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In this captivating collection of philosophical puzzles, Julian Baggini serves up a mental feast that will leave you craving more. The perfect gift for lovers of philosophy or mining intelligent ice-breaker topics for your next party, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten offers one hundred philosophical puzzles that stimulate thought on a host of moral, social, and personal dilemmas. Taking examples from sources as diverse as Plato and Steven Spielberg, author Julian Baggini presents abstract philosophical issues in concrete terms, suggesting possible solutions while encouraging readers to draw their own conclusions.

My Summary

Main Ideas, Takeaways & Similarities

Questions

I. What is the problem?
A. How is this problem formulated?
B. Why is this problem important?
C. What is the history of this problem?
D. Which prominent personalities have been interested in this problem?

II. What solutions to the problem are there?
A. What are the conclusions reached?
B. By what argument(s) is the conclusion reached?
C. What facts or assumptions serve as premises?
D. When a prominent personality offers a solution, does he also argue for or against other prominent personalities? Does he raise objections to alternative solutions? Does he consider objections to his own solutions?

III. Evaluation
A. What are the advantages and disadvantages of the alternative formulations to the problem?
B. Has the importance or history of the problem ever been misrepresented?
C. Are the solutions logically related to the premises?
D. Are the facts true? Are the assumptions acceptable? Are the objections answerable?

AI Summary

One-sentence meanings of all 100 thought-experiments in The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten

