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From the notebook

Hamas

⬅️ Key Arguments (MOC) · Related: Iran & the Axis of Resistance · Gaza · Polls · Genocide · Radicalization · Blockade in Gaza

One-line rebuttal

Hamas is a theocratic armed organization with an eliminationist founding charter and a record of deliberately attacking civilians. It has operated from civilian areas and has repeatedly treated a ceasefire or Palestinian state as conditional rather than a final settlement. Those facts establish Hamas’s agency and serious obstacles to peace; they do not remove Israel’s independent duties under IHL.

Core points

  1. Their own words. The charter and leaders’ statements are openly eliminationist (quotes & charters below). → Hamas in Its Own Words
  2. Human shields and civilian-area operations. The UN verified one Hamas commander’s use of a hostage as a shield and has recorded serious co-location and civilian-site concerns, while often declining to verify broader blanket claims. → Human Shields - UN and Human Rights Findings · REF - Hamas Use of Civilian Areas
  3. Program and governance matter. Calling Hamas “resistance” does not erase its Islamist program, repression of dissent and LGBT people, restrictions on women, attacks on civilians, or authoritarian rule. Explanation is not exoneration.
  4. Rejectionism. Refuses unilateral withdrawal; wants the war to continue. → hamas_hostage_deals_israel_rejections_fact_check · Peace Offers
  5. Support is substantial but measure-dependent. Early post-October 7 approval of Hamas’s decision was high, while current party identification is a minority and varies sharply by question, date, and territory. Do not turn approval of an operation into “all Palestinians support Hamas.” → Polls > Palestinian Polling After October 7
  6. Foreign operations and anti-Jewish target selection. A September 2026 German federal indictment alleges that Hamas planned murder attacks in Germany or Austria against Israeli representatives, people of Jewish faith, or pro-Israel persons. If proven, the inclusion of Jews as Jews is direct evidence of antisemitic targeting beyond the Israeli-Palestinian battlefield. → Alleged Hamas foreign-operations plot in Europe — Haniyeh bodyguard report and German indictment

Pinker — organization-specific relevance

Pinker explicitly names Hamas when discussing a radical Islamist fringe that converts collective humiliation, sacred values, honor, and enemy demonization into moral permission for violence. That supports examining Hamas’s ideology alongside occupation, blockade, and strategic incentives. Pinker also rejects a Muslim monolith and records changing attitudes toward violence; the passage cannot establish collective Palestinian guilt, current levels of Hamas support, or any exemption from Israel’s legal duties. → debate card · source passage

War-room interview — strategic agency and funding

Early rejectionism and Oslo-era spoiler violence

Hamas entered the Oslo years as an institutional rejectionist. Its 1988 Covenant called for Israel’s elimination, treated all Palestine as an Islamic endowment, and rejected negotiated peace initiatives; its antisemitic conspiracy claims should be named separately from opposition to Zionism. Hamas then opposed the 1993 Israel–PLO mutual-recognition framework rather than joining it.

The later record requires equal precision. Hamas’s hudna proposals, electoral participation, and 2017 acceptance of a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines as a “formula of national consensus” represent meaningful strategic or programmatic flexibility. They did not amount to recognition of Israel or acceptance of two states as a final end-state: the same document rejects the legitimacy of the “Zionist entity,” retains the claim to all Palestine, and endorses armed resistance. Whether the change reflects tactical adaptation, partial ideological evolution, or internal factional compromise requires evidence beyond the documents themselves. See Hamas Charters.

Attacks during negotiations and implementation

PeriodConduct and immediate settingWhat can safely be inferred
April 1994Hamas claimed the Afula and Hadera bombings after Baruch Goldstein’s Hebron massacre, during implementation of the Gaza–Jericho agreement.Retaliation was explicit; the attacks also struck the peace process, but negotiations continued.
July–August 1995Hamas attacks at Ramat Gan and Jerusalem targeted civilians while Oslo II was being negotiated.Anti-Oslo institutional policy and civilian targeting are clear; a senior political order must be proven attack by attack.
February–March 1996A four-attack wave followed Israel’s killing of Hamas bombmaker Yahya Ayyash and occurred before Israel’s close election.Revenge and spoiling can both be true. The wave badly damaged Peres and the peace camp and plausibly contributed materially to Netanyahu’s narrow victory; it did not alone determine the result.
1997Jerusalem attacks hit an already deteriorating process.They further weakened confidence, but settlements, closures, implementation disputes, and Israeli policy were also active causes.

