Palestinian Attitudes toward the West and the United States

What the evidence supports

There is extensive evidence of Palestinian hostility toward U.S. policy and, in some historical surveys, toward Americans and Westerners themselves. Distrust long predates the Gaza war. But attitudes differ between governments, people, culture, technology, and practical cooperation; between Gaza and the West Bank; and across time. Hamas, the Palestinian Authority/Fatah/PLO, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Lebanese Hezbollah also express distinct positions. Leaders’ statements establish their rhetoric, not the percentage of Palestinians who agree.

This research dossier brings together public polling, organizational documents, and dated leadership quotations. It follows the source leads in Polls, then checks original polling publications and contemporary reporting. WB means West Bank; EJ means East Jerusalem. Unless specified otherwise, percentages describe respondents in the named survey, not Palestinians worldwide.

Second pass (November 1, 2026): added material from the vault’s own poll archive (60.1.7 Books & Documents/Polls/), checked page by page: PCPSR’s 2001–2006 questions on 9/11, the Iraq war, American society, and attacks on American and British nationals; a 2016 measure of views of the American people; Arab Barometer’s 2018 and 2021 waves; PCPSR’s wartime satisfaction-and-blame series; and Pew’s bin Laden trend. A short scholarly reading list is at Further reading — scholarship on anti-Americanism.

Third pass (November 1, 2026): added JMCC’s archive. It covers perceived U.S. bias from 2000 to 2003, verdicts on four presidents from 2008 to 2022, Western countries ranked in 2008 and again in August 2026, and views of Europe during the war.

Contents: The main patterns · Public opinion about the United States · September 11, al-Qaeda, and the Iraq war, 2001–2011 · Views of Western people and culture · Europe and the wider international order · Cooperation, democracy, aid, and migration · Violence and extremism · Hamas — documents and negative leadership quotations · The Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and PLO · Palestinian Islamic Jihad · Hezbollah — a separate Lebanese actor · Interpretation and competing explanations · Methods, limits, and research gaps · Sources

The main patterns

1. Distrust is longstanding. Multiple pollsters document poor views of America or its leadership across administrations, not merely hostility to one president. See the separate Pew favorability and Gallup leadership series below.
2. Some hostility concerns people and culture. Direct Pew and PCPSR questions about Americans and Westerners provide evidence beyond opinions of foreign policy. Those measures are older (2007–2016) and should be dated explicitly. They also show the people/policy gap: in 2016, 35% viewed the American people favorably but only 12% U.S. foreign policy.
3. Perceived American support for Israel is central. Bias, weapons, diplomatic protection, and insufficient pressure on Israel recur in survey questions and political statements. These are respondents’ judgments and leaders’ arguments; a survey does not independently establish their causal or legal claims.
4. Europe is not a single object of opinion. Country ratings, approval of particular governments’ conduct, and perceptions of support for Palestine vary considerably. “The West” can obscure these differences. Yet the ranking has been stable: JMCC found the U.S. judged worst, then Britain, Germany, and France, both in 2008 and in 2026.
5. Hostility can coexist with a desire for useful relations. Some surveys find majorities valuing American ties even when very few identify the U.S. as a friend. Such answers are compatible: liking a power, trusting it, and needing its cooperation are different judgments.
6. The population is not interchangeable with its rulers or armed factions. Party identification, approval of a particular wartime role, and support for an ideological program are separate measures. Hezbollah is Lebanese, not Palestinian.
7. The record includes both militant hostility and accommodation. The quotations below include threats and ideological denunciation, but also documented willingness to negotiate and condemnations of attacks in Europe. Neither set should erase the other.
8. Distrust was already intense before the current wars. In December 2001, 94% opposed the U.S. campaign in Afghanistan and only 16% believed bin Laden’s group carried out 9/11. In 2003, 97% saw U.S. policy as biased toward Israel while large majorities rated American science, education, and gender equality positively.

These points are a synthesis of the evidence cataloged below, not a single poll result.

