Haidt, Chapter 2 — moral reasoning also manages reputation and alliances
Haidt’s social-intuitionist model gives this note a mechanism. A moral judgment commonly recruits reasons after the fact, while moral talk can manage reputation, build alliances, and recruit bystanders. That helps explain why a socially rewarded belief may remain stable after one stated argument is refuted: the argument may be serving a verdict and a relationship rather than producing the belief.
The model also prevents the thesis from becoming fatalistic. Other people’s reasons can trigger new intuitions, and social conditions can make truth-seeking either costly or safe. The practical question is therefore not only “Which incentive distorts this belief?” but “Which relationship, comparison, evidence, or accountability structure could make revision possible?” Social reasoning and influence, PDF pp. 66–69 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 2 source audit · Permanent model note
Haidt, Chapter 4 — accountability is only as epistemic as its audience
“More accountability” does not automatically mean more truth. Haidt’s account of Tetlock distinguishes exploratory thought from a more sophisticated defense of the expected answer. Exploratory reasoning becomes more likely when the demand for justification is known before the person commits, the audience’s view is unknown, and the audience is believed to be informed and accuracy-seeking. Once a constituency’s preferred position is obvious, reputational pressure can make the in-house press secretary work harder for conformity.
This turns social incentives into a design checklist: blind reviewers to identity and desired outcome when possible; ask for rival explanations before public commitment; reward explicit updating; separate evidence gathering from advocacy; and include critics who share enough purpose to challenge without making revision a form of exile. The chapter’s evidence is source-dated and does not imply that every audience or accountability procedure produces the same effect. Accountability and intuitive politicians, PDF pp. 97–100 (file not included in this release) · Diversity, shared fate, and correction, PDF pp. 113–114 (file not included in this release) · Chapter 4 source audit
People rarely apply a consistent, rational formulation for whatever their beliefs are. This is not because people are stupid or lack the ability to do so, but rather because there is little to no incentive for doing so. Truth is simply a means to enrich our lives. For the majority of political issues, it is easier to change the truth than it is to change one’s mind. There is great incentive in believing in particular untrue things, especially when there is little practical consequences for having an incorrect understanding of an issue.
Examples of certain social pressures:
- One might have family members belonging to a certain religion. “Leaving” that belief system might entail being completely disowned by one’s family, which would lead to significant loss of financial and social support.
- One might have an audience that demands to hear a certain thing, and giving a take counter to what that audience believes might cause one to incur a significant financial or reputational loss.
- One might belong to social groups in school or on social media that demand adherence to certain sociopolitical beliefs, and betraying those beliefs (or not showing strong support for them) might result in a person being thrown out of said social group.
For many of the social and political beliefs we hold and value today, being “factually correct” offers little to no reward. Whether or not you know the factual details about a particular shooting, war, catastrophe or medicine is very rarely relevant since that “belief” is not factually tested on a day to day basis.
Let’s analyze a controversial event, the Rittenhouse trial concerning the 2020 shootings in Kenosha, Illinois, and think about the social incentives on both sides, assuming you part of a social structure that is pro BLM:
- Rewards for having factually accurate beliefs:
- Assuming you’re not someone who’s job relies on getting the facts correct, like a prosecutor, lawyer, journalist or someone working in the system, there is no reward for being factually correct about anything related to Rittenhouse.
- Punishment for having factually accurate beliefs:
- If you are in any social circles that a staunchly pro BLM, expressing certain factual accuracies about the events of that night might lead to you being ostracized from your groups, or webbed as a white supremacist.
- Rewards for having factually inaccurate beliefs:
- Depending on what you get wrong, people might celebrate you for having incorrect beliefs, especially if youi’re over-stating the wrong-doings of Rittenhouse of under-stating the actions of the assailants. Common examples of wrong beliefs being rewarded: “Rittenhouse was spraying his magazine into the crowd!” or “The person chasing Rittenhouse only threw a plastic bag, how scary!”
- Punishment for having factually inaccurate beliefs:
- Assuming your inaccurate beliefs are cutting against Rittenhouse, you’re unlikely to face any repercussions (or even corrections) about having inaccurate beliefs relating to Rittenhouse. A gentle correction is likely the most you’d experience.
Given the incentive structures for and against certain beliefs, there’s little reason to expect someone to strive for factual accuracy and every reason to believe people would try to adhere to their social groups as much as possible.