The Evil Demon Demolishes easy certainty by imagining a deceiver powerful enough to make even the most “self-evident” truths doubtful.
Beam Me Up … Tests whether psychological continuity can make a teletransported copy genuinely you once the original body is destroyed.
The Indian and the Ice Shows that rejecting lone, extraordinary testimony can be rational even when, by chance, it is true.
A Byte on the Side Asks whether virtual infidelity is wrong because of the online act or because it signals turning away from a partner.
The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten Challenges animal-welfare arguments by picturing livestock that desire slaughter and consumption.
Wheel of Fortune Questions whether life-saving resources allocated by lottery can ever be fairer than by merit or need.
When No One Wins Presents a coerced soldier who must choose the least-bad atrocity, probing whether “minimising harm” can still be gravely immoral.
Good God Revives the Euthyphro dilemma: is the good good because God wills it, or does God will it because it is good?
Bigger Brother Explores how much privacy a society should forfeit for perfect security under total surveillance.
The Veil of Ignorance Uses Rawls’s device to argue that just rules are those we would endorse without knowing our own social position.
The Ship Theseus Shows that “sameness” depends on which continuity criterion—matter, form, or narrative—one privileges.
Picasso on the Beach Invites debate over whether artistic value lies in creator’s intent or in audience perception.
Black, White and Red All Over Uses color-blindness surgery to question whether physical accounts can capture qualia.
Bank Error in Your Favour Dissects self-serving excuses that transform an obvious theft into a “lucky break.”
Ordinary Heroism Asks if extreme self-sacrifice is supererogatory or merely what morality always demanded.
Racing Tortoises Restates Zeno’s paradox to undermine unexamined beliefs about space, time, and motion.
The Torture Option Confronts whether torture could be justified to avert catastrophe, pitting consequences against absolute rights.
Rationality Demands Newcomb-style puzzle reveals conflict between causal and evidential notions of rational choice.
Bursting the Soap Bubble Imagines consciousness as epiphenomenal, challenging whether mind can be real yet causally inert.
Condemned to Life Questions whether immortal but miserable beings have a right to end an unending life.
Land of the Epiphens Depicts creatures indistinguishable in behaviour yet lacking consciousness, testing how we infer other minds.
The Lifeboat Re-examines lifeboat ethics where not everyone can be saved, weighing fairness against utility.
The Beetle in the Box Wittgenstein’s private-language lesson: inner qualia cannot ground public meaning.
Squaring the Circle Shows the limits of intellect by following an impossible proof, separating analytic impossibility from empirical failure.
Buridan’s An Ass A starving donkey between equal hay bales exposes paralysis where pure rationality yields no reason to act.
Pain’s Remains Asks whether perfect replicas inherit remembered pain, questioning what makes suffering real.
Duties Done Pits rigid rule-following against compassion when they point in opposite directions.
The Nightmare Scenario Matrix-style simulation hypothesis re-ignites radical doubt about any external world.
Life Dependency Violinist analogy forces a choice between enforced bodily support and another’s right to life.
Memories Are Made of This Suggests that transplanted or fabricated memories destabilise what it means to remain the same person.
Just So Critiques how readily we accept neat evolutionary stories without strong evidence.
Free Simone Brainwashing case asks whether freedom demands desires formed without coercion or merely acting on current wishes.
The Free-Speech Booth Examines whether absolute free speech remains desirable when it enables extreme harm.
Don’t Blame Me Genetic-predisposition defence probes how biology affects moral responsibility.
Last Resort Human-shield dilemma weighs intentional harm against collateral harm.
Pre-emptive Justice Considers punishing people for crimes predicted but not yet committed.
Nature the Artist Questions whether bio-engineered beauty trivialises natural wonder.
I Am a Brain Tests whether personhood follows the brain alone or requires a body.
The Chinese Room Argues that syntactic symbol manipulation is not sufficient for genuine understanding.
The Rocking-Horse Winner Explores whether exploiting inexplicable luck is ethical.
Getting the Blues Mary the scientist shows that complete physical knowledge omits subjective experience.
Take the Money and Run Weighs loyalty against utilitarian benefit in an economic hit-man scenario.
Future Shock Introduces the non-identity problem: our actions affect which future people exist, complicating harm.
Till Death Us Do Part Tests whether marriage vows bind when terminal illness radically alters circumstances.
The Invisible Gardener Pits disappearing evidence for a caretaker deity against empirical scepticism.
Amoebaesque Fission cases question what counts as one person when beings divide like amoebae.
Rabbit! Illustrates Quine’s indeterminacy of translation with the mysterious word “gavagai.”
Evil Genius Externally controlled brain revives doubts about genuine free will.
The Hole in the Sum of the Parts Asks whether emergent properties make wholes more than their components.
The Good Bribe Small bribe that saves lives tests whether corruption can be morally praiseworthy.
Living in a Vat Matrix-like case questions the evidential basis for believing in an external reality.
More or Less Population-ethics puzzle pits maximising total happiness against maximising average happiness.
Double Trouble Split-brain regeneration shows personal survival without numerical identity.
The Elusive I Explores whether a stable self survives through shifting memories and personalities.
Sustainable Development Balances duties to future generations against present economic growth.
The Total Perspective Vortex Hitchhiker device shows how grasping the cosmic scale can annihilate self-importance.
Eating Tiddles Asks whether eating a dead pet is wrong when no suffering occurs, testing moral disgust.
Divine Command Abraham-Isaac scenario probes whether obeying a divine order can trump moral instincts.
The Eyes Have It Color-module swap questions whether shared vocabulary guarantees shared experience.
Do as I Say, Not as I Do Challenges whether moral preaching loses force when the preacher is a hypocrite.
Mozzarella Moon Explores realism versus instrumentalism by positing a cheesy moon that nonetheless yields correct equations.
I Think, Therefore? Shows that the Cogito may secure “thinking” but not necessarily a thinker with enduring identity.
No Know Externalist account suggests one can know facts without conscious justification.
Nipping the Bud Genetic screening to prevent potential criminals raises spectre of eugenics.
Soul Power Neuroscientific findings challenge the existence of an immaterial soul.
The Forger Perfect forgery indistinguishable from original asks if authenticity has intrinsic worth.
The Poppadom Paradox Infinite divisibility paradox questions how anything can be solid if always divided further.
Mad Pain Case of someone who enjoys pain questions whether mental states are defined by causes or by typical effects.
The Horror Total determinism evokes existential dread about human autonomy.
An Inspector Calls Retroactive punishment scenario tests justice when new moral standards are applied to the past.
Life Support Debates whether keeping a permanently unconscious patient alive benefits that “person.”
Free Percy Talking parrot with personhood demands challenges species-based moral status.
Being a Bat Nagel’s bat shows the irreducibility of subjective experience to objective science.
Water, Water, Everywhere Twin-Earth case reveals that meaning depends partly on external natural kinds.
The Ring of Gyges Invisibility ring probes whether morality depends on fear of punishment or internal virtue.
Net Head Neural web implant asks whether outsourcing cognition undermines genuine understanding.
The Scapegoat Utilitarian sacrifice of an innocent to save many critiques act-utilitarian reasoning.
Gambling on God Pascal’s wager casts belief as a prudential bet under uncertainty.
A Clockwork Orange Conditioning criminals to be harmless questions whether moral action requires the freedom to choose evil.
Hearts and Heads Trolley-problem variant pits instinctive empathy against detached calculation.
Sense and Sensibility Emotion-suppressing drug raises issue of affect’s role in moral judgment.
The Freeloader Prisoner who benefits from an escape tunnel he didn’t dig illustrates fairness in cooperative ventures.
The Golden Rule Probes limits of reciprocity when others’ preferences differ radically from one’s own.
The Pleasure Principle Experience-machine variant asks whether engineered bliss can equal authentic achievement.
The Nowhere Man Life devoid of desires or projects questions what gives existence meaning.
Art for Art’s Sake Debates whether art needs moral or social purpose to justify itself.
Fair Inequality Explores when income inequality is just if it benefits everyone.
Total Lack of Recall Severe amnesia case tests whether a memory-less life can still have value.
Kill and Let Die Switch-track trolley problem scrutinises the moral divide (if any) between killing and letting die.
Something We Know Not What Mystery smell questions whether science can fully capture qualitative essence.
No One Gets Hurt Virtual child pornography challenges harm-based justifications for criminalisation.
Autogovernment Anarchic community asks whether imposed government is necessary if voluntary norms suffice.
Zombies Conceivable mindless bodies challenge the claim that consciousness is nothing over and above the physical.
The Sorites Tax Highlights vagueness by showing how tiny increments in tax seem never to make a fair difference yet clearly can.
The Problem of Evil Restates the classical challenge to an all-good, all-powerful God given pervasive suffering.
Family First Nepotism case pits impartial moral theory against special obligations to kin.
Moral Luck Contrasts equally reckless drivers, one harmless and one fatal, to expose how outcomes skew moral judgment.
The Experience Machine Nozick’s device asks whether pleasure alone suffices for the good life or if we crave authenticity.
Give Peace a Chance? Absolute pacifist stance tests whether refusing violence is moral when it enables grave injustice.
The Nest Café Sweat-shop coffee shop reveals everyday consumer complicity in global exploitation.