Public opinion about the United States

Country favorability: Pew’s historical measurements

These are favorable views of the United States as a country, not approval of every U.S. policy. Years identify the survey/report wave. They are selected observations, not an uninterrupted annual series.¹²

Interpretation: the evaluations are predominantly negative, but not fixed. The improvement between the last two observations cautions against treating any one result as a permanent national disposition. The 2014 publication preceded the July–August Gaza war’s full course; it should not be described as a postwar measure.

Leadership approval: Gallup’s longer series

Gallup’s trend covers West Bank/East Jerusalem, excluding Jewish Israeli-majority areas. There is no 2024 Gaza estimate. It measures U.S. leadership approval, not views of American citizens.³

In July–August 2024, 76% rejected the adequacy of U.S. civilian-protection efforts; 71% its aid-delivery efforts. 68% believed it could significantly influence Israeli government policy; 70% Israeli military operations.³

Interpretation: perceived responsibility may be heightened by the belief that Washington has leverage it is not adequately using. The survey measures that belief; it does not quantify actual American control over Israeli decisions.

Bias, Obama, and Trump: JMCC

JMCC Poll 74, fielded May 31–June 4, 2011, interviewed 1,198 adults face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza. 91.8% saw the U.S. as biased toward Israel, versus 4.8% who considered it biased toward neither side. Obama’s recent speech made 44.4% more pessimistic about resolving the conflict and 11.2% more optimistic; 43.6% said it made no difference.⁴

JMCC Poll 89, fielded February 17–21, 2017, interviewed 1,199 adults face-to-face across the West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza; reported error ±3 points. Trump’s election made 53.7% more pessimistic and 4.7% more optimistic. The report contrasts this with 28.1% more optimistic and 18.9% more pessimistic after Obama’s election. Concerning a possible U.S. embassy move to Jerusalem, 23.4% selected rescinding recognition of Israel, 19.7% an embassy boycott, 18.7% a UN complaint, and 16.5% ending dealings with the U.S. as peace-process sponsor.⁵

These are distinct questions about mood, expected policy, and preferred responses. The response choices are not interchangeable measures of “hatred.”

JMCC’s longer record: bias, presidents, and visits, 2000–2022

Perceived bias, all face-to-face in the West Bank and Gaza, n≈1,200 each:jmccbias

The first three questions span the start of the Second Intifada and predate 9/11. The October 2003 result is an operational version of distrust: almost no one would accept an American-only presence, but nearly a third would accept the U.S. alongside Europe.

Verdicts on presidents, each a single JMCC wave:jmccpres

The October 2009 and April 2010 points are as reported in the November 2011 release. In June 2009, 40.8% also said U.S. handling of the region had improved since Obama took office, against 49.8% who saw no change. The Trump comparisons from February 2017 are in the JMCC section above.

Reading the arc: the Obama series is the clearest example in the vault of opinion responding to American conduct. Hope roughly doubled after the Cairo speech, then collapsed over two years. Biden never received that initial lift. A fixed civilizational hostility would not produce a 35%-to-5% swing within one presidency. A durable baseline of distrust, briefly suspended, would.

Before and after October 7: distinguish the questions

Arab Barometer VIII, September 28–October 8, 2023, n=1,189, was conducted largely before October 7. Its published table reports 19% favorable toward the U.S. and 74% unfavorable. This establishes substantial prewar negativity. In the same survey, 70% opposed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine: opposition to American policy did not imply blanket approval of an American rival.⁶

PCPSR Poll 90, November 22–December 2, 2023, n=1,231, reported widespread rejection of the conduct of the U.S. and major Western European governments during the war. 26% assigned primary blame for Gazans’ suffering to the U.S., compared with 52% to Israel, 11% to Hamas, and 9% to the PA. 64% opposed PA participation in U.S.-involved discussions of Gaza’s postwar future; 33% supported it.⁷

JMCC Poll 101, October 21–23, 2023, West Bank only, n=715, two weeks into the war:jmcc101

• The U.S.: 65.5% said full American backing for Israel was expected, 18.7% expected it but “not to this degree,” and 14.0% did not expect it.
• Europe: 69.2% were “not surprised at all” by what the question called “the biased European position towards Israel.”

