Skip to content
Read • Question • ConnectAnthony’s notes & researchReturn with a new question
Anthony’s NotesA personal field guide
From the notebook

Metaphysics Study Plan

Eighteen units, roughly one a week. Each unit opens with a map of the main positions (the rival schools and their sub-strains, who holds them, and where to read each one), then videos, the encyclopedia, and your own books, cited to chapter, section and printed page. Units 1–12 are the core of the subject (what exists and what it is like); 13–15 turn to persons; 16–18 are the big-picture and method questions.

How to work each unit

  1. Map — skim the unit’s Main positions first, so you know the options before anyone argues for one.
  2. Watch the videos in the order listed (usually 30–60 minutes). Crash Course and Wireless Philosophy first; Sadler and Philosophy Tube go deeper or add history.
  3. Look it up: read the opening sections of the Stanford Encyclopedia (SEP) entry. Wikipedia is the quick orientation; SEP is the authority.
  4. Read the core book passage (marked Core). Everything else is for depth.
  5. Write a short answer to the unit’s question in your own voice. A position card in 30 Rhetoric works well, so it enters your review queue.

Your library

Page numbers are the printed page numbers in each book, not the PDF viewer’s page count. The PDFs live in /Volumes/NAS/Library/Philosophy/Topics/Metaphysics.

Short nameBookEdition in your folderBest used for
Loux & CrispMichael J. Loux and Thomas M. Crisp, Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction4th ed., Routledge 2017The spine of the plan: rigorous, analytic, covers almost every unit
NeyAlyssa Ney, Metaphysics: An Introduction1st ed., Routledge 2014The clearest modern textbook; excellent logic primer at the front
van InwagenPeter van Inwagen, Metaphysics4th ed., Westview 2015The big questions: God, persons, freedom, being
MumfordStephen Mumford, Metaphysics: A Very Short IntroductionOUP 2012Fast warm-up; one short chapter per topic
Key ConceptsHelen Beebee, Nikk Effingham and Philip Goff, Metaphysics: The Key ConceptsRoutledge 2011A dictionary; look up entries as you meet terms
Crane & FarkasTim Crane and Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and AnthologyOUP 2004The primary texts (Quine, Lewis, Kripke, Parfit, and others)
HeilJohn Heil, From an Ontological Point of ViewOUP 2003Advanced; argues one view (powers and modes) rather than surveying
FeserEdward Feser, Scholastic Metaphysics: A Contemporary IntroductionEditiones Scholasticae 2014The Aristotelian–Thomist counterweight to the analytic books
MooreA. W. Moore, The Evolution of Modern Metaphysics: Making Sense of ThingsCambridge 2012The history, Descartes to Deleuze
HaskerWilliam Hasker, Metaphysics: Constructing a World ViewInterVarsity 1983Short Christian-philosophy introduction; dated but clear
ThomassonAmie Thomasson, Rethinking MetaphysicsOUP 2025A skeptic’s challenge to the whole enterprise; read last
HeideggerMartin Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Fried and Polt2nd ed., Yale 2014The continental counterpoint on Being
LeibnizG. W. Leibniz, Discourse on Metaphysics, trans. Jonathan BennettEarly Modern TextsA short primary text; cited by section (§)

Two notes on the files themselves:

  • Duplicate van Inwagen: both van Inwagen PDFs are the same 4th edition. Keep Metaphysics -- Van Inwagen, Peter.pdf, which carries the printed page numbers used below; the other one only has PDF page numbers.
  • Crane & Farkas can’t be searched: its PDF is a scan with no text layer, so search inside it won’t find anything. Navigate by the page numbers given here.

The channels

  • Crash Course Philosophy (playlist) — short and lively; covers about a third of the units.
  • Wireless Philosophy (Wi-Phi) — animated explainers by working philosophers (Yale, MIT and others).
  • Gregory B. Sadler — university lectures on the classic texts (Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume, Kant, Heidegger).
  • Philosophy Tube — Abigail Thorn’s early videos (2013–2016) cover time, possible worlds, abstract objects, composition and identity.

How these were chosen: Reddit was not reachable from my tools, so the three channels besides Crash Course are the ones named most often across seven published roundups of the best philosophy YouTube channels. Wireless Philosophy and Sadler each appeared on five lists and Philosophy Tube on four. Where none of the four covers a topic, a Bonus video from a well-regarded source fills the gap (Closer To Truth, Jeffrey Kaplan, Kane B, Carneades.org).

Every strain in the Main positions maps now carries its own Watch: links, so you can go straight from a position (say, classical compatibilism) to a video on it. Those lists draw first on the four channels above, then on other academic sources: Jeffrey Kaplan, Kane B, Closer To Truth, Daniel Bonevac, the Thomistic Institute (Aquinas 101), the Royal Institute of Philosophy, Carneades.org, Philosophy Vibe, Philosophy Overdose (archival interviews such as Magee’s), Darren Staloff’s lectures and the Free Will Show. Every link was checked against YouTube before it went in.

At a glance

UnitTopicThe question
1What is metaphysics?What is it trying to do, and can it succeed?
2Being and existenceWhat does it mean to exist, and how do we decide what exists?
3Universals and particularsWhat do two red things have in common?
4Abstract objectsDo numbers and propositions exist?
5SubstanceWhat is a thing, beyond its properties?
6Change, act and potency, form and matterHow is change possible?
7Possibility and necessityWhat makes something possible or necessary?
8EssenceWhich features could a thing not lack?
9Causation, laws and powersWhat is it for one thing to cause another?
10TimeIs only the present real? Does time pass?
11PersistenceHow does one thing last through change?
12Parts and wholesWhen do many things make up one thing?
13Personal identityWhat makes you the same person over time?
14Mind and bodyAre you a physical thing?
15Free willCan you act freely if everything is caused?
16Why anything at all?Why is there something rather than nothing?
17Realism, anti-realism, idealismIs reality independent of minds?
18Grounding and the method of metaphysicsWhat depends on what, and is metaphysics worth doing?

Unit 1 — What Is Metaphysics?

