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Cuba Put on US State Sponsors of Terrorism List

The basic answer is that the U.S. has put Cuba on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list for two different eras of conduct:

Originally in 1982, because the Reagan administration said Cuba had repeatedly supported armed insurgencies and groups in Latin America that used terrorism.
Again in 2021, because the Trump administration said Cuba was giving safe haven to wanted terrorists and fugitives, especially members of Colombia’s ELN and several U.S. fugitives tied to violent or terrorism-related crimes. Cuba was removed in 2015 under Obama after the U.S. certified that Cuba had not supported international terrorism in the previous six months and had given assurances it would not do so in the future.
A careful distinction matters here: the U.S. legal standard is not only “did the state itself bomb civilians,” but whether it has “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism” or given shelter, aid, logistics, training, or sanctuary to groups or individuals involved in terrorism. The allegations against Cuba are therefore mostly about support, training, arms transfers, sanctuary, and harboring fugitives, not usually about Cuba itself directly carrying out spectacular international terror attacks in the way people think of al-Qaeda or ISIS.
Here are the main periods and examples the U.S. has relied on.
1. The original 1982 designation
CRS summarizes that Cuba was first added in 1982 because U.S. reports and statements alleged Cuban ties to international terrorism and support for terrorist groups in Latin America. A CRS report quotes earlier U.S. assessments saying Havana supported armed revolution in Latin America and provided “training, arms, safe havens, and advice” to guerrilla groups, many of which engaged in terrorist operations.
Specific examples cited by U.S. sources for that era include:

M-19 in Colombia: the State Department and later CRS said Cuba supported or trained M-19 guerrillas; U.S. officials also alleged Cuba helped provide arms to M-19.
FALN: a Puerto Rican nationalist group that carried out bombings in the United States; CRS says the State Department later cited Cuban support for FALN as part of the original rationale.
FMLN in El Salvador: cited by the State Department as one of the groups Cuba was supporting around the time of the 1982 designation.
FSLN/Sandinistas in Nicaragua: also cited by the State Department as part of the original rationale, including helping move Soviet arms for use by insurgent organizations.
Broader support for insurgencies in Central America, Angola, and Ethiopia was also cited in U.S. explanations.
So, if you ask, “What did the U.S. say Cuba had done?” the answer for the early period is: train, arm, advise, finance, shelter, and facilitate movements of insurgent groups that used terrorism.
2. The later rationale for keeping Cuba on the list before 2015
By the 2000s, the case had shifted away from “Cuba is exporting revolution across Latin America” and toward “Cuba still provides safe haven and limited support.” CRS says the U.S. rationale then included:
safe haven for some ETA members from Spain,
safe haven and some degree of support for members of FARC and ELN from Colombia,
and harboring more than 70 U.S. fugitives on the island, including Joanne Chesimard / Assata Shakur.
That is one reason critics argued Cuba’s continued presence on the list had become a Cold War holdover, while supporters argued harboring terrorists and violent fugitives was enough by itself to justify keeping it there. The CRS report explicitly presents both sides of that debate.
3. Why Cuba was removed in 2015
Obama’s administration reviewed the designation and concluded Cuba met the legal criteria for rescission. The White House said the U.S. certified to Congress that Cuba had not provided support for international terrorism during the previous six months and had provided assurances it would not support such acts in the future.
That does not mean the U.S. suddenly approved of the Cuban regime generally. It means the administration said Cuba no longer met the specific statutory standard for being on the terrorism list at that time.
4. Why Cuba was put back on in 2021
In January 2021, the Trump administration redesignated Cuba. The reason given was that Cuba had “repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism” by granting safe harbor to terrorists. Reuters reported that the administration specifically pointed to Cuba’s harboring of U.S. fugitives and Colombian rebel leaders. State Department material from the 2021 terrorism report says the redesignation was based on Cuba’s granting safe harbor to terrorists, including refusing to return certain fugitives and continuing to host members of the ELN after a 2019 Bogotá bombing and after Colombia requested extradition.
The most cited modern examples are:
ELN leaders in Cuba after the ELN’s 2019 Bogotá police academy bombing, which killed 22 cadets. The U.S. position was that Cuba should have returned them when Colombia requested it.
Assata Shakur / Joanne Chesimard and other U.S. fugitives living in Cuba, some tied to violent or terrorism-related offenses.
So the modern rationale is less “Cuba is funding global terror networks” and more “Cuba is harboring people and organizations involved in terrorism or terrorist violence.”
Did Cuba itself commit terrorist attacks?
The U.S. case is generally not centered on recent direct Cuban state terrorist attacks. It is centered on:
historic support for insurgent and militant groups that used terrorism,
later safe haven for members of designated groups,
and refusal to extradite certain wanted fugitives.
The strongest historical examples the U.S. has cited
If you want the shortest list of the main examples the U.S. has relied on over time, it would be:
M-19 in Colombia: training and arms allegations.
FALN: cited as part of the original rationale.
FMLN in El Salvador: cited as part of the original rationale.
FSLN/Sandinistas in Nicaragua: arms-transshipment/support allegations.
FARC and ELN in Colombia: later safe haven / limited support allegations.
ETA members in Cuba: safe haven allegations.
U.S. fugitives such as Assata Shakur: long-running safe haven issue.
Bottom line
The U.S. has listed Cuba not mainly because Cuba was accused of acting like al-Qaeda, but because Washington has argued that Cuba has, at different times, supported, trained, armed, sheltered, or refused to surrender groups and individuals involved in terrorism. The strongest historical U.S. case is the 1960s-1980s support for leftist insurgencies in Latin America; the strongest modern case is safe haven for ELN figures and U.S. fugitives. Whether that amounts to a fair or politically motivated designation is heavily disputed, but that is the core of the U.S. rationale.
If you want, I can turn this into a clean timeline with dates, groups, and what exactly the U.S. alleged in each period.