The second item’s wording presupposes bias, so it measures surprise, not whether respondents judged Europe biased.

Country favorability, satisfaction with wartime performance, assigning blame, and supporting diplomatic participation should not be plotted as one continuous attitude scale.

AWRAD’s wartime findings: very negative roles and perceived Western motives

AWRAD, October 31–November 7, 2023, n=668; West Bank/southern Gaza; face-to-face:⁸

Agreement totals add two categories. Reasons were prompted and could overlap. They measure perceptions, not verified Western motives. Wartime displacement limits coverage. Negativity about governments coexisted with appreciation for solidarity.⁸

More recent evidence, 2025–2026

PCPSR Poll 96, October 22–25, 2025, n=1,200, face-to-face in both territories, measured satisfaction with wartime roles: Spain 35%, France 20%, UK 14%, and the U.S./President Trump 6%. For comparison, the Houthis received 74%, Hezbollah 50%, Iran 44%, China 34%, and Russia 25%. The U.S. item specified Trump in this wave, which limits comparisons with earlier country-level items.⁹

Pew, March 30–April 28, 2026, n=1,038, West Bank and East Jerusalem only, found 69% saying the U.S. provided too much military assistance to Israel, versus 3% the right amount and 1% too little. 70% said it provided too little humanitarian aid to Gaza, versus 2% the right amount and 1% too much. Large unsure groups should not be redistributed into opposition.¹⁰

PCPSR Poll 97, August 5–8, 2026, n=1,270—830 West Bank and 440 Gaza; reported error ±3.5 points—asked about the recent U.S.–Iran war. 45% sided with Iran, 12% against Iran, and 40% with neither Iran nor the U.S. “Against Iran” should not automatically be rewritten as support for America; nor does siding with Iran establish approval of attacks on American civilians.¹¹

Wartime satisfaction and blame: PCPSR’s repeated items, 2023–2025

PCPSR asked the same two questions in most wartime polls, in both territories, face-to-face. Satisfaction is with each actor’s role during the war; blame is which party respondents hold most responsible for Gazans’ suffering.¹²

Israel was blamed first in every wave (51%–64%); Hamas by 7%–14%. The U.S. was consistently the second most blamed party and the least satisfactory international actor, below Russia, China, the UN, Germany, France, and the UK whenever they were listed.¹²

Two companion findings show how respondents separated Western governments from Western publics:

• Poll 90: 87% said the response of the U.S. and the major Western powers (UK, France, Germany) to the bombardment showed disregard for international humanitarian law; 10% said it showed commitment to it. 70% called Western talk of a two-state solution not serious.¹²
• Poll 92: about 70% were optimistic that protests at American universities would push U.S. policy toward the Palestinian side. This is an expectation about American society’s influence, not a rating of it, but it sits awkwardly with a picture of undifferentiated hostility to Americans.¹²

Poll 94 is not in the vault archive; its blame figure is taken from Poll 95’s comparison. Poll 93’s release did not report the blame item.

Arab Barometer’s U.S. rating across waves

Sources: AB V and VII from the archived Palestine reports; VIII and IX as cited above.ab5ab7⁶¹³

The Wave VII report adds that Palestinians gave the U.S. the lowest rating of any participating Arab public. Moroccans rated it 69% favorable, and Mauritanians, Jordanians, and Sudanese 50% or more. Palestinian hostility is therefore not simply regional Arab opinion.ab7

Wave VII, October 2021:

• Biden versus Trump: 56% saw Biden’s regional policies as the same as Trump’s, 31% as worse, and 16% as better. The report labels “same or worse” 71%, but its own components sum to 87%; use the components.
• Afghanistan: 80% favored the American withdrawal.
• Threats: 53% called the rise of U.S. economic power a critical threat to Palestinian national interests, second only to the occupation (86%). Iran’s nuclear program came third (48%), and China’s economic rise last (26%).ab7

Responses to American peace plans: 2020 and 2025

PCPSR Poll 75, February 5–8, 2020, n=1,270, was moved forward a month to measure the reaction to Trump’s “Deal of the Century.”psr75

• The plan: 94% opposed it as a package and 4% supported it. Opposition to individual components ranged from 91% to 95%.
• Its meaning: 82% said it returned the conflict to an existential one.
• Abbas’s response: 65% supported his announced policy of ending relations with Israel and the United States, but 68% doubted he would actually end security coordination.