Question: What is metaphysics trying to do, and why did Hume and Kant think it had failed?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Metaphysics · Wikipedia: Metaphysics

Read

  • Core: Loux & Crisp, Introduction (pp. 1–16): “The Nature of Metaphysics—Some Historical Reflections” (p. 2) and “Metaphysics as Category Theory” (p. 10)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 1 “Introduction” (pp. 1–22)
  • Mumford, “What is an introduction?” (pp. 1–2) and ch. 10 “What is metaphysics?” (pp. 98–108)
  • Hasker, ch. 1 “Introducing Metaphysics”: “Metaphysical Questions”, “Answering Metaphysical Questions”, “Evaluating Metaphysical Theories”
  • Moore, Introduction §§1–8 (pp. 1–22), especially §6 “Three Questions” and §7 “The Importance of Metaphysics” (p. 16)
  • If your logic is rusty: Ney, “Preparatory Background: Logic for Metaphysics” (pp. 1–28). It pays off in every later unit.
  • Key Concepts: Analysis (p. 5), Conceptual analysis (p. 45), Theoretical virtues (p. 248), Ockham’s razor (p. 150)
  • Already in your vault: Hicks, Lecture 2: Essential Questions, §3 “The basic metaphysical categories”

Write: Define metaphysics in two sentences, then state Kant’s complaint against it and whether you accept it.

Unit 2 — Being and Existence

Question: Does Sherlock Holmes exist? How would Meinong, Russell and Quine each answer, and who is right?

Key terms: ontology · ontological commitment · non-existent objects · paraphrase · Ockham’s razor

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Existence · SEP: Nonexistent Objects · SEP: Ontological Commitment · Wikipedia: Existence · Wikipedia: Ontological commitment · Wikipedia: Nonexistent objects

Read

  • Core: Ney, ch. 1 “An Introduction to Ontology” (pp. 30–59): “The Puzzle of Nonexistent Objects” (p. 31), “Finding One’s Ontological Commitments: Quine’s Method” (p. 37), “The Method of Paraphrase” (p. 42), “Ockham’s Razor” (p. 48)
  • van Inwagen, “Coda: Being” (pp. 291–326)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part III “Being”: introduction (p. 137); Quine, “On What There Is” (p. 179); Aristotle, Categories selection (p. 149)
  • Heil, ch. 1: §1.1 “The Inescapability of Ontology” and §1.7 “Ontology”
  • Moore, ch. 12 “Quine”, §7 “Quinean Metaphysics II: Ontology” (p. 321)
  • Scholastic view: Feser, §4.3 “The analogy of being” (p. 284)
  • Key Concepts: Existence (p. 69), Being (p. 15), Meinongianism (p. 120), Non-existent objects (p. 147), Ontological commitment (p. 151), Criterion of ontological commitment (p. 55), Paraphrase (p. 155), Ontology (p. 152)

Write: State Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment in one sentence, then give one sentence you believe that seems to commit you to something you don’t want to believe in.

Unit 3 — Universals and Particulars

Question: When two things are both red, is there one thing (redness) they share, or only two similar things?

Key terms: realism · nominalism · tropes · one over many · exemplification · Bradley’s regress

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Properties · SEP: Tropes · SEP: Nominalism in Metaphysics · SEP: The Medieval Problem of Universals · IEP: Universals · Wikipedia: Problem of universals · Wikipedia: Trope (philosophy)

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 2 “What is a circle?” (pp. 14–23)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 1 “The Problem of Universals I: Metaphysical Realism” (pp. 17–44): “Realism and Nominalism” (p. 17), “Realism and Predication” (p. 21), “Realism and Abstract Reference” (p. 26), “Restrictions on Realism—Exemplification” (p. 29)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 2 “The Problem of Universals II: Nominalism” (pp. 45–81): “Austere Nominalism” (p. 50), “Metalinguistic Nominalism” (p. 60), “Trope Theory” (p. 70), “Fictionalism” (p. 77)
  • Ney, ch. 2: “Universals and the One Over Many Argument” (p. 64), “Nominalism and Other Options” (p. 77)
  • Heil, ch. 12 “Universals” (pp. 126–136) and ch. 13 “Modes” (pp. 137–150)
  • Feser, §4.1.3 “Moderate realism” (p. 247)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part IV: Plato (p. 227), Armstrong (p. 235), Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals” (p. 249), D. C. Williams, “On the Elements of Being” (p. 262)
  • Key Concepts: Universals (p. 265), Nominalism (p. 145), Trope theory (p. 255), Resemblance nominalism (p. 225), Class nominalism (p. 38), Ostrich nominalism (p. 154), Austere nominalism (p. 12), Immanent realism (p. 100), Bradley’s regress (p. 18)
  • Already in your vault: Books on Universals

Write: Pick realism, trope theory or austere nominalism and give the best objection to your pick.

Unit 4 — Abstract Objects: Numbers, Propositions, Facts

Question: Do numbers exist? If so, where, and how could we know about them?

Main positions

  • Platonism — mathematical objects and propositions exist, abstract and mind-independent. Figures: Frege, Gödel. Read: Ney, “Mathematical Objects” (p. 81); Key Concepts, “Platonism” (p. 165). Watch: 4 Ways of Thinking About Abstract Objects — Philosophy Tube · 9:26; Philosophy of Mathematics: Platonism — Kane B · 1:13:21; Silvia Jonas: Is Mathematics Invented or Discovered? — Closer To Truth · 7:40
    • The main argument for it is indispensability: our best science quantifies over numbers, so we are committed to them. Figures: Quine, Putnam.
    • The main problem is Benacerraf’s challenge: how could we know about causally inert objects outside space and time?
  • Neo-Fregean abstractionism — numbers exist, but “lightly”: they come for free from principles like Hume’s Principle. Figures: Bob Hale, Crispin Wright. Watch: Frege, Hume’s Principle, and Logical Ontology — BlueSpectacles · 36:32
  • Structuralism — mathematics is about structures, not individual objects. There is an ante rem version (Shapiro) and an eliminative, modal version (Hellman). Watch: Structuralism (Mathematical Philosophy) — I - Dot · 19:47
  • Nominalism about abstracta Watch: Abstract Objects — Daniel Bonevac · 6:08
    • Fictionalism — “there are prime numbers” is true only in the story of mathematics. Figure: Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers. Read: Key Concepts, p. 72. Watch: What If All of Mathematics Is Just an Elaborate Fiction? — EJ Falconi · 9:20
    • Paraphrase strategies — rewrite talk of abstracta without commitment. Read: Ney, “Applying Quine’s Method” (p. 71).
  • Aristotelian realism about mathematics — numbers and shapes are real, but as features of physical things (quantities and ratios). Figure: James Franklin. Watch: James Franklin on the Philosophy of Mathematics — UNSW Mathematics & Statistics · 8:13
  • Intuitionism and conceptualism — mathematical objects are mental constructions. Figure: Brouwer. Read: Key Concepts, “Psychologism” (p. 200). Watch: Setting the Record Straight on Intuitionism — K-Theory · 33:22
  • Easy ontology — numbers exist, but trivially, so there is no deep question. Read: Thomasson, §8.2. Watch: Amie Thomasson: Ontology Made Easy — Books & Books · 53:17
  • Propositions: traditional realism (Frege, Plantinga), nominalism about propositions (only sentences and utterances), and facts or states of affairs as the basic units of reality (Armstrong). Read: Loux & Crisp, pp. 118, 127, 139.

