“Naturalized realism” is a somewhat loose label rather than a sharply defined doctrine, but since it sits between realism and naturalism, you can explore several related traditions and sources to flesh out what it often means and how philosophers approach it. Below are places to start, key thinkers and ideas, and how to relate them back to Blackburn’s usage.
What “Naturalized Realism” tends to mean (in context)
In the context in which you encountered “naturalized realism” (e.g. Blackburn’s discussion of universals, realism about properties, conceptualism), the phrase usually means:
- A realist stance (i.e. believing something objective or mind-independent is out there), but one that is “naturalized” by tying realism to our best scientific, natural, or empirical practices.
- It avoids invoking metaphysical or Platonic “extravagances” by insisting our concepts or universals must be anchored in the natural order (e.g. causal powers, dispositions) or in evolutionary/biological constraints.
- It aims for a middle path: preserving objectivity while acknowledging that our conceptual scheme is shaped by biology, perception, and practice.
So you’ll see “naturalized realism” as a form of scientifically informed realism about universals or properties, not full-blown Platonism, but not brute nominalism either.
Some key philosophical sources and fields to explore
To deepen your grasp, these are some fruitful domains, authors, and texts to look into:
| Topic | Why It’s Relevant | Sample Resources |
|---|---|---|
| Scientific Realism / Structural Realism | These debates are about which parts of scientific theories we should believe in (laws, entities, structures). Naturalized realism often aligns with or critiques these. | The SEP article Naturalism & Realism(or Naturalism in Epistemology) (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |
| Naturalism in Philosophy | Since “naturalizing” means drawing on the empirical/natural sciences, philosophers of naturalism help set the background conditions. | The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy article on Naturalism (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) |
| Conceptualism vs Realism vs Nominalism | The debate over universals is central. Naturalized realism often tries to mediate between these extremes. | Texts on universals in metaphysics or property theory |
| Evolutionary Epistemology / Cognitive Science | Because naturalization often appeals to our cognitive setup (eyes, brain, perceptual systems, evolution) to explain how we form concepts. | Contemporary works in philosophy of mind, perception theory |
| Contemporary Realist Philosophers | Many philosophers in analytic tradition attempt versions of naturalized realism. | Books/articles by Michael Devitt, David Armstrong, J. L. Mackie, Hilary Putnam, David Lewis |
How to Use This in Your Reading of Blackburn
When Blackburn alludes to a “naturalized realism” in Think, he’s gesturing toward the idea that:
- Certain universals or conceptual categories (e.g. color, shape, causation) may be fixed or constrained not arbitrarily but by our perceptual and biological systems and their interaction with the world.
- Thus, although our conceptual scheme is not identical to brute reality, it is anchored by the natural order in such a way that realism is defensible but not metaphysically extravagant.
- The hope is to avoid both (i) naïve realism (where we pretend our concepts mirror an unconditioned world) and (ii) radical conceptualism/nominalism (where everything is purely human-imposed).
When you see Blackburn argue that our concepts are “constrained enough to reclaim realism without Platonist mystery,” he is invoking this idea of naturalized realism.
Suggested Readings / Next Steps
Here are some readings to follow:
- Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Naturalism in Epistemology
Explores how philosophical work can (or should) be continuous with science. (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy — Naturalism
Gives background on the broad doctrine of naturalism (what it means to be “naturalized”). (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - Amanda Bryant, Naturalized Metaphysics without Scientific Realism
A more recent paper examining how metaphysical work might be naturalized without strict commitment to scientific realism. (argumenta.org) - Bernard Linsky & Edward Zalta, Naturalized Platonism vs. Platonized Naturalism
A discussion of how abstract objects (like universals) might be accommodated on a “naturalized” ontology. (mally.stanford.edu) - Works by Michael Devitt
Devitt is a contemporary metaphysician who defends versions of realist metaphysics respecting naturalistic constraints. - Metaphysics textbooks / anthologies
Look for chapters on realism, universals, and naturalism in standard metaphysics surveys (e.g., works by Michael Loux, E. J. Lowe, Jonathan Schaffer).