PCPSR Poll 96, October 22–25, 2025, presented the September 2025 Trump Plan in its Arab and Islamic framing: end of the war, hostage and prisoner releases, no forced transfer, aid entry, gradual Israeli withdrawal, Hamas’s disarmament, PA reform, and a path to a state.psr96pdf

• The plan: 47% supported and 49% opposed it. Support was 59% in Gaza and 39% in the West Bank.
• Disarmament: 69% opposed the disarmament clause even if it were the condition for the war not returning (78% WB / 55% Gaza).
• A state: 70% doubted the plan would produce a state within five years.

Reading the contrast: the 2020 plan was rejected almost unanimously; an American-brokered plan that ended a war Gazans were living through split opinion evenly, with Gazans more favorable. A U.S. label alone does not determine the response. The content, and who bears the war, matter.

September 11, al-Qaeda, and the Iraq war, 2001–2011

This section adds the first post-9/11 decade. These are dated findings from a period of Second Intifada violence and should not be read as current opinion. See September 11 attacks and Osama bin Laden for the events themselves.

December 2001: denial, rejection of the U.S. campaign, and a split on “terrorism”

PCPSR Poll 3, December 19–24, 2001, n=1,357, face-to-face in both territories, error ±3 points:¹⁴

Gaza was harsher than the West Bank on the Twin Towers item (59% disagreed that it was terrorism, against 50% in the West Bank). PCPSR’s own reading was that opposition to the Afghanistan campaign followed from disbelief in bin Laden’s responsibility. It also concluded that Palestinians judged “terror” by the perpetrators’ aims rather than their methods: Listed Israeli acts were classed as terror by 91%–98%, while only 10% classed the Palestinian assassination of Israeli minister Rehavam Ze’evi that way.¹⁴

What this establishes: at the time, a majority rejected both al-Qaeda’s responsibility and the U.S. response, and only a minority classed 9/11 as terrorism. What it does not establish: approval of 9/11. No item asked whether respondents supported the attacks, and disbelief that bin Laden did it is a different answer from endorsing what was done.

April 2003: the Iraq war and its perceived motives

PCPSR Poll 7, April 3–7, 2003, n=1,315, fielded during the invasion. PCPSR reports 99% opposed the American-led war.¹⁵ Asked for the primary motive of the U.S. and Britain:

Almost no one chose a cultural motive: the war was read as material and strategic. The “help Israel” answer is a perception; for the argument that Israel was not behind the war, see the Wurmser interview and Iraq War.

The war-support table in the archived PDF has misaligned answer labels. The 99% figure is PCPSR’s own summary, not recalculated here.

Confidence in bin Laden fell by half

Pew’s surveys of Palestinian Muslims found confidence in bin Laden “to do the right thing in world affairs” fell 38 points between 2003 and spring 2011, to 34%. That implies about 72% in 2003. Even at 34%, it was the highest of the six Muslim publics surveyed in 2011, against 26% in Indonesia, 22% in Egypt, 13% in Jordan, and 1%–3% in Lebanon and Turkey. In the same survey, 28% of Palestinian Muslims viewed al-Qaeda favorably and 68% unfavorably.pew11bl

The trend is real decline; the level remained the highest Pew measured. Both facts belong in an argument. Compare Haniyeh’s praise of bin Laden and the PA’s welcome of his death, in Ismail Haniyeh, May 2, 2011 — condemnation of bin Laden’s killing and Counterevidence: PA positions are not identical to Hamas’s.