Research on strategic terrorism identifies spoiling—violence intended to undermine a peace agreement by destroying trust—and outbidding among rival organizations as mechanisms relevant to Hamas. The framework fits Hamas’s anti-Oslo program and the political effects of its attacks, but it cannot substitute for attack-specific evidence of motive or command. Kydd and Walter, “The Strategies of Terrorism” · Bueno de Mesquita, “Conciliation, Counterterrorism, and Patterns of Terrorist Violence”

Bottom line

Hamas was a consequential spoiler of Oslo. Its deliberately anti-civilian attacks weakened confidence in the process and plausibly helped defeat Peres in 1996. That establishes independent Palestinian organizational agency and rebuts a literally Israel-only explanation. It does not show that every attack had one motive, that the Political Bureau ordered every bombing, that Hamas alone caused Oslo’s collapse, or that Palestinians collectively bear Hamas’s responsibility. Rabin’s assassination by an Israeli extremist, settlement expansion, closures, delayed implementation, Israeli rejectionism, and later governmental obstruction remain part of the causal record. → peace-process synthesis

Ending Hamas requires more than battlefield attrition

The Matau–LightBulb debate cites RAND’s comparative study but misstates its denominator. RAND examined 648 terrorist groups active from 1968 to 2006. Among the 268 groups whose endings could be determined, 43% entered politics, 40% were ended principally through policing or intelligence, 10% achieved victory, and only 7% were ended by military force. Large and religiously motivated organizations were especially difficult to end. RAND full report · research brief.

Strategic implication—not a Hamas-specific prediction

Military force may be necessary to stop attacks and degrade Hamas’s capacity, but it is not a complete theory of victory. A durable anti-Hamas strategy combines border defense, intelligence and policing, disruption of finance and command, hostage recovery, protection of civilians, legitimate Palestinian alternatives, and a postwar political order that reduces Hamas’s recruitment advantage. RAND does not prove Hamas will negotiate or disappear; it shows why “kill enough fighters” is historically an incomplete strategy.

LonerBox–Jay Shapiro: resistance language does not determine the program

In the 15 September 2026 debate, Jay frames Hamas as a condemnable but historically intelligible resistance movement produced by domination. LonerBox’s reply is that the moral category “resistance” cannot answer what Hamas seeks, whom it targets, or whether its proposed Palestinian state is a final settlement.

Strongest counter-Hamas formulation

“Oppression can explain why an armed movement recruits; it cannot tell us whether the movement’s actual program is emancipatory. Read its documents, dated proposals, targets, governing choices, and expected political end-state.”

The argument has three stages:

  1. Separate the general Palestinian right to resist occupation from Hamas’s specific Islamist program.
  2. Treat October 7 as an operation whose civilian targeting, hostage-taking, anticipated Israeli response, and political consequences require independent moral evaluation.
  3. Ask how the strategy increased Palestinian freedom rather than assuming that international isolation of Israel equals liberation.

The source note also preserves the limits: Hamas may have had multiple motives; Palestinians are not Hamas; blockade and occupation constrain Gaza; and Hamas wrongdoing cannot legalize disproportionate Israeli attacks. → full argument and evidence ledger

Alleged Hamas foreign-operations plot in Europe — Haniyeh bodyguard report and German indictment

Bottom line

German prosecutors allege that Hamas moved from maintaining logistical and weapons infrastructure in Europe to preparing a concrete murder attack in Germany or Austria for the second anniversary of October 7. The alleged targets included not only Israeli representatives and pro-Israel people but people of Jewish faith. If the indictment’s facts are proven, that target category is operational evidence of antisemitic terrorism abroad: Jewish identity itself, outside Israel and apart from military status, made people potential targets.

The Haniyeh-bodyguard report

On 27 September 2026, the Jerusalem Post and Times of Israel, citing a Sunday Times investigation, reported that a British citizen referred to in the United Kingdom as “Mr. X” had previously served on Ismail Haniyeh’s personal security detail in Gaza. The reports identify him with the separately prosecuted Mohammed A., who was arrested in London in November 2025 on a German warrant. They say he later received British asylum and citizenship and became a central figure in the European plot. Jerusalem Post report · Times of Israel report

This biographical link is press reporting, not a fact stated in the German prosecutor’s public releases. British reporting restrictions also limited publication of the suspect’s identity while parallel proceedings remained active. The official filings independently establish the existence of the German case and identify a Mohammed A., but they do not themselves say that he guarded Haniyeh.