Highlights

The purpose of such ‘thought experiments’ is to strip away the things that complicate matters in real life in order to focus clearly on the essence of a problem. (Page 10)

The evil demon (Page 14)

Perhaps this is the thought experiment’s pay-off: our capacity to reason has to be taken as basic for any serious thought to be undertaken at all. We can doubt whether any particular piece of reasoning is sound by thinking hard about it. But we cannot doubt whether our general capacity for reason is flawed or not. At best we can say it seems to serve us well enough. Is that enough to vindicate rationality, or does it leave it weakened? (Page 15)

Beam me up … (Page 18)

The ‘psychological continuity’ theory of personal identity has an intuitive appeal. It is only because it seems to reflect our fundamental intuitions that we can make sense of stories such as Kafka’s Metamorphosis, in which a man wakes up in the body of a beetle. We instantly recognise that the man is the beetle because his mind inhabits it. Mental, not physical continuity, marks him out as the same person. (Page 19)

Perhaps then to ask whether Stelios is a clone or ‘the same’ person is the wrong question. Perhaps we should instead ask what matters about our past and future existence. And maybe the answer to that is psychological continuity, by whatever means necessary. (Page 19)

The Indian and the ice (Page 22)

The problem is, however, that sometimes something genuinely does come along that forces us to reconsider what we thought we knew. We cannot dismiss an idea simply because it doesn’t fit with our present beliefs. Rather, we need very good reasons to do so, because what is firm and established has to carry more weight than what is being claimed by an individual or small group which goes against it. (Page 23)

A byte on the side (Page 25)