Views of Western people and culture

Americans as people: direct evidence rather than inference from foreign policy

Pew’s Spring 2013 topline, question Q9b, asked about Americans, separately from the U.S. as a country. In the Palestinian territories, 1% were very favorable, 12% somewhat favorable, 14% somewhat unfavorable, 63% very unfavorable, and 10% unsure/refusing. Thus favorable totaled 13% and unfavorable 77%. These figures were checked against the original table, printed p. 72 / PDF p. 10.¹⁶

This is strong historical evidence that negativity was not confined to government policy. It is not a current estimate, and the question did not establish why each respondent felt that way.

American society versus American policy: PCPSR, October 2003

PCPSR Poll 9, October 7–14, 2003, n=1,318, face-to-face in both territories, asked respondents to rate conditions inside the United States, alongside questions on U.S. policy.¹⁷

The policy questions in the same poll found:¹⁷

• Bias: 97% saw U.S. policy on the conflict as biased toward Israel; 2% called it balanced.
• Sincerity: 96% called the U.S. insincere about a Palestinian state, and 92% insincere about PA reform.

Why this matters: in the same respondents, American science, education, gender equality, and the economy drew majority approval while foreign policy, religious freedom, and the treatment of minorities did not. PCPSR attributed the low marks on religious freedom and minorities to the post-9/11 treatment of Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. That is the pollster’s interpretation, not something the question measured. This is the clearest dataset in the vault for the claim that Palestinian hostility is aimed more at American power than at American society. It is still 2003 data.

The American people in 2016: the most recent direct measure found

PCPSR, February 10–14, 2016, n=1,270, conducted with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, compared views of Germany and the United States:¹⁸

Further findings in the same poll:

• Territory: views of the American people were somewhat warmer in the West Bank (37% favorable) than in Gaza (33%).
• Comparison with the EU: the EU outscored the U.S. on honest brokerage (46% agreed) and trust (53%).
• Lobby influence: 76% said the Jewish American community has a significant influence on U.S. foreign policy. This is a perception of lobby influence comparable to AWRAD’s 2023 “Israeli lobby” item, not a measured fact about policymaking.¹⁸

Reading it against 2013: Pew found 13% favorable toward Americans in 2013; PCPSR found 35% favorable toward “the American people” in 2016. Different pollsters, wording, and years, so this is not a trend line. Both put a majority unfavorable. The 2016 poll’s wider people/policy gap (35% versus 12%) is its most useful contribution.

Pew’s 2013 report also found 76% of Palestinians identifying the U.S. as an enemy, the highest share among the surveyed publics. That is a characterization of a country’s relationship, not an answer about attacking individuals.¹⁹

Westerners’ characteristics: Pew 2011

Among Palestinian Muslims in Pew’s 2011 study, majorities associated each of six negative characteristics with Westerners: violence, greed, fanaticism, selfishness, immorality, and arrogance. 71% attributed at least three of these six characteristics. Yet 56% associated Westerners with respect for women. These prompted descriptions concerned people in Western countries, not just their governments.²⁰

In the companion section, 72% of Palestinian Muslims described Muslim–Western relations as bad; more than seven in ten perceived most or many Americans as hostile toward Muslims. 80% of Palestinian Muslims who thought Muslim countries should be more prosperous selected official corruption as a leading explanation, showing that criticism did not exclusively target external powers.²¹

The evidence therefore includes both negative stereotyping of Western people and a perception that Western people are hostile in return. These findings describe 2011 respondents and cannot establish the attitudes of every Palestinian, Palestinian Christians, or later generations.

Technology versus popular culture: Pew 2007

In 2007, 67% in the Palestinian territories admired American scientific and technological advances, while 68% disliked American music, movies, and television.²²

This is a useful example of different judgments within the same population. Respect for technological achievement does not entail cultural identification, and rejection of cultural exports does not by itself establish endorsement of violence.

Europe and the wider international order

Arab Barometer IX: countries and territorial differences

October 8–26, 2025; 1,655 adults: 855 Gaza / 800 West Bank; face-to-face; error ±3 points. Published March 2026. Favorable combines very/somewhat favorable.¹³

West Bank only: whose policies are better?¹³

Alternatives included equally good/bad and unsure: 38% rated both equally bad on the conflict; 33% on security.¹³

Interpretation: external-policy perceptions do not establish domestic liberties in either country. Gaza’s comparatively higher Western ratings challenge a simple geographic stereotype.