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Abstract Objects · SEP: Platonism in Metaphysics · SEP: Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics · SEP: Propositions · SEP: Fictionalism in the Philosophy of Mathematics · IEP: Mathematical Platonism · Wikipedia: Abstract and concrete

Read

  • Core: Ney, ch. 2 “Abstract Entities” (pp. 60–88): “The Abstract/Concrete Distinction” (p. 62), “Applying Quine’s Method” (p. 71), “Mathematical Objects” (p. 81)
  • Loux & Crisp, ch. 4 “Propositions and Their Neighbors” (pp. 118–148): “The Traditional Theory of Propositions” (p. 118), “Nominalism about Propositions” (p. 127), “Facts, States of Affairs, and Events” (p. 139)
  • Thomasson, §8.2 “Re-Evaluating Metaphysical Debates About Abstracta” (a deflationary view; best reread after Unit 18)
  • Key Concepts: Abstract vs concrete (p. 3), Platonism (p. 165), Numbers (p. 149), Fictionalism (p. 72), Proposition (p. 196), Facts (p. 71), States of affairs (p. 237), Set (p. 230)

Write: Does “there is a prime number between 2 and 5” commit you to an abstract object? Answer yes or no and defend it.

Unit 5 — Substance: What Is a Thing?

Question: Is a thing just a bundle of its properties, or is there something that has them?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Substance · SEP: The Identity of Indiscernibles · SEP: Aristotle’s Categories · IEP: Substance · Wikipedia: Substance theory · Wikipedia: Bundle theory · Wikipedia: Haecceity

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 1 “What is a table?” (pp. 3–13)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 3 “Concrete Particulars I: Substrata, Bundles, and Substances” (pp. 82–117): “Substratum and Bundle Theories” (p. 83), “Another Objection to the Bundle Theory—the Identity of Indiscernibles” (p. 94), “Problems for the Substratum Theory” (p. 101), “Aristotelian Substances” (p. 104)
  • Feser, §3.2 “Substance versus accidents” (pp. 210–219), including §3.2.2 “The empiricist critique” (p. 213); §3.3.1 “Individuation” (p. 220)
  • Heil, ch. 15 “Objects” (pp. 169–178), §15.2 “Substrata”
  • Leibniz, §8 (the notion of an individual substance) and §9 (each substance expresses the whole universe)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part III: Locke selection (p. 155); Robert M. Adams, “Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity” (p. 161)
  • Key Concepts: Substance (p. 238), Bundle theory vs substance-attribute theory (p. 23), Substratum (p. 239), Identity of indiscernibles (p. 97), Leibniz’s Law (p. 114), Haecceitism (p. 89), Particulars (p. 157)

Write: Could there be two things exactly alike in every property? Say what your answer commits you to about substance.

Unit 6 — Change, Act and Potency, Form and Matter

Question: Parmenides argued change is impossible. How did Aristotle answer, and does the answer still work?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Aristotle’s Metaphysics · SEP: Form vs. Matter · SEP: Aristotle on Causality · IEP: Aristotle: Metaphysics · Wikipedia: Potentiality and actuality · Wikipedia: Hylomorphism · Wikipedia: Four causes

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 4 “What is a change?” (pp. 34–43)
  • Core: Feser, ch. 1 “Act and potency”, §1.1 “The general theory” (pp. 33–44)
  • Core: Feser, ch. 3 “Substance”, §3.1 “Hylemorphism” (pp. 177–209): §3.1.1 “Form and Matter” (p. 177), §3.1.2 “Substantial form versus accidental form” (p. 181)
  • Feser, ch. 2, §2.1 “Efficient versus final causality” (p. 96) and §2.2 “The principle of finality” (p. 101)
  • Leibniz, §10 (substantial forms), §11 (don’t despise the Scholastics), §12 (extension can’t be the whole of body)
  • Key Concepts: Form and matter (p. 78), Aristotle (p. 11)
  • Already in your vault: Hicks, Lecture 2, §§7–10 (Parmenides, Zeno, Heraclitus, Aristotle on change)

Write: Explain act and potency using an acorn, then say whether modern science still needs the distinction.

Unit 7 — Possibility and Necessity

Question: What makes it true that you could have been a lawyer? Are other possible worlds real places?

Key terms: modality · possible worlds · modal realism (Lewis) · actualism (Plantinga) · counterparts

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Possible Worlds · SEP: The Possibilism-Actualism Debate · SEP: Varieties of Modality · SEP: David Lewis’s Metaphysics · Wikipedia: Possible world · Wikipedia: Modal realism

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 8 “What is possible?” (pp. 76–86)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 5 “The Necessary and the Possible” (pp. 149–180): “Problems about Modality” (p. 150), “Possible Worlds” (p. 154), “The Metaphysics of Possible Worlds Nominalism—David Lewis” (p. 162), “Actualism and Possible Worlds—Alvin Plantinga” (p. 168)
  • Ney, ch. 7 “Modality” (pp. 190–210): “The Possible Worlds Analysis of Modality” (p. 193), “Ersatz Modal Realism” (p. 202), “Rejecting the Possible Worlds Analysis” (p. 207)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part V: Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds selection (p. 330); Plantinga, “Actualism and Possible Worlds” (p. 334); Armstrong, A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility selection (p. 350)
  • Moore, ch. 13 “Lewis”, §3 “Modal Realism” (p. 335) and §4 (p. 339); ch. 3 “Leibniz”, §4 “Leibniz’ Various Modal Distinctions” (p. 78)
  • Leibniz, §13 (the complete concept of Caesar; certain but contingent truths)
  • Key Concepts: Modality (p. 126), Possible worlds (p. 167), Modal realism (p. 127), Possibility (p. 171), Necessity (p. 139), Contingent truths (p. 52), Possibilia (p. 167)

Write: State the “incredulous stare” objection to Lewis, then give his best reply.