Cuba spies

You can’t really get “all the times” in a literal sense, because many espionage operations stay classified or were never publicly proven. What we can do is list the major publicly established cases and operations in which Cuba was caught spying on the United States or running intelligence activity against U.S. targets. U.S. government sources describe Cuba as having run a long-term intelligence effort against the U.S., including human espionage inside the U.S. government and broader intelligence collection from Cuban territory.
Here are the main publicly documented cases.
1. Ana Belén Montes — Defense Intelligence Agency
Montes was a senior DIA analyst and one of the most damaging Cuban spies caught inside the U.S. government. The FBI says she was recruited by Cuban intelligence in 1984, entered DIA in 1985, and passed classified U.S. military information to Cuba until her arrest on September 21, 2001. She pleaded guilty in 2002.
2. Marta Rita Velázquez — alleged recruiter/facilitator for Cuban intelligence
The Justice Department unsealed an indictment in 2013 alleging that Velázquez helped Cuban intelligence recruit Ana Montes, introduced her to a Cuban intelligence officer in 1984, accompanied her to Cuba for tradecraft training, and helped her obtain a job at DIA. This was a charged case, not a conviction reported in the source I found, and Velázquez remained outside the U.S. when DOJ announced it.
3. Walter Kendall Myers and Gwendolyn Myers — State Department
DOJ says Kendall Myers and his wife worked as clandestine agents of the Cuban Intelligence Service for nearly 30 years. Kendall Myers held a Top Secret clearance at the State Department; according to DOJ, the couple received encrypted shortwave messages from Cuba, met handlers abroad, and passed U.S. information to Cuban intelligence. Both pleaded guilty in 2009; Kendall received a life sentence and Gwendolyn received a prison term of 81 months.
4. Victor Manuel Rocha — former ambassador and National Security Council official
In 2024, DOJ said Rocha admitted that he had secretly acted for decades as an agent of the Cuban government. Rocha had served in senior diplomatic posts, including on the National Security Council and as ambassador to Bolivia. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced in April 2024 to 15 years in prison.
5. The Cuban Five / Wasp Network
This was a major Cuban spy network dismantled in the United States in the late 1990s. DOJ court filings say the network penetrated anti-Castro exile organizations in Florida, including Brothers to the Rescue, and gathered intelligence for Cuba. An FBI publication described the case as involving five Cuban agents convicted in Miami and called it the largest spy ring then known to have been dismantled in U.S. history; DOJ’s Supreme Court filing says the network targeted Brothers to the Rescue and other exile groups.
6. Carlos Alvarez — Florida International University professor
A DOJ national security summary says Carlos Alvarez admitted in a 2006 guilty plea that he had worked for nearly 30 years in the United States as a covert intelligence agent for Cuba, including gathering information on the Cuban exile community. He was sentenced to 60 months in prison.
Beyond named spy prosecutions, U.S. historical records also describe a broader Cuban intelligence presence. A 1974 interagency memorandum in the State Department historical series says Cuban intelligence officers in Latin America were “focused primarily on espionage” even as Havana reduced direct support for armed subversion.
There is also the Lourdes signals intelligence facility in Cuba, which U.S. official historical material described as a major intelligence collection site aimed at U.S. military installations and sensitive activities. That was not just a single “spy case” but a long-running intelligence collection platform on Cuban soil used against the U.S. during the Cold War.
So the best concise answer is:

