Summary

Toshi Yoshihara discusses the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) and People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) strategic DNA, emphasizing political warfare and subversion.

The conversation focuses on the “peaceful liberation” of Beijing in 1949 as a case study, highlighting the CCP’s tactics of infiltration, subversion, and manipulation of personal relationships.

Key tactics included isolating Beijing, demonstrating the futility of resistance, and activating an underground network of communist sympathizers and double agents.

A notable aspect was the involvement of General Fu Zui’s daughter, who was a CCP member, in persuading her father to surrender the city.

The CCP’s United Front tactics, dating back to the 1920s, involved undermining nationalist organizations by befriending leaders and grooming double agents.

The CCP exploited familial ties and human weaknesses to manipulate individuals and achieve their objectives.

Mao Zedong considered the “Beijing method” a model applicable to other areas of nationalist resistance.

The PLA continues to study and celebrate the liberation of Beijing as a paragon of good operational practice.

The conversation shifts to present-day concerns regarding Taiwan, highlighting the risk of coercion and subversion.

The PLA’s development of capabilities points toward both invasion and coercion scenarios.

Subversion poses unique challenges due to its subtle indicators and the difficulty in distinguishing genuine political shifts from coercive operations.

There are concerns about retired and active-duty Taiwanese military officers pledging allegiance to the mainland or working with Chinese intelligence agencies.

The shifting balance of power and skepticism in American politics create a psychological situation where Taiwanese individuals may start making accommodations.

The CCP may attempt to induce a “reverse Zelensky effect,” creating confusion and doubt about the Taiwanese willingness to fight for themselves.

Awareness of the CCP’s subversive strategies is crucial to avoid surprise and undue pessimism.

Content

Toshi Yoshihara, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments and author of ⁠Mao’s Army Goes to Sea: The Island Campaigns and the Founding of China’s Navy⁠, joins the show to discuss how the PLA took Beijing in 1949 by subversion, and how they may yet seize Taiwan.
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Times
    •      01:53 Introduction
    •      03:24 Peaceful liberation
    •      07:19 Planning and preparation
    •      10:36 Isolation
    •      17:30 A tradition of manipulation
    •      23:51 True believers
    •      28:23 Helpless
    •      34:55 Political warfare
    •      41:53 Surprise
    •      47:32 Holy Grail
    •      50:51 Fault lines
    •      57:44 What to read?

Summary

Strategic DNA: Subversion as a Way of War

Enduring doctrine. From its founding, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) treated united front work, infiltration, and political warfare as core tools—used alongside conventional force, not just as a stopgap when weak.
Continuity over a century. CCP leaders such as Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping began their careers in clandestine “enemy work,” cultivating agents, planting cadres inside rival institutions, and manipulating personal networks. This craft became institutional memory the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) studies and celebrates.

Case Study—Beijing, 1949 (“Peaceful Liberation”)

Campaign setting. The fall of Beijing occurred within the Pingjin Campaign, one of the PLA’s “three great campaigns” (with Liaoshen and Huaihai) that sealed Nationalist defeat and opened the road south.
Operational method (“Beijing method”).
1. Isolation: Cut rail lines and surround nearby Nationalist garrisons to sever reinforcement and relief.
2. Demonstrations of force: Seize nearby cities and destroy outlying units to dramatize the futility of resistance.
3. Subversion at the top: Under Marshal Nie Rongzhen, the CCP activated a large underground: sympathizers, double agents, and “fifth-column” operatives inside the city and inside the commander’s inner circle.
  - The Nationalist garrison commander (General Fu) was targeted through familial and mentor ties; his daughter—a committed CCP member married to a CCP agent—was inserted to assess his psychology and press surrender; a former teacher and compromised deputies reinforced the pressure.
Outcome and significance. Fu surrendered ~250,000 troops and the city largely intact, boosting CCP prestige and setting a template for future operations. The PLA teaches this case as exemplary political-military integration—subversion as decisive enabler of maneuver.

Why It Worked (and Why It Matters Today)

Human-centric targeting. The CCP excelled at reading personal motives, exploiting loyalties (family/teacher-student), and mixing inducements, threats, and blackmail.
True-believer networks. Many agents were long-cultivated “sleepers” who rose through Nationalist ranks over decades, activated when conditions ripened.
Not just for the weak. Even when strong (e.g., late-war Huaihai), the PLA still tried to subvert opponents—it’s how they make war, not only when they lack firepower.

From 1949 to Taiwan Now: “Conquering by Other Means”

Coercion and invasion are complementary. Contemporary PLA modernization builds amphibious/strike capabilities and expands non-kinetic options (coercion, subversion, political warfare). Beijing can sequence or combine these, switching from coercion to force—or vice versa—based on opportunity.
Why political warfare is attractive now.
- Escalation risk management: Subversion can move the status quo without inviting immediate vertical escalation.
- Ambiguity and surprise: Indicators of subversion (bribery, blackmail, assassinations, sabotage, persuasion of key elites) are opaque and often look episodic, denying Washington clean decision points.
- Reverse-Zelensky effect: The objective is to erode U.S. will by making Taiwan appear divided, hesitant, or unwilling to fight—prompting the question in Washington, “If they won’t fight, why should we?”
- Exploit U.S. policy boundaries: If a legitimate Taiwan leader appears to invite negotiations or “peaceful” political integration under pressure, it complicates any U.S. casus to intervene under the One China policy framework.

Present-Day Fault Lines and Tactics Regarding Taiwan

Elite penetration risks. Recurrent cases of retired and active Taiwanese officers implicated in PRC intelligence work indicate persistent targeting of the coercion-from-within pathway (e.g., alleged plots to form assassination/sabotage cells).
Political fragmentation. United Front work cultivates parties, business figures, media, and local networks to shape incentives and narrow Taiwan’s perceived choices.
Psychological shaping. China’s growing nuclear and conventional power underwrites a narrative that U.S. intervention will be too costly/uncertain, encouraging Taiwanese hedging and accommodation.
The “holy grail” scenario. If Beijing can engineer a situation where Taiwan’s top leadership publicly asks the U.S. not to intervene—or appears to accept political terms—Beijing gains a potent legitimacy shield without firing (many) shots.

Implications for the U.S. and Allies

Broaden the aperture. Planning that focuses mainly on invasion misses the subversion fight already underway. Indicators and warning for political warfare must center on elite capture, command-and-control integrity, media/information manipulation, and coercion of families/networks.
Resilience first. Help Taiwan harden institutions, parties, military promotions, and vetting, plus counter-influence transparency (money flows, media ownership, front organizations).
Guard against defeatism. Recognize the playbook to avoid being whipsawed by engineered confusion or sudden collapses that look organic but reflect prior subversion.

Ep 237: Toshi Yoshihara on China’s Subversive Strategies