Unit 8 — Essence and Essentialism

Question: Could you have had different parents and still been you?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Essential vs. Accidental Properties · SEP: Natural Kinds · Wikipedia: Essence · Wikipedia: Essentialism · Wikipedia: Rigid designator

Read

  • Core: Ney, ch. 7: “Essentialism and Anti-essentialism” (p. 211), “Essentialism Today” (p. 213), “The Relation between Essence and Necessity” (p. 215)
  • Core: Feser, ch. 4 “Essence and existence”, §4.1 “Essentialism” (pp. 234–266): §4.1.1 “The reality of essence” (p. 234), §4.1.2 “Anti-essentialism” (p. 240), §4.1.5 “Modality” (p. 261), §4.1.6 “Essentialism in contemporary analytic metaphysics” (p. 263)
  • Feser, §4.2 “The real distinction” between essence and existence (p. 267)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part V: Kripke, Naming and Necessity selection (p. 313)
  • Key Concepts: Essence (p. 63), Necessary a posteriori truths (p. 136), Necessity of origin thesis (p. 139), Natural kinds (p. 134), Kripke, Saul (p. 113), Sortals (p. 235)

Write: Give Kripke’s argument that water is necessarily H₂O in three steps, then say which step you’d attack.

Unit 9 — Causation, Laws and Powers

Question: Is causation just one thing regularly following another (Hume), or real powers in things?

Main positions: causation

Main positions: laws of nature

  • Humean regularity and “best system” views — laws are the axioms of the simplest, strongest summary of what happens. Figures: Mill, Ramsey, Lewis. Read: Key Concepts, “Ramsey–Lewis view of laws” (p. 205) and “Regularity theory of laws of nature” (p. 219). Watch: Laws of Nature: The Best System Analysis — Kane B · 46:23
  • Governing (necessitation) views — laws are relations of necessitation between universals. Figures: Dretske, Tooley, Armstrong. Read: Key Concepts, p. 59. Watch: Laws of Nature 2 — Kane B · 36:14; Why the Laws of Nature? (Episode 411) — Closer To Truth · 26:47
  • Dispositional essentialism — laws flow from the natures of properties; Mumford even argues there are no laws over and above powers. Figures: Bird, Ellis, Mumford. Read: Feser, §1.2.2.4 (p. 75); Heil, §9.5 (p. 95). Watch: Alexander Bird: The Structure and the Necessity of the Natural Laws — Royal Institute of Philosophy · 1:06:45
  • Anti-realism about laws — Bas van Fraassen (Laws and Symmetry) and Nancy Cartwright (How the Laws of Physics Lie). Watch: Bas van Fraassen: What is the Origin of the Laws of Nature? — Closer To Truth · 10:18

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: The Metaphysics of Causation · SEP: Counterfactual Theories of Causation · SEP: Regularity and Inferential Theories of Causation · SEP: Laws of Nature · SEP: Dispositions · IEP: Causation · IEP: Laws of Nature · Wikipedia: Causality

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 5 “What is a cause?” (pp. 44–54)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 6 “Causation” (pp. 181–197): “Hume’s Account of Causation” (p. 181), “The Response to Hume” (p. 186), “Neo-Humean Approaches” (p. 189)
  • Ney, ch. 8 “Causation” (pp. 217–238): “Three Reductive Theories of Causation” (p. 223), “Physical Theories of Causation” (p. 232)
  • Powers view: Feser, §1.2 “Causal powers” (pp. 45–78), including §1.2.2.4 “Powers and laws of nature” (p. 75); §2.3 “The principle of causality” (p. 116), including §2.3.2.1 “Hume’s objection” (p. 120)
  • Heil, ch. 8 “Powers” (pp. 75–84) and ch. 9 “Dispositional and Categorical Properties” (pp. 85–96), §9.5 “What Is a Law of Nature?” (p. 95)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part VI: Aristotle (p. 380), Hume (p. 382), Lewis, “Causation” (p. 390), Davidson, “Causal Relations” (p. 401), Mellor (p. 412)
  • Leibniz, §§14–15 (substances don’t act directly on one another) and §§17–18 (force vs quantity of motion)
  • Key Concepts: Regularity theory of causation (p. 217), Counterfactual theory of causation (p. 54), Humeanism (p. 93), Humean supervenience (p. 93), Dispositional properties (p. 59), Categorical and dispositional properties (p. 29), Law of nature (p. 114), Dretske–Tooley–Armstrong view of laws (p. 59), Ramsey–Lewis view of laws (p. 205), Pre-emption (p. 174), Causation by absence (p. 33)

Write: Give one case that breaks the counterfactual theory (pre-emption works well) and say what it shows.

Unit 10 — Time

Question: Do the past and future exist, or only the present? Does time really pass?

Key terms: A-theory · B-theory · McTaggart · presentism · eternalism · growing block · time travel

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Time · SEP: Presentism · SEP: Time Travel · SEP: Being and Becoming in Modern Physics · IEP: Time · IEP: Time Travel · Wikipedia: A series and B series · Wikipedia: Eternalism · Wikipedia: Philosophical presentism · Wikipedia: Growing block universe

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 6 “How does time pass?” (pp. 55–64)
  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 7 “The Nature of Time” (pp. 198–222): “McTaggart’s Argument” (p. 198), “The B-Theory” (p. 205), “The A-Theory” (p. 209), “The New B-Theory” (p. 216)
  • Ney, ch. 5 “Time” (pp. 138–169): “The Argument against the Ordinary View from Special Relativity” (p. 140), “Ontologies of Time” (p. 142), “The Truthmaker Objection” (p. 152), “Time Travel” (p. 162)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 4 “Temporality” (pp. 71–106), newly revised in this edition and including presentism
  • Crane & Farkas, Part VII: McTaggart (p. 454), Prior, “Changes in Events and Changes in Things” (p. 464), Smart, “The Space-Time World” (p. 496), Lewis, “The Paradoxes of Time Travel” (p. 510)
  • Key Concepts: A-theory (p. 12), B-theory (p. 21), McTaggart (p. 119), Unreality of time (p. 267), Presentism (p. 177), Eternalism (p. 65), Growing block theory (p. 86), Moving spotlight theory (p. 133), Flow of time (p. 77), Tensed and tenseless theories (p. 245), Time travel (p. 253), Grandfather paradox (p. 86)
  • Already in your vault: Hicks, Lecture 2, §§12–15 (Newton, Einstein, Hume and Kant on space and time)

Write: Give McTaggart’s argument in four premises and say which one the B-theorist rejects.