What German and Austrian authorities allege

  • November 2025 arrest warrant: Germany’s Federal Public Prosecutor said Mohammed A. was strongly suspected of Hamas membership. It alleged that he twice met another suspect in Berlin, received five handguns and ammunition, moved them to Austria, and stored them in Vienna to prepare attacks on Israeli or Jewish facilities in Germany. German Federal Public Prosecutor, 6 November 2025
  • Vienna weapons cache: Austria’s Directorate for State Security and Intelligence reported finding five handguns and ten magazines in a rented Vienna storage unit. It attributed the cache to Hamas-linked foreign operational structures and said Israeli or Jewish institutions in Europe were suspected targets. Austrian Interior Ministry, 6 November 2025
  • September 2026 indictment: German federal prosecutors charged seven other alleged Hamas members with membership in a foreign terrorist organization, preparation of a serious act of violence endangering the state, and weapons offenses. The indictment alleges that senior Hamas officials commissioned weapons procurement for a concrete attack planned near the second anniversary of October 7. By the October 2025 arrests, the group had allegedly acquired one functioning fully automatic rifle, thirteen functioning pistols, and more than 700 rounds of ammunition. German Federal Public Prosecutor, 11 September 2026
  • Mohammed A.’s alleged role: The indictment calls the separately prosecuted Mohammed A. a prominent participant connected to Hamas’s leadership level. It alleges that he moved part of the arsenal to Vienna and recorded a claim-of-responsibility video announcing the planned attack in Hamas’s name.

The official indictment describes the intended victims as:

“Repräsentanten Israels, Menschen jüdischen Glaubens oder pro-israelisch eingestellte Personen” — Israeli representatives, people of Jewish faith, or people with pro-Israel views.

What the targets establish—and what they do not

The target list is stronger evidence than a generic allegation that Hamas “hates Jews” because it separates three categories:

  1. Israeli representatives — targets linked to the Israeli state;
  2. pro-Israel persons — targets defined by political viewpoint;
  3. people of Jewish faith — targets defined by religious identity.

If proven, the third category defeats the claim that the alleged operation was directed only at Israel, its armed forces, or “Zionism” as a political project. A Jewish community center or a Jewish person in Europe is not made a military target by Jewish identity. Selecting such targets is properly described as antisemitic terrorism, and it puts alleged operational conduct in direct tension with Hamas’s 2017 claim that its conflict is with the “Zionist project” rather than Jews because they are Jews. See Hamas Charters and Hamas in Its Own Words.

The evidence does not prove the inner beliefs of every Hamas member, every Palestinian, or every person who supports Hamas. It also does not yet constitute a final judicial finding: an indictment records the prosecution’s evidence and theory, and Mohammed A. was being prosecuted separately and had not yet been extradited to Germany when the September release was issued.

Denial and present evidentiary status

Hamas denied any connection to the suspects when the first arrests were announced in 2025 and said its armed activity remained confined to Israel and the Palestinian territories. Associated Press, 6 November 2025

The September 2026 indictment is a materially stronger official allegation than the initial intelligence reporting: it attributes the plan to Hamas, alleges instructions from senior officials, identifies a substantial recovered arsenal, and describes a pre-recorded video in Hamas’s name. But until trial evidence is tested and judgment entered, the correct formulation remains “German prosecutors allege”, not “a court has proven.”

Debate-ready conclusion

The strongest responsible claim is not merely that a former Haniyeh bodyguard was accused. It is that German prosecutors have charged an alleged Hamas network with preparing an externally directed murder operation in Europe and expressly identified Jews as Jews among the intended victims. If the allegations are sustained, the case demonstrates both foreign terrorist operational capacity and antisemitic target selection; it cannot be reduced to armed resistance against Israeli forces or to opposition to Zionism alone. → Antisemitism

Ceasefire and disarmament proposals — sequencing is the central issue

Hamas’s public positions have changed in detail and must be dated rather than flattened into “Hamas will never disarm.”