But if we would object to the virtual affair, that would seem to indicate that it is not the role of the third party which is crucial after all. What causes the hurt is not the turning to someone else, but the turning away from the relationship. On this view, when Dick turns on a computer to turn him on, he is signalling that he has stopped seeing his wife as the person with whom he wishes to express his sexuality. (Page 26)

The pig that wants to be eaten (Page 28)

Wheel of fortune (Page 32)

Marge’s mistake is a warning against the limits of thought experiments. If her system seems foolproof, it is because she has already tested it out, and it works every time. In her head, that is. If the gambler can be so easily led astray by imagining what would happen in hypothetical situations, so can a philosopher. (Page 32)

The point is that the improbability of what has happened in the past does not affect the probability of what is yet to happen. (Page 33)

When no one wins (Page 35)

If I don’t do it somebody else will’ is generally speaking a weak justification for wrongdoing. You are responsible for the wrong you do, regardless of whether or not others would have done it anyway. (Page 35)

Good God (Page 38)

And the Lord spake unto the philosopher, ‘I am the Lord thy God, and I am the source of all that is good. Why does thy secular moral philosophy ignore me?’ And the philosopher spake unto the Lord, ‘To answer I must first ask you some questions. You command us to do what is good. But is it good because you command it, or do you command it because it is good?’ ‘Ur,’ said the Lord. ‘It’s good because I command it?’ ‘The wrong answer, surely, your mightiness! If the good is only good because you say it is so, then you could, if you wished, make it so that torturing infants was good. But that would be absurd, wouldn’t it?’ ‘Of course!’ replieth the Lord. ‘I tested thee and thou hast made me pleased. What was the other choice again?’ ‘You choose what is good because it is good. But that shows quite clearly that goodness does not depend on you at all. So we don’t need to study God to study the good.’ ‘Even so,’ spake the Lord, ‘you’ve got to admit I’ve written some pretty good textbooks on the subject …’ Source: Euthyphro by Plato (380 BCE) (Page 38)

If this is so, then it is no wonder that many believe that there can be no morality without God. If goodness and Godness cannot be separated, secular morality is a contradiction in terms. However, our imaginary conversation seems to demonstrate very clearly and simply that this cannot be so. If God is good, it is because God is and chooses to do what is already good. God doesn’t make something good by choosing it; he chooses it because it is good. (Page 39)

Even if God and the good really were one, it would still be reasonable to ask what makes this identity true. The answer would surely be that we know what good is and it is this which would enable us to say truly that God is good. If God advocated pointless torture, we would know that he was not good. This shows that we can understand the nature of goodness independently of God. And that shows that a godless morality is not an oxymoron. (Page 39)

Bigger Brother (Page 41)

The French scientist Pierre Laplace suggested that if we knew both the laws of physics and the location of every particle in the universe, we would be able to predict everything that would come to pass in the future. Quantum theory has shown that to be false since not all causal processes are strictly determined by prior conditions. There is more indeterminacy in the universe than Laplace supposed. (Page 41)

theory The appeal to quantum indeterminacy won’t do. Even if it is true that quantum thought introduces more unpredictability experiment has allowed, all it would do is replace an entirely predictable causal process with one which contains unpredictable, random elements. But our actions are no more free if they are the result of random causal processes than if they are the result of strictly determined ones. Free will appears to require that we escape the physical causal chain altogether. And that, it seems, we cannot do. than our (Page 42)

The veil of ignorance (Page 45)

Rawls thought that if we want to know what fairness is on Earth, we should imagine ourselves to be in a similar position. The key difference is that we should also imagine that we do not know whether we will be smart or stupid, dextrous or clumsy, fit or sickly. That way we will be able to come up with rules to determine how to distribute goods which are completely fair and do not discriminate against anyone. (Page 46)

Fans of Rawls believe the veil of ignorance is the best device we have for deciding what a fair society would look like. Critics say that it does no such thing: when we go behind the veil we simply take our existing political views and prejudices and make our decisions accordingly. It can therefore be seen as either the most useful or useless thought experiment in the history of political philosophy. (Page 46)

The ship Theseus (Page 48)

