons, fueled the [second] intifada beyond control and turned it into an all-out war.”14 It is largely forgotten that the fi rst Hamas suicide bombing of the second intifada did not occur until fi ve months into Israel’s relentless bloodletting. Israeli forces had fi red one million rounds of ammunition in just the fi rst few days of the uprising, while the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed during the fi rst weeks was 20:1. 15 In the course of the spiralin
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pted that tested their loyalty. By the end of the Oslo “peace process,” Israel could count among its many blessings that the number of Israeli troops serving in the occupied Palestinian territories was at the lowest level since the start of the fi rst intifada.25 Th e only holdout in the Palest
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pted that tested their loyalty. By the end of the Oslo “peace process,” Israel could count among its many blessings that the number of Israeli troops serving in the occupied Palestinian territories was at the lowest level since the start of the fi rst intifada.25 Th e only holdout in the Palest
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rmine who was going to win.”27 Since its establishment in 1988, Hamas had formally rejected the internationally endorsed terms for resolving the Israel-Palestine confl ict. However, its participation in the electoral contest signaled the possibility that the Islamic movement “was evolving and could evolve still more.”28 But Israel immediately tightened its siege, and “economic activity in Gaza came to a standstill, moving into survival mode.”29 Th e United States and European Union followed suit, as they infl icted “devastating” fi nancial sanctions. 30 If the 25. “Israel Army’s W
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o bow to its authority.”39 T h e United States and Israel reacted promptly to Hamas’s rejec-tion of this “democracy promotion” bid (i.e., the coup attempt) by further tightening the screws on Gaza. 40 In June 2008, Hamas and Israe
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ael’s claim of self-defense. Th e 2008 annual report of B’Tselem (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) documented that between 1 January and 26 December 2008, Israeli security forces killed 455 Palestinians, of whom at least 175 were civilians, while Palestinians killed 31 Israelis, of whom 21 were civilians. Hence, on the eve of Israel’s so-called war of self- defense, the ratio of total Palestinians to Israelis killed stood at almost 15:1, while the ratio of Palestinian civilians to Israeli civilians killed was at least 8:1. In Gaza alone, Israel killed at least 158 noncombatants in 2008, while Hamas rocket attacks killed 7 Israeli civilians, a ratio of more than 22:1. Israel deplored the detention by Hamas of one Israeli combatant captured in 2006, yet Israel detained some 8,000 Palestinian “political prisoners,” including 60 women and 390 children, of whom 548 were held in administrative detention without charge or trial (42 of them for more than two years).5 1 Its ever-tight-ening noose a
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Palestinian human rights. T h e blockade amounted to “collective punish-ment, a serious violation of international humanitarian law.”5 2 In September 2008, the World
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ernational humanitarian law.”52 In September 2008, the World Bank described Gaza as “starkly transform[ed] from a potential trade route to a walled hub of humanitarian donations.”5 3 In mid-December, the United Na
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efi eld hostilities in 1949, Egypt kept a tight rein on the activity of Fedayeen (Palestinian guerrillas) in Gaza. But in early 1955, Israeli leaders plotted to lure Egypt into war in order to topple President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Th ey launched a bloody cross-border raid into Gaza killing 40 Egyptian soldiers. Th e Gaza raid proved a near-perfect provocation, as armed border clashes escalated. In October 1956, Israel (i
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