Unit 11 — Persistence: Lasting Through Change

Question: When a banana ripens, is the same banana wholly present at each moment, or is it a four-dimensional thing with temporal parts?

Main positions

  • Endurantism (three-dimensionalism) — a persisting thing is wholly present at every moment it exists. Figures: Chisholm, van Inwagen, Lowe. Read: Loux & Crisp, p. 223; Crane & Farkas, Chisholm (p. 537). Watch: What are Temporal Parts? (Perdurantism and Endurantism) — Carneades.org · 5:02; Persistence Through Time (lecture) — Simon Cushing · 1:12:34
    • Replies to the problem of change: properties are relations to times, or they are had “time-ly” (adverbialism). Read: Ney, “Defending Three Dimensionalism” (p. 185).
  • Perdurantism (four-dimensionalism, “worm” theory) — a thing is a four-dimensional whole extended in time as well as space, with different temporal parts at different times. Figures: Quine, Lewis, Mark Heller. Read: Loux & Crisp, pp. 231, 235, 239; Key Concepts, p. 158. Watch: Four-Dimensionalism Explained (Temporal Parts & Time Worms) — Philosophy Vibe · 16:39
    • The key argument is the problem of temporary intrinsics: one banana can’t be both green and yellow, but two temporal parts can. Figure: Lewis. Read: Ney, p. 178; Crane & Farkas, Lewis (p. 552).
  • Exdurantism (stage theory) — ordinary things are instantaneous stages that persist by having temporal counterparts. Figures: Ted Sider, Katherine Hawley. Read: Ney, “Exdurantism” (p. 183). Watch: Persistence Through Time (lecture) — Simon Cushing · 1:12:34
  • Identity as primitive (anti-criterialism) — there is no informative criterion of identity over time. Figures: Chisholm; Feser (for substances). Read: Feser, §3.3.2.2 (p. 230); Key Concepts, “Anti-criterialism” (p. 10).
  • Scholastic view — a substance persists because its substantial form persists; four-dimensionalism is rejected. Read: Feser, §3.3.2.1 (p. 223). Watch: Substantial Form (Aquinas 101) — Thomistic Institute · 10:17
  • The Ship of Theseus — the candidates are continuity of material, continuity of form or function, “both ships” (coincident objects), and “no fact of the matter” (conventionalism). Watch: Ship of Theseus — Wi-Phi · 8:07; Batman & Identity: Crash Course Philosophy #18 — Crash Course · 9:09; The Paradox of Theseus’s Ship (90 Second Philosophy) — Carneades.org · 1:33

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Temporal Parts · SEP: Identity Over Time · IEP: Persistence in Time · Wikipedia: Perdurantism · Wikipedia: Endurantism · Wikipedia: Ship of Theseus

Read

  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 8 “Concrete Particulars II: Persistence through Time” (pp. 223–249): “Two Theories of Persistence—Endurantism and Perdurantism” (p. 223), “Persistence and the Nature of Time” (p. 227), “An Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Properties” (p. 235), “A Second Argument for Perdurantism—Change in Parts” (p. 239)
  • Ney, ch. 6 “Persistence” (pp. 170–189): “The Problem of Temporary Intrinsics” (p. 178), “Exdurantism” (p. 183), “Defending Three Dimensionalism” (p. 185)
  • Against four-dimensionalism: Feser, §3.3.2 “Persistence” (pp. 223–233), including §3.3.2.1 “Against four-dimensionalism” (p. 223) and §3.3.2.2 “Identity as primitive” (p. 230)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part VIII: Chisholm, “Identity Through Time” (p. 537); Lewis, On the Plurality of Worlds selection on temporary intrinsics (p. 552)
  • Key Concepts: Persistence (p. 161), Endurantism (p. 62), Perdurantism (p. 158), Temporal parts (p. 244), Temporary intrinsics (p. 245), Four-dimensionalism (p. 79), Identity over time (p. 97), Ship of Theseus (p. 230)

Write: Which ship is the Ship of Theseus, the repaired one or the one rebuilt from the old planks? Say what your answer commits you to.

Unit 12 — Parts and Wholes

Question: When do several things make up one further thing? Always, never, or only sometimes (for example, when they make up a life)?

Key terms: special composition question · mereological nihilism · universalism · constitution · problem of the many · vagueness

Main positions: composition (the special composition question)

Main positions: material constitution (the statue and the clay)

Main positions: wholes and vagueness

  • Reductionism vs emergence — a whole is nothing over and above its parts, or it has emergent properties (“weak” emergence only surprises us; “strong” emergence is new and irreducible). Read: Mumford, ch. 3; SEP: Emergent Properties. Watch: Emergence — Wi-Phi · 5:40; David Chalmers: Why is Emergence Significant? — Closer To Truth · 12:43; Tim Maudlin: What is Strong Emergence? — Closer To Truth · 12:14
  • Theories of vagueness — epistemicism (Timothy Williamson), supervaluationism (Kit Fine) and metaphysical vagueness (Gareth Evans argues against vague identity). Read: Loux & Crisp, ch. 10 (pp. 283, 295); Crane & Farkas, Evans (p. 209) and Lewis (p. 210). Watch: The Sorites Paradox & Vagueness — Thinking About Stuff · 4:21; Timothy Williamson on Relativism and Vagueness — Philosophical Trials · 1:10:31
  • Atoms vs gunk — whether everything is ultimately made of simples, or divisible forever. Read: Key Concepts, “Gunk” (p. 88).