You might then think that which is the ‘genuine’ Theseus is not a question with a single answer. It all depends on what your interest in the boat is. But this answer may have disturbing consequences. For are not people rather like Theseus? As we go through life, the cells in our body continually die and are replaced. Our thoughts too change, so that little of what was in our heads when we were ten years old remains when we are twenty, and these thoughts, memories, convictions and dispositions are in turn replaced as we grow older. Are we then to say that there is no right answer as to whether we are the same people who we were many years ago and that it just depends on what our interest in ourselves is? If the identity of Theseus is not a factual matter, then can there be a fact about the identity of anything that gradually changes over time, human beings included? (Page 49)

Picasso on the beach (Page 51)

Recognising that there is no sharp dividing line between the performative and the plastic may prompt us to reconsider our attitudes towards preservation and restoration. In general, we assume that it is desirable to keep, or restore, pictures so that they are as similar to how they were when they were new. But perhaps we should see the slow deterioration of artworks as an essential part of their performative dimension. (Page 52)

Perhaps we could go further and say that our desire to preserve is a form of denial about our own mortality. The fact that art can endure longer than people has led some to seek a form of proxy immortality through it. (Although Woody Allen famously claimed he did not want immortality through art, but through not dying.) If we accept that art is mortal too, and that nothing is truly permanent, maybe we can see more clearly where the value of art and life is to be found: in experiencing them. (Page 52)

Black, white and red all over (Page 54)

This is what the story of Mary illustrates. As a scientist, Mary knows everything about red in physical terms. Yet there is something she doesn’t know: what it looks like. No scientific account of the world can give her this knowledge. Science is objective, experimental, quantitative; sense experience – indeed all mental experience – is subjective, experiential and qualitative. What this seems to show is that no physical description of the world, however complete, can capture what goes on in our minds. As philosophers put it, the mental is irreducible to the physical. (Page 55)

Bank error in your favour (Page 57)

Richard’s thought that the bank could well afford the loss is also spurious, for if that justifies his actions then it also justifies shoplifting. Shops are also insured and a small theft will barely dent their profits. (Page 58)

The reason why Richard was so easily persuaded by his own arguments is that, like all of us, he is prone to self-serving bias in his thinking. Reasons that justify benefits to ourselves seem more persuasive than those that don’t. It is very difficult to disable this bias and think impartially. After all, why would we want to do that? (Page 58)

Ordinary heroism (Page 60)

Private Kenny’s story seems to be an example of what philosophers call supererogatory behaviour. This is when someone does something good which goes beyond what is demanded of them by morality. (Page 60)

To put it another way, someone will be praised for doing a supererogatory act, but won’t be blamed for not doing it. (Page 60)

Perhaps it is a purely intellectual exercise to worry about whether acts usually considered heroic are supererogatory or simply what morality requires. The fact remains that human nature being what it is, we all know that some acts require extraordinary efforts. Whether such people do more than morality demands or whether the majority of us are moral failures doesn’t change that. (Page 61)

Racing tortoises (Page 63)

There is no simple way out. Solutions actually require quite complex mathematics. And this is perhaps the real lesson of the tortoise race: armchair theorising using basic logic is an unreliable guide to the fundamental nature of the universe. But that in itself is a sobering lesson, because we rely upon basic logic all the time to spot inconsistencies and flaws in argument. It is not logic itself which is at fault: the more complex solutions to paradoxes such as these themselves depend on holding the laws of logic firm. The difficulty is rather with applying it. (Page 64)

The torture option (Page 66)

The argument is a challenging one for defenders of human rights, who have tended to see all torture as indefensible. To maintain their position, they can adopt one of two strategies. The first is to insist that the torture is in principle wrong. Even if it would save thousands of lives, there are some moral lines that cannot be crossed. There is an arguable case for this position, but the charge of indifference to the lives of those left to die as a result is hard to shake. (Page 67)

Rationality demands (Page 69)

If you believe that reason always demands what is right, then it may just be that, contrary to appearances, the bombing is right, not that the argument is wrong. To assume the argument is wrong is already to elevate an intuitive conviction over the dictates of reason. (Page 70)

Reason is, and ought only to be, the slave of the passions.’ If reason is isolated from feeling, we should not assume that it will always lead us to good. (Page 70)