DatePublic positionWhat remained unresolved
April 2024Khalil al-Hayya told AP that Hamas would accept a state on the 1967 lines, a truce of five years or more, lay down arms, and become a political party if an independent Palestinian state were established.Whether the truce was final; weapon inventory; tunnels; inspectors; enforcement; sequencing with Israeli withdrawal and statehood.
May 2025Osama Hamdan rejected disarmament while occupation continued and linked weapons to a Palestinian state and complete Israeli withdrawal.The offer remained conditional and did not publish an independently verifiable decommissioning mechanism.
July–August 2026Hamas and regional intermediaries said factions accepted a roadmap to collect and store weapons under Palestinian technocratic supervision, reportedly sector by sector.Whether weapons would be surrendered or destroyed; disclosure of inventory; tunnel and manufacturing infrastructure; noncompliance sanctions; international-force authority; Israeli-withdrawal sequence.

Sources: AP interview with Khalil al-Hayya, April 2024 · Osama Hamdan interview, May 2025 · Washington Post on the July 2026 collection-and-storage proposal · Axios on the August 2026 roadmap.

Counter-Hamas argument

A ceasefire proposal is not operationally adequate merely because it uses the word “disarmament.” A durable plan needs a declared weapons and tunnel inventory, agreed inspectors, access rights, storage or destruction procedures, monitoring after withdrawal, and predefined consequences for noncompliance.

Current-status correction

At the time of the panel, LonerBox’s skepticism about an unverified, post-withdrawal “warehouse the weapons” promise was well founded. By mid-2026 the proposal had become more concrete, so saying “Hamas has offered nothing” is no longer accurate. The dispute is now whether the roadmap is verifiable and enforceable.

Information control and casualty presentation

The strongest evidence does not establish that every Gaza witness lies. It establishes a coercive and strategically managed information environment:

  • Archived notices attributed to Gaza’s Hamas-run Interior Ministry instructed activists to call everyone killed an “innocent civilian,” avoid publishing commanders’ names and photographs, and not discuss military achievements with foreign contacts. The reproduction comes through an Israeli government annex, so its provenance and translations should be cited openly. Israeli annex reproducing the notices.
  • The UN’s 2014 Gaza inquiry stated that fear of reprisals limited what witnesses would say about Palestinian armed groups. UN inquiry.
  • The Foreign Press Association documented harassment, threats, questioning, and proposed blacklisting by Hamas authorities, while its archive also records abuses by Israel and the Palestinian Authority. FPA statements archive.
  • Amnesty documented torture and summary executions of alleged collaborators or informants. Amnesty, Strangling Necks.

Claim boundary

This supports heightened corroboration and the argument that Hamas sought to maximize the public “civilian” frame. It does not prove the categorical panel version that a civilian who tells the UN a dead person was a fighter will automatically be executed. The research pass found no written order or verified case establishing that universal rule.

Casualty labels sometimes change after armed-group biographies or other records emerge. See Gaza Casualty Figures > Later identification as a fighter and Goldstone Report. A later fighter identification changes classification but does not automatically establish that the strike was lawful on the information available at the time.

Strategy, evacuation counter-messaging, and civilian protection

The published Soypill debate dossier adds sources that make the agency argument more concrete:

  • A New York Times investigation reports Hamas military activity in and around civilian homes, infrastructure, medical facilities, UN offices, and mosques, and describes a strategy of surviving and prolonging the war. This is strong press reporting, not a court finding and not proof about every site.
  • On 13 October 2023, Hamas officials urged residents not to follow Israel’s mass evacuation order. Guardian. Later Hamas messaging again criticized evacuation instructions. Al Jazeera, 10 July 2024. This may expose civilians to danger, but urging people to remain is not automatically the specific war crime of human shielding; intent and circumstances must be shown. → Human Shields - UN and Human Rights Findings.
  • Mousa Abu Marzouk said Hamas’s tunnels were built to protect fighters and that Israel and the UN were responsible for protecting Gaza’s civilians. Report and translated interview clip. The statement is probative of Hamas’s priority structure; it does not eliminate Israel’s attacker and occupation-related obligations.

Dual-role and protected-profession claims: evidence ladder

The debate dossier links compilations alleging armed-group roles among some people described as journalists, medical workers, police, or aid workers: journalist spreadsheet · health-worker spreadsheet.