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Mereology · SEP: Material Constitution · SEP: The Problem of the Many · SEP: Ordinary Objects · SEP: Emergent Properties · SEP: Vagueness · Wikipedia: Mereology · Wikipedia: Mereological nihilism · Wikipedia: Emergence

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 3 “Are wholes just sums of parts?” (pp. 24–33)
  • Core: Ney, ch. 3 “Material Objects” (pp. 89–118): “The Paradoxes of Material Constitution” (p. 91), “The Special Composition Question” (p. 103), “Mereological Nihilism” (p. 110), “Mereological Universalism” (p. 112), “Vagueness” (p. 114)
  • Loux & Crisp, ch. 9 “Concrete Particulars III: Parts and Wholes” (pp. 250–278): “The Problem of the Many” (p. 251), “Mereological Nihilism” (p. 253), “Mereological Moderatism” (p. 255), “Constitution Metaphysics” (p. 264)
  • Loux & Crisp, ch. 10 “Metaphysical Indeterminacy” (pp. 279–303): “Composition and Metaphysical Indeterminacy” (p. 287), “Evans’s Argument Against Vague Identity” (p. 295)
  • Heil, ch. 16 “Substantial Identity” (pp. 179–194): §16.4 “‘Overlapping Objects’ and Eliminativism” (p. 183), §16.8 “Material Constitution” (p. 190), §16.9 “Eddington’s Tables” (p. 191)
  • Feser, §3.1.6 “Anti-reductionism in contemporary analytic metaphysics” (p. 204)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part III: van Inwagen, Material Beings selection (p. 193); Evans, “Can There Be Vague Objects?” (p. 209); Lewis, “Vague Identity: Evans Misunderstood” (p. 210)
  • Key Concepts: Mereology (p. 121), Special composition question (p. 236), Nihilism (p. 145), Universalism (p. 265), Unrestricted mereological composition (p. 268), Gunk (p. 88), Simple (p. 231), Overlap (p. 155)

Write: Give van Inwagen’s answer to the special composition question and the strangest thing it implies (hint: tables).

Unit 13 — Personal Identity

Question: What makes you, now, the same person as the child in your old photos? Memory, body, soul, or nothing deep at all (Parfit)?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Personal Identity · IEP: Personal Identity · Wikipedia: Personal identity

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 7 “What is a person?” (pp. 65–75)
  • Core: Crane & Farkas, Part VIII: Parfit, “Personal Identity” (p. 560); Snowdon, “Persons, Animals, and Ourselves” (p. 578); introduction (p. 527)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 11 “The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Personal Identity” (pp. 249–266)
  • Hasker, ch. 3, “Eternal Life: Immortality or Resurrection?”
  • Leibniz, §34 (the immortality we want requires memory)
  • Key Concepts: Psychological continuity (p. 197), Bodily continuity (p. 17), Animalism (p. 7), Memory theory (p. 120), Fission (p. 75), Survival (p. 241), Simple view of personal identity (p. 231), Split brain case (p. 237), Quasi-memory (p. 200)
  • Already in your vault: Hicks, Lecture 2, §17 (the Ship of Theseus applied to human beings); Lecture 7: The Human Being

Write: In Parfit’s fission case, which of the two resulting people is you? Defend “neither,” “both,” or “one.”

Unit 14 — Mind and Body

Question: Are you a physical thing? If not, how does your mind move your body?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Dualism · SEP: Physicalism · SEP: The Mind/Brain Identity Theory · SEP: Supervenience · IEP: Dualism and Mind · Wikipedia: Mind–body problem · Wikipedia: Mind–body dualism · Wikipedia: Physicalism

Read

  • Core: van Inwagen, ch. 10 “The Nature of Rational Beings: Dualism and Physicalism” (pp. 223–248)
  • Hasker, ch. 3 “Minds and Bodies”: “The Mystery of Mind and Body”, “Avoiding the Problem: Behaviorism and Idealism”, “Dualism”, “Materialism”, “Emergentism”
  • Crane & Farkas, Part IX: Descartes (p. 611), Leibniz (p. 619), Lewis, “Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications” (p. 629), Davidson (p. 639), Nagel, “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (p. 648)
  • Heil, ch. 19 “Conscious Experience” (pp. 223–239) and ch. 20 “Zombies” (p. 240)
  • Leibniz, §33 (the communication between soul and body)
  • Moore, ch. 1 “Descartes” (pp. 25–43)
  • Key Concepts: Supervenience (p. 239), Reductionism (p. 215)
  • Already in your vault: Mind and the 60.9.3.7 Mind folder

Write: Give the conceivability argument for dualism and the one premise a physicalist should deny.

Unit 15 — Free Will and Determinism

Question: If every event has a prior cause, can any of your choices be up to you?

Main positions: kinds of determinism

Main positions: incompatibilism (free will and determinism can’t both be true)

Main positions: compatibilism (free will and determinism can both be true)

  • Classical compatibilism — freedom is doing what you want without external constraint; “could have done otherwise” means “would have, had you chosen to”. Figures: Hobbes, Hume, Mill, G. E. Moore, Ayer. Read: Crane & Farkas, Hume (p. 673); Ney, p. 246. Watch: Compatibilism: Crash Course Philosophy #25 — Crash Course · 8:55; Hume, Enquiry: The Doctrine of Necessity — Sadler · 15:07; What is Compatibilism? (Free Will) — Carneades.org · 7:31
  • Hierarchical (“mesh”) theories — you act freely when your will matches what you want to want. Figures: Harry Frankfurt; Gary Watson (valuational view). Read: Crane & Farkas, Frankfurt (p. 682). Watch: First vs Second Order Desires (Frankfurt’s Volitions) — Carneades.org · 3:34; Harry Frankfurt: “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” — Simon Cushing · 56:51
  • Reasons-responsiveness — freedom is acting from a mechanism that responds to reasons, which requires “guidance control” but not “regulative control” (the ability to do otherwise). Figures: John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Read: Key Concepts, p. 88. Watch: Free Will and Moral Responsibility (John Martin Fischer) — Brain in a Vat · 54:29
  • Semicompatibilism — moral responsibility is compatible with determinism even if the ability to do otherwise isn’t. Figure: Fischer. Watch: John Martin Fischer and Semi-Compatibilism — infophilosopher · 1:00:47
  • Strawsonian compatibilism — responsibility is grounded in our “reactive attitudes” (resentment, gratitude), which no metaphysical theory could overturn. Figure: P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment” (1962). Read: Key Concepts, p. 209. Watch: P. F. Strawson: “Freedom and Resentment” — Simon Cushing · 49:24
  • New dispositionalism — the ability to do otherwise is a disposition you can have even in a deterministic world. Figures: Kadri Vihvelin, Michael Fara.
  • Leibniz — reasons “incline without necessitating”. Read: Leibniz, §13, §30.