Even if this view is too pessimistic and it is never rational to do evil, the problem we still face is that we can never be sure we are being perfectly rational. To those who saw the reason in Stalinism and Maoism, the logic did not seem flawed at all. Sophia is bright, but how can she tell whether reason really does demand she place the bomb or whether she has simply failed to spot the flaw in the argument? It is one thing to believe in the sovereignty of reason. It is quite another to believe in the power of human beings always to be able to recognise what that sovereign demands. (Page 70)

Bursting the soap bubble (Page 72)

This raises the question of what the real-world counterpart of St Hilda Hogden House is. We do not generally isolate ourselves with bricks and mortar, but we do confine the ranges of our experience in many subtler ways. If you only ever read one newspaper, you are severely limiting the intellectual space which you inhabit. If you only ever discuss politics with people who share your broad opinions, you are erecting another metaphorical fence around your own little world. If you never try to see the world from another’s point of view, let alone walk a mile in their bare feet, you are again refusing to look beyond the walls of the small, comfortable world you have constructed for yourself. (Page 73)

Perhaps the greatest difficulty we face in this regard is spotting the Kenneth within. How do we distinguish between the deluded fools who have mad worldviews and those who have genuinely discovered an unseen dimension of life that has eluded us? We can’t give everyone who believes they have accessed hidden truths the benefit of the doubt. For one thing, since they all claim contradictory things, they can’t all be right. But if we dismiss them all too readily, we risk being like the naive, foolish Weatherfieldians, fated to accept a life of illusion instead of one of reality. (Page 73)

Condemned to life (Page 75)

The tragedy of human life, it is often thought, is that our mortality means that death is the only thing that we know for sure awaits us. The story of Vitalia turns this conventional wisdom on its head and suggests that immortality would be a curse. We need death to give shape and meaning to life. Without it, we would find life pointless. On this view, if hell is eternal damnation, the eternity of life in Hades would be enough to make it a place of punishment. (Page 75)

It is harder to admit that we are responsible for how we use the time allocated to us. Perhaps we should stop thinking ‘if only I had more time’ and think instead ‘if only I made better use of the time I’ve got’. (Page 76)

Land of the Epiphens (Page 78)

Indeed, if you think about thinking, there does seem to be something almost involuntary about it. Solutions ‘come to us’, for example, not we to them. Reflect on what it really feels like to think, and the idea that it is a byproduct of a process you are not conscious of may not seem quite so fanciful. (Page 79)

Duties done (Page 100)

The context may be mundane, but the issue in moral theory it addresses is important. Do not be misled by the genteel scenario. The question is: at what point can we say we have discharged our moral responsibilities? It applies not only to sending news to parents, but to cancelling orders for nuclear attack. (Page 100)

The idea of what is reasonable to expect is crucial here. If we were talking about an order to cancel a nuclear attack, then our expectation of the checks and extra measures that should be taken would be much higher. The extent to which we are required to make sure the desired outcome actually happens thus varies according to the seriousness of the outcome. It’s OK to just forget to set the video recorder. Just forgetting to call off the troops is inexcusable. (Page 101)

The problem of the holiday letter touches on one of the most fundamental issues in moral philosophy: the link between agents, actions and their consequences. What this thought experiment suggests is that ethical reasoning cannot focus on just one of these aspects. If ethics is all about consequences, then we have the absurdity that even someone like Sue, who does all she can, still does wrong if her actions do not turn out right. If ethics does not concern itself with consequences at all, however, we have a different absurdity, for how can it not matter what actually happens as the result of our actions? (Page 101)

The free-speech booth (Page 123)

Such a view has the merits of simplicity and consistency, but it is surely also plain simple-minded. The problem is that defenders of absolute freedom of speech appear to uphold the ‘sticks and stones’ theory of language. Words can always be ignored, so we need not fear people saying false or abusive things. But this is not true. When someone shouts ‘Fire!’ in a crowded theatre, a performance is disrupted, distress caused, and sometimes injury or even death results in the panic that follows. False allegations can ruin lives. The prevalence of racist or sexist abuse can blight the lives of those who have to put up with it. (Page 124)