Yes, Cuba has repeatedly been caught spying on the U.S.
The biggest publicly established cases include Ana Montes, the Myers couple, Victor Rocha, Carlos Alvarez, and the Cuban Five/Wasp Network.
In addition to those cases, U.S. records describe a broader pattern of Cuban espionage and signals intelligence collection, not just isolated spies.
If you want, I can turn this into a chronological timeline with dates, who they were, what positions they held, and what each was accused or convicted of passing to Cuba.

Chinese spying from Cuba

Here’s the clearest way to think about it:

Bottom line

There is good evidence that Cuba hosts signals-intelligence sites that are useful for spying on the United States, and U.S. officials have said China has had intelligence-collection access in Cuba since at least 2019. What is less certain in public evidence is the exact ownership and command relationship of each site: some appear to be Cuban facilities that China likely accesses or benefits from, while others are described by analysts as sites most likely supporting China’s collection efforts rather than publicly proven, fully Chinese-run bases.

What is actually established

The strongest publicly grounded points are these:

In June 2023, the White House said the U.S. had raised concerns with Havana about Cuba hosting Chinese spy operations on its territory.
U.S. officials also said in 2023 that China had been spying from Cuba for some time, and Reuters reported that the alleged effort involved an electronic eavesdropping facility roughly 100 miles from Florida.
Secretary of State Antony Blinken said the U.S. would have “deep concerns” about PRC intelligence or military activities in Cuba.
The 2024 U.S. Intelligence Community Annual Threat Assessment said China is pursuing overseas military access and listed Cuba among the places where Beijing is reportedly considering facilities. The report does not itself say “China definitely operates a spy base in Cuba,” but it does place Cuba inside China’s broader overseas basing ambitions.

What the installations appear to be

Open-source analysis from CSIS says four Cuban sites are the ones most likely supporting China’s intelligence collection against the U.S. These are not all equally certain as “Chinese-run,” but they are the core set that analysts focus on.

1. Bejucal

Bejucal, near Havana, is described by CSIS as the largest active Cuban SIGINT site it reviewed. CSIS says it has long been suspected of ties to Chinese intelligence and that it has undergone observable upgrades in recent years. Reuters also said Bejucal had seen “major updates” and linked it to suspected Chinese intelligence activity.
Why it matters:

It is well placed to monitor activity across the southeastern United States and the Caribbean.
CSIS says equipment there may be able to observe rocket launches from Cape Canaveral and Kennedy Space Center, and more broadly help characterize U.S. military exercises, missile tests, and submarine activity.

2. Wajay

Wajay is a smaller site near Bejucal. CSIS says it has security fencing, guard posts, and a growing antenna complex, suggesting a sensitive SIGINT role. CSIS is more cautious here: it says rumors that China helped build or modernize it are unsubstantiated.
Why it matters:

CSIS assesses it is likely focused on terrestrial signal interception and transmission, meaning radio and other line-of-sight or ground-based communications rather than satellite dishes.

3. Calabazar

Calabazar, also on Havana’s outskirts, has numerous dish antennas and other equipment that CSIS says bear the hallmarks of SIGINT operations. CSIS is careful here too: it says Calabazar was not identified in publicly available records as having ties with China, but it still appears to be part of Cuba’s broader intelligence-collection system.
Why it matters:

CSIS notes the growth of space-monitoring equipment at Calabazar and Bejucal, which is notable because Cuba lacks its own meaningful satellite program. That makes outside-facing collection the more plausible explanation.