Key arguments

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Free Will · SEP: Compatibilism · SEP: Arguments for Incompatibilism · SEP: Causal Determinism · IEP: Free Will · Wikipedia: Free will · Wikipedia: Compatibilism · Wikipedia: Incompatibilism

Read

  • Core: Ney, ch. 9 “Free Will” (pp. 239–258): “The Problem of Free Will and Determinism” (p. 241), “Compatibilism” (p. 246), “Libertarianism” (p. 252), “Skepticism about Free Will” (p. 256)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 12 “The Powers of Rational Beings: Freedom of the Will” (pp. 267–286). He is the author of the consequence argument, so this is the source.
  • Hasker, ch. 2 “Freedom and Necessity”: “Compatibilism: A Way Out?”, “Determinism: Arguments and Objections”, “Free Will: Arguments and Objections”, “Freedom, Necessity and God”
  • Crane & Farkas, Part X: Hume (p. 673), Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person” (p. 682), van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism” (p. 695), Loewer (p. 707), Chisholm, “Human Freedom and the Self” (p. 720)
  • Leibniz, §13 and §30 (reasons “incline without necessitating”)
  • Key Concepts: Compatibilism (p. 40), Consequence argument (p. 50), Frankfurt-style cases (p. 81), Principle of alternate possibilities (p. 182), Libertarianism (p. 116), Agent causation (p. 3), Hard determinism (p. 90), Problem of luck (p. 191), Reactive attitudes (p. 209), Source incompatibilism (p. 235)
  • Already in your vault: Free Will

Write: Put the consequence argument in premise form and say whether a Frankfurt case defeats it.

Unit 16 — Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?

Question: Must something exist necessarily, or could there have been nothing at all?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Nothingness · SEP: Cosmological Argument · SEP: Ontological Arguments · SEP: Principle of Sufficient Reason · IEP: Anselm’s Ontological Argument · Wikipedia: Why is there anything at all? · Wikipedia: Principle of sufficient reason

Read

  • Warm-up: Mumford, ch. 9 “Is nothing something?” (pp. 87–97)
  • Core: van Inwagen, Part Two “Why the World Is”: ch. 6 “Necessary Being: The Ontological Argument” (pp. 129–158) and ch. 7 “Necessary Being: The Cosmological Argument” (pp. 159–182)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 9 “The Place of Rational Beings in the World: Design and Purpose” (pp. 201–222)
  • Crane & Farkas, Part I “God”: Parfit, “Why Anything? Why This?” (p. 12); Aquinas, “The Five Ways” (p. 31); Anselm (p. 41); Leibniz, Monadology selection (p. 43)
  • Feser, §2.4 “Causal series”, including §2.4.2 “Per se versus per accidens” (pp. 161–170); §4.2 “The real distinction” (p. 267)
  • Hasker, ch. 4, “The Origin of the World”; ch. 5 “God and the World” (naturalism, pantheism, panentheism, theism)
  • The continental version: Heidegger, ch. 1 “The Fundamental Question of Metaphysics” (pp. 1–56). Read the translators’ outline (p. xxx) first.
  • Moore, ch. 3 “Leibniz” (pp. 67–86)
  • Already in your vault: Hicks, Lecture 1: Origins of Reality and Lecture 3: Nature & Super-Nature

Write: State the principle of sufficient reason, then van Inwagen’s argument that it proves too much (that it leaves no contingent truths).

Unit 17 — Realism, Anti-Realism and Idealism

Question: Does the world exist and have its features independently of minds and language?

Main positions

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Realism · SEP: Idealism · SEP: George Berkeley · SEP: Kant’s Transcendental Idealism · SEP: Scientific Realism · IEP: George Berkeley · Wikipedia: Philosophical realism · Wikipedia: Anti-realism · Wikipedia: Idealism

Read

  • Core: Loux & Crisp, ch. 11 “The Challenge of Anti-Realism” (pp. 304–338): “Two Views about the Nature of Reality” (p. 304), “Dummett’s Anti-Realist” (p. 310), “The Inscrutability of Reference” (p. 317), “Putnam’s Anti-Realism” (p. 323), “Realism or Anti-Realism?” (p. 328)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 3 “Externality” (pp. 53–70, on Berkeley) and ch. 5 “Objectivity” (pp. 107–122)
  • van Inwagen, ch. 2 “Individuality” (pp. 27–52), on monism: is there only one thing?
  • Hasker, ch. 4 “The World”: “The Idealist Rejection of Realism”, “The Scientific Critique of Realism”, “Consequences of Scientific Realism”
  • Crane & Farkas, Part II “Realism and Idealism”: Locke (p. 69), Berkeley, Three Dialogues (p. 77), Kant (p. 101), Robinson (p. 107), Dummett, “Realism” (p. 120)
  • Moore, ch. 5 “Kant” (pp. 107–142); ch. 14 “Dummett”, §2 “Realism and Anti-Realism” (p. 350)
  • Heil, §6.4 “Anti-Realism and Ontology” (p. 58)
  • Key Concepts: Realism and anti-realism (global) (p. 212), Anti-realism (p. 10), Idealism (p. 95), Phenomenalism and idealism (p. 162), Primary and secondary qualities (p. 179), Response-dependence (p. 226), Brains in a vat (p. 20)
  • Already in your vault: Subjectivism vs Objectivism

Write: Give Berkeley’s master argument in two sentences, then the reply you find strongest.

Unit 18 — Grounding, Fundamentality and What Metaphysics Is For

Question: Is reality layered, with some facts holding in virtue of others? And are metaphysical debates about the world, or about our concepts?