The IDF’s official compilation is audited in IDF Press Files dossier, including comparison with CPJ’s completed 2026 review and separation from broader death-toll claims. It names 170 people the IDF says were presented as journalists while in Hamas, PIJ, or other armed groups. Profiles that reproduce captured documents or armed-group records can support rungs 2–3 below; profiles resting only on undisclosed intelligence or interrogations remain an interested party’s assertion.

Use this hierarchy:

  1. Verified identity match — full name, age, image, date, and location align.
  2. Primary armed-group acknowledgment — an obituary, biography, or unit record identifies membership or role.
  3. Independent corroboration — press, institutional, or captured-record evidence supports the identification.
  4. Legal classification — determine continuous combat function or direct participation; membership or political affiliation alone is insufficient.
  5. Attack assessment — ask what was known beforehand and separately assess target, precautions, and expected civilian harm.

Do not generalize from confirmed cases

A confirmed fighter who also worked in a hospital or media role proves that dual roles occur. It does not establish a reliable percentage for all journalists or health workers, make those professions generally targetable, or legalize a strike that killed civilians disproportionately.

Child recruitment and military socialization

The evidence is real but narrower than the strongest panel claim:

  • A UN report verified five instances in which Palestinian armed groups recruited or used children aged 16–17 during the 2014 conflict.
  • The UN later reported Hamas and PIJ summer camps where children as young as 14 were exposed to military content and activities. Camp participation is not the same as verified combat deployment.
  • A Hamas-affiliated 2026 profile describes 16-year-old Suhaib Lubbad as joining al-Qassam and appearing in its “Moons of the Flood” martyr series.

Sources: UN 2014 conflict findings · UN 2020 children-and-armed-conflict report · Palestinian Information Center profile.

The panel’s exact recent figure—about twenty child combatants, including a 14-year-old—was not independently established. A partisan compilation located during review alleged PIJ fighters aged 15–17. Use the verified historical cases and the primary 16-year-old biography; do not present the “twenty/age fourteen” figure as settled.

Moral and legal calibration

Recruiting children is an abuse by the armed group. A child who directly participates may lose civilian protection for such time, but remains a child in demographic reporting and retains special protections. Evidence of some recruitment cannot be generalized to children killed in unrelated incidents.

Quotes

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One State

Khaled Mashal, the leader of the Hamas movement and one of its senior figures, says. He says: “We will be forced to temporarily agree to a two-state solution in order to prepare for a bigger war. We will not agree to any concessions. We demand a state whose borders stretch from the head of the mountain in the north to Eilat in the south.”

Hamas Hiding behind Civilian’s

Hamas Money

Wants Destruction of Israel

Transclude of behind-hamas’s-bloody-gambit-to-create-a-‘permanent’-state-of-war-(published-2023)#^mi278o

The+7+October+Parliamentary+Commission+Report+-+The+Roberts+Report+-+APPG+UK-Israel, p.57 (file not included in this release)

Hamas’ purpose is to undermine the foundations of Israel’s existence, paving the way for the latter’s utter elimination It knew that military victory was unlikely and therefore the attack sought to trigger a fierce Israeli retaliation, which would isolate Israel internationally and create global outrage. Sinwar stated in a speech in 2018, that “We would rather die as martyrs than die out of oppression and humiliation. We are ready to die, and tens of thousands will die with us,” hinting at a willingness to invite fierce retaliation to the Strip in order to fulfil his broader objectives Further confirming this intended aim, Ghazi Hamad, a member of Hamas’ political wing, stated in an interview to the LCBI news station in Lebanon on 24 October 2023 “Will we have to pay a price? Yes, and we are ready to pay it. We are called a nation of martyrs, and we are proud to sacrifice martyrs.”

Hamas Indoctrination System

  • cartoons for young children on Killing Jews
  • Kid training camps for terrorism
  • https://x.com/HonestReporting/status/1729246847472902207?s=20
  • https://x.com/DrEliDavid/status/1729939116282847455?s=20
  • Transclude of colonel-john-spencer---is-israel's-army-the-most-moral-in-the-world--(the-saad-truth_1844)---youtube#^ujbz9p
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  • Teaching Terror How Hamas Radicalizes Palestinian Society
  • Hamas ‘Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it’
  • Hamas indoctrination is 'atrocious,' says expert, as crowds gather at hostage releases
  • HRC 44 Written Statement Palestinian Violations of Child Rights