4. El Salao

El Salao, near Santiago de Cuba, is the newest and in some ways the most strategically interesting site. CSIS says satellite imagery shows a new CDAA under construction since 2021, and Reuters reported that CSIS assessed it as likely capable of monitoring the nearby U.S. naval base at Guantánamo Bay.
Why it matters:

A CDAA is mainly used for high-frequency direction finding, which means locating the origin of radio transmissions.
CSIS says that once complete, El Salao would likely be able to monitor U.S. Navy and partner activity in the Caribbean and gather metadata-like intelligence from radio traffic near Guantánamo.
Reuters noted the site’s projected range could extend thousands of nautical miles, depending on final configuration.

So what can these sites actually do?

The main value is probably signals intelligence, not dramatic “movie-style” spying. In practice that means they could help collect:

radio transmissions and communications metadata,
radar and electronic emissions,
telemetry and tracking data related to launches and tests,
patterns of U.S. military movement, tempo, and exercises.
That matters because even when communications are encrypted, the frequency, origin, direction, timing, and volume of transmissions can still reveal a lot about operations. CSIS explicitly makes that point.

The key nuance

The public record does not prove every site is a wholly Chinese-owned base with PLA flags flying over it. The more careful formulation is:

Cuba clearly has a mature SIGINT infrastructure.
U.S. officials say China has had intelligence-collection access in Cuba since at least 2019.
Open-source analysts identify several Cuban sites as the most likely locations supporting Chinese collection against the U.S.
But the exact operational arrangement at each site remains partly opaque in public evidence.

What China and Cuba say

Both Beijing and Havana have denied the accusations. Reuters reported Cuban officials rejected the idea of Chinese military facilities on the island, and Chinese officials called the spying allegations slander.

Plain-English conclusion

The best current understanding is that China likely benefits from, has access to, or is helping upgrade parts of Cuba’s intelligence-collection network, especially sites that can monitor the southeastern U.S., Florida launch facilities, Caribbean naval activity, and Guantánamo. The strongest open-source case centers on Bejucal and the newer El Salao site, while Wajay and Calabazar look like part of the same broader collection architecture but are less clearly tied to China in public evidence.

Citation list

Reuters, “White House: US shared concerns with Cuba about hosting China spy base.”
Reuters, “China has been spying from Cuba for some time, U.S. official says.”
Reuters, “Does a Cuba base host a Chinese spy station? US thinks so.”
Reuters, “US would have ‘deep concerns’ about China military activities in Cuba, Blinken says.”
Reuters, “New Cuban radar site near US military base could aid China spying, think tank says.”
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community (2024), section noting Cuba among places where China is reportedly considering overseas facilities.
CSIS, “China’s Intelligence Footprint in Cuba: New Evidence and Implications for U.S. Security.”
CSIS, “Secret Signals: Decoding China’s Intelligence Activities in Cuba.”
I can also turn this into a one-page table with columns for site, location, likely function, evidence level, and why it matters to the U.S.

Embargo not the reason for Cuba’s economic decline (obviously)