Main positions: grounding and fundamentality

Main positions: what metaphysics is for (metametaphysics)

  • Heavyweight (neo-Quinean) realism — ontological questions are deep and factual, and are answered by theory choice. Figures: Quine, van Inwagen, Sider. Watch: Quine’s Ontology — Daniel Bonevac · 47:49
  • Neo-Carnapian deflationism — existence questions are trivial within a framework and practical outside one. Figures: Carnap (internal and external questions), Eli Hirsch (quantifier variance), Amie Thomasson (easy ontology). Read: Ney, p. 120; Thomasson, chs. 6–8. Watch: Metaphysics: Carnap on Ontology — Kane B · 55:01; Carnap on Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology — Daniel Bonevac · 48:41; Amie Thomasson: Easy Ontology and the Work of Metaphysics — Royal Institute of Philosophy · 59:16
  • Epistemic skepticism — the questions are real but we can’t answer them. Figures: Karen Bennett (“epistemicism”), Uriah Kriegel.
  • Naturalized metaphysics — only metaphysics that serves science is legitimate. Figures: James Ladyman and Don Ross, Every Thing Must Go. Read: Ney, p. 134. Watch: Naturalized Metaphysics 1 — Kane B · 33:02; Naturalized Metaphysics 2 — Kane B · 41:41
  • Conceptual engineering — metaphysics should improve our concepts rather than discover hidden facts. Figure: Thomasson. Read: Thomasson, ch. 6 and ch. 9. Watch: Conceptual Engineering — Kane B · 1:00:56

Study

Watch

Encyclopedia: SEP: Metaphysical Grounding · SEP: Fundamentality · SEP: Truthmakers · SEP: Rudolf Carnap · Wikipedia: Metaphysical grounding · Wikipedia: Meta-ontology · Wikipedia: Truthmaker theory

Read

  • Core: Ney, ch. 4 “Critiques of Metaphysics” (pp. 119–137): “Carnap’s Two Critiques of Metaphysics” (p. 120), “Responses to Carnap’s Arguments” (p. 127), “The Relationship between Metaphysics and Science: A Proposal” (p. 134); plus ch. 1, “Fundamental Metaphysics and Ontological Dependence” (p. 53)
  • Core: Thomasson, ch. 5 “Fundamentality and Grounding Projects” (§5.1 “Grounding: The Basic Idea” through §5.5), then ch. 1 “The Traditional Conception of Metaphysics” and ch. 6 “Metaphysics as Conceptual Engineering”
  • Thomasson, ch. 4 “The Truthmaker Conception of Metaphysics” and ch. 10 “The Perennial Philosophical Project”
  • Heil, ch. 2 “Levels of Reality” (pp. 17–21), ch. 5 “Abandoning the Levels Conception” (pp. 40–50), ch. 7 “Truth Making” (pp. 61–74)
  • Moore, ch. 11 “Carnap” (pp. 279–301) and Conclusion (p. 581)
  • Key Concepts: Metametaphysics (p. 122), Truthmakers (p. 262), Supervenience (p. 239), Carving nature at its joints (p. 27), Linguistic framework (p. 118)
  • Already in your vault: Grounding

Write: After 18 units, is metaphysics about the world or about our concepts? Answer with Thomasson on one side and Loux & Crisp on the other, and say which one you side with.

Optional tracks

History of modern metaphysics. Read Moore alongside the units: ch. 2 Spinoza (p. 44) with Unit 5; ch. 4 Hume (p. 87) with Unit 9; ch. 12 Quine (p. 302) with Unit 2; ch. 18 Heidegger (p. 459) after Unit 16. Leibniz’s Discourse (30 pages) can be read whole in one sitting after Unit 9.

Heidegger on Being. After Unit 16, continue with Heidegger ch. 2 “On the Grammar and Etymology of the Word ‘Being’” (p. 57), ch. 3 “The Question of the Essence of Being” (p. 82) and ch. 4 “The Restriction of Being” (p. 102). Pair them with Sadler’s Being and Time | The Question of the Meaning of Being (13:29) and What Is Metaphysics | Nature of Metaphysical Inquiry (14:55), and Moore ch. 18.

Social ontology. What are races, genders and money? Ney ch. 10 “The Metaphysics of Race” (pp. 259–279); Wi-Phi’s Racial Ontology #1 (Introduction); SEP: Social Ontology.

Better books to consider

Loux & Crisp is the best spine you could have. You already own the right core. These would add something your shelf lacks:

  • Earl Conee and Theodore Sider, Riddles of Existence: A Guided Tour of Metaphysics (2nd ed., OUP 2014). The best first book on the subject: one lively chapter per puzzle. Better than Hasker as a first pass, and it pairs well with Mumford.
  • Robert C. Koons and Timothy H. Pickavance, Metaphysics: The Fundamentals (Wiley-Blackwell 2015). A rigorous survey that takes the Aristotelian options seriously, bridging Loux & Crisp and Feser. Their The Atlas of Reality (2017) is the expanded version.
  • E. J. Lowe, A Survey of Metaphysics (OUP 2002). A harder and deeper spine than Ney, neo-Aristotelian, and strong on substance, causation and time.
  • Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics (Blackwell 2008). Paired essays, one on each side of each question. Best for your argumentation work: every chapter is a live debate.
  • Jaegwon Kim, Daniel Z. Korman and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Metaphysics: An Anthology (2nd ed., Wiley-Blackwell 2012). Broader than Crane & Farkas and has a searchable text layer.
  • D. M. Armstrong, Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (Westview 1989). The classic short book for Unit 3.
  • Ney, 2nd edition (Routledge). An updated edition of the book you have exists. Your first edition is fine for this plan.

Progress

  • Unit 1 — What is metaphysics?
  • Unit 2 — Being and existence
  • Unit 3 — Universals and particulars
  • Unit 4 — Abstract objects
  • Unit 5 — Substance
  • Unit 6 — Change, act and potency, form and matter
  • Unit 7 — Possibility and necessity
  • Unit 8 — Essence
  • Unit 9 — Causation, laws and powers
  • Unit 10 — Time
  • Unit 11 — Persistence
  • Unit 12 — Parts and wholes
  • Unit 13 — Personal identity
  • Unit 14 — Mind and body
  • Unit 15 — Free will
  • Unit 16 — Why anything at all?
  • Unit 17 — Realism, anti-realism, idealism
  • Unit 18 — Grounding and the method of metaphysics