Hamas Leaders

  • Ismail Haniyeh
    • Net worth: $4 Billion
  • Spent over $1 million dollars at Qatar luxury hotel for 2 weeks while Gaza was burning
  • Hamas Leadership

Mahmoud Abbas’ Dissertation - Tablet Magazine

Hamas did attacks before they were elected in Gaza; reason Israel put in a blockade once they were elected
List of Palestinian suicide attacks - Wikipedia

  • Israel has been firing rockets continuously for about 17 years spanning govs from left and right
  • Open Air Prison
  • Israel helped create Hamas
    • Wanted to undermine the PLO (Fatah Party)
    • Tolerated predecessors—financing unclear
    • Hoping it would be peaceful and if not would divide the Palestinian movements
  • Pulling out of Gaza was to shore up demographics due to them pulling out of the West Bank

Hamas Charters

  • 2017_Hamas_Charter.pdf (file not included in this release)
    • Full sovereign state with Jerusalem as capital
    • Doesn’t talk about itself as government—national liberation and resistance movement
    • Interesting statements about: peace & tolerance. Umbrella for other creeds and religions. How Islam upholds justice and freedom, irrespective of religion, race, gender or nationality.
    • Jews DOES NOT equal Zionist project (Israel)—Not because they are Jews, as a religion.
    • Over the years, Hamas has sometimes moderated its public position with respect to the possibility of a Palestinian state alongside Israel. But its political program still officially “rejects any alternative to the full liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea” — referring to the area reaching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, which includes lands that now make up Israel. (apnews)
    • Compared to the PLO that voted and recognized Israel

      Hamas is of the view that the Jewish problem, anti-Semitism and the persecution of the Jews are phenomena fundamentally linked to European history and not to the history of the Arabs and the Muslims or to their heritage. The Zionist movement, which was able with the help of Western powers to occupy Palestine, is the most dangerous form of settlement occupation which has already disappeared from much of the world and must disappear from Palestine.”

Hamas believes that no part of the land of Palestine shall be compromised or conceded, irrespective of the causes, the circumstances and the pressures and no matter how long the occupation lasts. Hamas rejects any alternative to the full and complete liberation of Palestine, from the river to the sea. However, without compromising its rejection of the Zionist entity and without relinquishing any Palestinian rights, Hamas considers the establishment of a fully sovereign and independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital along the lines of the 4th of June 1967, with the return of the refugees and the displaced to their homes from which they were expelled, to be a formula of national consensus.

  • Hamas_Covenant_1988.pdf (file not included in this release) 
    Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it" (The Martyr, Imam Hassan al-Banna, of blessed memory).

This is the law governing the land of Palestine in the Islamic Sharia (law) and the same goes for any land the Moslems have conquered by force, because during the times of (Islamic) conquests, the Moslems consecrated these lands to Moslem generations till the Day of Judgement.

A woman can go out to fight the enemy without her husband's permission, and so does the slave: without his master's permission.

It is necessary to instill in the minds of the Moslem generations that the Palestinian problem is a religious problem, and should be dealt with on this basis. Palestine contains Islamic holy sites. In it there is al- Aqsa Mosque which is bound to the great Mosque in Mecca in an inseparable bond as long as heaven and earth speak of Isra` (Mohammed's midnight journey to the seven heavens) and Mi'raj (Mohammed's ascension to the seven heavens from Jerusalem).

For a long time, the enemies have been planning, skillfully and with precision, for the achievement of what they have attained. They took into consideration the causes affecting the current of events. They strived to amass great and substantive material wealth which they devoted to the realisation of their dream. With their money, they took control of the world media, news agencies, the press, publishing houses, broadcasting stations, and others. With their money they stirred revolutions in various parts of the world with the purpose of achieving their interests and reaping the fruit therein. They were behind the French Revolution, the Communist revolution and most of the revolutions we heard and hear about, here and there. With their money they formed secret societies, such as Freemasons, Rotary Clubs, the Lions and others in different parts of the world for the purpose of sabotaging societies and achieving Zionist interests. With their money they were able to control imperialistic countries and instigate them to colonize many countries in order to enable them to exploit their resources and spread corruption there. You may speak as much as you want about regional and world wars. They were behind World War I, when they were able to destroy the Islamic Caliphate, making financial gains and controlling resources. They obtained the Balfour Declaration, formed the League of Nations through which they could rule the world. They were behind World War II, through which they made huge financial gains by trading in armaments, and paved the way for the establishment of their state. It was they who instigated the replacement of the League of Nations with the United Nations and the Security Council to enable them to rule the world through them. There is no war going on anywhere, without having their finger in it.