The most accurate answer is: both are true. The embargo and Cuba’s place on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list materially hurt Cuba’s economy, but Cuba also has a long record of self-inflicted economic weakness from central planning, state domination, bad incentives, policy reversals, and chronic mismanagement. The claim that Cuba is “in shambles only because of the embargo” is too simple, and the claim that “the embargo barely matters” is also false.
The U.S. embargo mainly works by restricting U.S. persons and firms from dealing with Cuba or Cuban state-linked interests unless an exception or license applies. That does not mean Cuba is cut off from the whole world. Cuba still trades with many countries, and it still imports significant goods from the United States under exceptions, especially food and agricultural products. USDA says U.S. agricultural exports to Cuba were about $430.29 million in 2024, and State Department material says the United States remains a major supplier of food and agricultural products to Cuba. OEC’s 2024 trade data also shows Cuba continues to trade with non-U.S. partners.
So the embargo does not mean “Cuba cannot trade with other countries.” What it does mean is that trade and finance involving Cuba become more expensive, riskier, and more cumbersome, especially wherever the U.S. financial system, U.S. shipping routes, U.S. compliance risk, or dollar transactions are involved. A major example is the 180-day rule: a vessel that enters Cuba to trade or purchase services generally cannot enter a U.S. port to load or unload freight for 180 days afterward unless an exception applies. That rule plainly discourages some shipping activity with Cuba because calling at Cuba can complicate profitable access to U.S. ports.
There are important exceptions, though. OFAC says vessels are not subject to that 180-day penalty in certain circumstances, including some authorized trade and some shipments of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices. That means the U.S. system is restrictive, but not a total maritime quarantine.
Cuba’s return to the State Sponsors of Terrorism list adds another layer of pain. The list carries sanctions such as restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance, a ban on defense exports and sales, tighter controls on dual-use exports, and other financial restrictions. In practice, beyond the formal legal penalties, SSOT status tends to create banking “de-risking”: foreign banks, insurers, and counterparties often decide Cuba is too legally or reputationally risky, which makes payments, letters of credit, correspondent banking, and trade finance harder even when a transaction is theoretically lawful. That is one reason many analysts say the SSOT designation has effects larger than the text of the statute alone.
That is why the embargo and SSOT status can hamper Cuba’s trade with other countries, not just with the United States. The mechanism is usually indirect: foreign firms may still be legally able to trade with Cuba under their own country’s laws, but U.S. sanctions exposure, shipping frictions, financing problems, fear of secondary consequences, and the need to avoid U.S.-linked transactions can raise costs or deter deals. The EU has explicitly said the embargo damages Cuba’s economy and living standards and that trade and foreign investment are important for Cuba’s modernization and growth. The UN General Assembly again voted in 2024 for ending the embargo and expressed concern about its adverse effects.
At the same time, it would be wrong to say Cuba’s economy would otherwise be healthy. Reuters described Cuba’s economy in 2024 as being hurt by a mix of factors including the pandemic, tightened U.S. sanctions, and a state-dominated business model plagued by bureaucracy, mismanagement, and corruption. Reuters also reported that in September 2024 the Cuban government tightened rules on its still-young private sector, with analysts saying the measures would constrain rather than unleash recovery. That is a classic self-inflicted problem: when the private sector becomes a rare bright spot, the state still tends to pull it back under tighter control.
A good recent summary from UCL puts it well: both U.S. sanctions and Cuban policy failures have inflicted economic damage. UCL notes that Cuba’s 2021 currency and price reforms went badly, feeding inflation instead of producing efficient restructuring, and that Cuba’s economy remains below pre-COVID levels with weak exports and high import dependence. That points to deep structural weakness beyond sanctions alone.
The macro picture reinforces that. World Bank data shows Cuba’s GDP growth was -1.1% in 2024, and recent CRS material describes food and medicine shortages and blackouts as part of Cuba’s prolonged crisis. That is not just a short-term sanctions story; it reflects an economy that has struggled for decades to generate productivity, exports, investment, and enough domestic supply.
So, is Cuba’s economy “in shambles due to the embargo”? Partly, yes: the embargo and SSOT status make trade, finance, energy procurement, remittances, and investment harder and can sharply worsen shortages and crises. But is Cuba’s economic decline also rooted in communist policies and long-term state control? Also yes: decades of central planning, weak incentives, price controls, limited private enterprise, currency distortions, bureaucratic control, and policy reversals have left the economy fragile and uncompetitive.
My bottom-line judgment would be this:

“The embargo has hurt Cuba badly” — true.
“SSOT status makes trade and finance harder, including with third countries” — true.
“Cuba cannot trade with other countries because of the embargo” — false. It still trades with many countries and even imports substantial U.S. agricultural goods.
“Cuba’s crisis is only because of the embargo” — false.
“Cuba’s crisis is entirely self-inflicted and the embargo is irrelevant” — also false.
The fairest one-sentence version is: the embargo and SSOT status significantly worsen Cuba’s economy, but Cuba’s long-run stagnation and recurrent collapse are also deeply tied to its own economic model and policy choices.
If you want, I can next give you a side-by-side chart: “What the embargo causes” vs. “What Cuba’s own system causes.”