“The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas),” dated 18 August 1988. One State, Two States Resolving the Israel Palestine — Prof Benny Morris — 2009 flattened, page 171 (file not included in this release)

“Hamas are freedom fighters, not a terrorist organization.”

“Palestinians aren’t Hamas. Palestinians are innocent.”

  • Around 70% or more of Palestinians support Hamas. They were the ones who created Hamas and continue to support them both financially, logistically, and militarily. Many Palestinians support the attacks Hamas carries out against Israel, including the horrific acts on October 7th. So, how are Palestinians not Hamas when a huge majority support them? Yes, there are a few Palestinians who don’t support Hamas but they are in the minority. The main point here is that since most Palestinians support Hamas, it’s fair to say that Palestinians, as a group, align with Hamas. On October 7th, many were even celebrating in the streets. If you support something, then you’re a part of it.

https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2024/03/22/poll-hamas-remains-popular-among-palestinians/

Palestinians: Do you support the October 7th attack?

https://youtu.be/M_AR71W6l3M?si=iIqSSytUFdpRn2OF

Palestinians backed up October 7th:

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/poll-shows-palestinians-back-oct-7-attack-israel-support-hamas-rises-2023-12-14/

Gaza Street on October 7th: https://youtu.be/x7UjdKhPgME?si=GRUj7ERc7jIR7sqH

You can also find more sources to look at from this user profile:

https://www.reddit.com/r/Israel/s/6EgT3ZNIz2

Netanyahu Funding Hamas

Dave Smith on Idea that Israeli Leader Netanyahu Propped Up Hamas fb3264c184c8799e08ae97e03f38228a_MD5.mp4 (file not included in this release)

  • Netanyahu was stopping the far-right from wanting to invade Gaza due to the rocket attacks
Link to original

Rockets from Hamas 2005-2025

YearApprox. Rockets FiredNotes
2005Data included in 2005–2007 totalFollowing Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, rocket attacks increased.
2006Data included in 2005–2007 totalContinued escalation of rocket attacks.
2007~2,807Significant increase in rocket and mortar attacks.
2008~1,500Spike in attacks leading up to Operation Cast Lead.
2009Continued but declined after Operation Cast LeadRocket fire persisted but at reduced levels post-conflict.
2012~2,257During Operation Pillar of Defense.
2014~4,005During Operation Protective Edge.
2021 (May)~4,360During 11-day conflict in May.
2023 (May)~1,469May 9–13 fighting with Islamic Jihad.
2023 (Oct)~5,000+Beginning of the Israel–Hamas war after October 7 attacks.
2023–2024~26,000+Total through early 2024 during ongoing conflict.

Citations

Stealing Aid

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Genocide Debate Prep > C5: Starvation

Misc

Hamasissues_rescinds_sweeping_rules_on_Gaza_coverage.pdf (file not included in this release)
Propaganda Video of Father
Categorization_and_culpability_in_Hamas_leaders_accounts_of_the_Palestinian_Israeli_conflict.pdf (file not included in this release)
THE_ORIGINS_OF_HAMAS-_Militant_Legacy_or_Israeli_Tool.pdf (file not included in this release)
60 Knowledge/60.1 Israel-Palestine/60.1.2 Misc/Hamas in Politics - Democracy Religion and Violence
Social-Civilian Apparatuses of Hamas, Hizballah, and Other Activist Islamic Organizations
Religeopolitics - Dissident geopolitics and the fundamentalism of Hamas and Kach
Hamas - Victory with Ballots and Bullets
Is Hamas Winning
The E-Marketing Strategy of Hamas
Hamas leaders continue to make Israel’s case better: [twitter.com/paulrubens/status/1730542163102982636?t=xb13EEOqoGwhKNIIkjwRdw

Hamas Mickey Mouse Farfour teaches Palestinian children Islamic world domination - YouTube

Hamas Leader Khaled Mashal: Our Losses Are Tactical | MEMRI
Criticism of Hamas - Wikipedia

Files

Hamas.base (file not included in this release)