Here’s a clean side-by-side chart.

Issue	What the embargo / SSOT causes	What Cuba’s own system causes
Trade with the U.S.	Cuba is heavily restricted from normal trade with the United States, though licensed exceptions remain, especially for food and agricultural products.	Even where trade is possible, Cuba’s state system often struggles to produce enough exportable goods, attract investment, or respond flexibly to demand.
Trade with other countries	The embargo does not legally stop all third countries from trading with Cuba, but it raises costs and risk because firms try to avoid U.S. sanctions exposure, dollar clearing problems, shipping complications, and banking compliance issues.	Cuba’s state controls, bureaucracy, unreliable payments, and policy unpredictability also make foreign firms hesitant even apart from U.S. pressure.
Shipping	The 180-day rule can discourage some vessels from serving Cuba because a Cuba port call can complicate later access to U.S. ports, though there are exceptions.	Cuba’s own port inefficiencies, shortages, and state management problems can further reduce the smooth flow of goods.
Banking and finance	SSOT status especially makes banks and insurers wary of Cuba, creating de-risking: lawful transactions may still become hard to finance or process.	Cuba’s weak creditworthiness, low foreign exchange reserves, and state mismanagement also undermine confidence and access to finance.
Food and medicine availability	Sanctions can make importing inputs, financing shipments, and paying suppliers harder, worsening shortages.	Poor domestic production, state agricultural inefficiency, price distortions, and chronic planning failures also contribute heavily to shortages.
Energy and blackouts	Sanctions can complicate fuel purchases, payments, and logistics, worsening energy stress.	Aging infrastructure, underinvestment, weak productivity, and state-sector inefficiency are major internal causes of recurring blackouts.
Private sector growth	Sanctions reduce access to capital, payments systems, equipment, and external commercial partners.	Cuba’s government has repeatedly restricted, reversed, or tightly controlled private enterprise, limiting one of the few possible engines of recovery.
Long-run growth	The embargo acts as a constant drag by limiting market access, finance, and integration with the nearest large economy.	Central planning, weak incentives, currency distortions, policy mistakes, and state domination have produced decades of low productivity and fragility.
Tourism and foreign investment	U.S. restrictions and broader sanctions risk deter some investors and travelers, and SSOT status worsens reputational and compliance concerns.	Cuba’s internal rules, red tape, and unreliable business environment also discourage investment and make recovery harder.
Overall economic crisis	The embargo and SSOT meaningfully worsen Cuba’s crisis.	Cuba’s economic model is also a core cause of its long-term stagnation and repeated crises.

Plain-English takeaway

Claim	Verdict
“Cuba’s economy is in shambles only because of the embargo”	False
“The embargo has badly hurt Cuba”	True
“Cuba can’t trade with other countries because of the embargo”	False
“SSOT makes third-country trade and banking harder”	True
“Cuba’s own communist/state-controlled system has also caused long-term decline”	True

Best one-sentence summary

The embargo and SSOT status significantly worsen Cuba’s economy, but Cuba’s long-running decline is also deeply rooted in its own economic system, policy failures, and state control.
Paste-friendly citation list for Obsidian:

UCL comment on Cuba’s economic crisis: https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/2024/jan/comment-economic-crisis-cuba-government-missteps-and-tightening-us-sanctions-are-blame
USDA Cuba trade page: https://fas2.stg.platform.usda.gov/regions/cuba
OFAC FAQ on 180-day vessel rule: https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/779
OFAC Cuba sanctions FAQs topic page: https://ofac.treasury.gov/faqs/topic/1541
U.S. State Department, State Sponsors of Terrorism: https://www.state.gov/state-sponsors-of-terrorism
EU explanation of vote on U.S. embargo against Cuba: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-explanation-vote-united-nations-general-assembly-resolution-embargo-imposed-usa-against_en
World Bank data for Cuba: https://data.worldbank.org/?locations=1W-CU
Reuters on Cuba’s 2024 economic measures and crisis: https://www.reuters.com/markets/cuba-announces-new-measures-war-time-economy-amid-growing-crisis-2024-07-01/
I can also remake this as a more argumentative chart with columns for “anti-embargo argument,” “anti-communist argument,” and “what the evidence actually supports.”

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