Ranking Western governments: JMCC in 2008 and 2026

Two JMCC polls, eighteen years apart, asked respondents to judge named Western governments:jmcc08jmcc105

• November 20–23, 2008: dissatisfaction with each country’s role in the peace process.
• August 20–25, 2026: each country’s role toward the conflict rated bad. In Gaza, interviews were conducted in tents, shelters, and buildings.

The wording differs, so the columns are not a strict trend. But the order is the same in both waves: the U.S. first, then Britain, Germany, and France. Spain is the 2026 outlier, rated good or average by 54.7%. The same 2026 poll found 66.4% calling Germany biased toward Israel (72.0% in Gaza), and only 2.5% calling it supportive of Palestinians.jmcc105

JMCC Poll 104, September 4–8, 2025, West Bank only, n=715, asked whether recognition of a Palestinian state by European countries such as France and the UK would help achieve independence: 52.2% said it would have a positive impact and 45.5% no impact.jmcc104

So European recognition drew a split verdict, and European governments still rated mostly bad a year later. Recognition did not erase the ranking.

Regional Arab opinion: useful context, different population

The 2022 Arab Opinion Index specifically reported 92% of Palestinian respondents rating U.S. policy toward Palestine negatively. The same report said Palestinian assessments of Iranian policy were divided: 42% positive, 41% negative.²³

The 2025 Arab Opinion Index’s regional aggregate found 76% negative toward U.S. policy on Palestine. On the stated reason for a negative view of America, 54% selected foreign policy and 24% disagreement with values/culture. 27% expressed a negative view of the American people with foreign policy set aside. These are regional figures, not Palestinian-specific estimates.²⁴

The December 12, 2023–January 5, 2024 Arab Center survey covered 8,000 respondents in 16 countries, including the West Bank but not Gaza. Its 94% negative evaluation of the U.S. response and 76% reporting a worsening view of the U.S. are also regional aggregates. Each country received equal weight; this was not a population-weighted count of all Arabs.²⁵

Cooperation, democracy, aid, and migration

Dislike and a desire for useful relations can coexist

Washington Institute/PCPO, July 8–27, 2023, n=1,572, face-to-face; error approximately ±4 points per regional subsample:²⁶

“Competitor or enemy” combines two categories and should not be relabeled “enemy” alone. The sponsor is a U.S. policy institute; fieldwork was performed by PCPO. Its results should be considered alongside other pollsters.

A June 2022 Washington Institute report on West Bank polling found 13% wanting the U.S. to stay out altogether, compared with 45% in its 2020 comparison; 35% prioritized pressure on Israel and 24% pressure on the PA/Hamas for democracy and against corruption. 64% considered good U.S. relations important. The report dates are clear; exact fieldwork dates are not supplied here.²⁷

Arab Barometer V, October 5–24, 2018, came months after the U.S. embassy moved to Jerusalem.ab5

• Economic ties: 31% wanted stronger economic relations with the U.S., two points above 2012.
• Aid: 49% wanted more American aid (54% WB / 41% Gaza), against 61% for more Chinese aid.
• Motives: 85% in the West Bank and 80% in Gaza said Western countries give aid mainly to gain influence over Palestine.

Wanting the aid and distrusting the donor’s motive are, again, compatible answers.

Gallup’s 2010 Muslim–West report found 56% in the Palestinian territories calling greater interaction between the Muslim and Western worlds a benefit and 32% a threat. 52% attributed Muslim–West tensions mainly to political interests rather than religion or culture, among the highest such shares Gallup recorded. The report draws on its 2008–2010 World Poll waves, and the extracted text does not give the Palestinian fieldwork year for these items.gallup10

Democratic institutions and social values

The Arab Barometer IX governance report, based on October 2025 interviews, reports 60% regarding democracy as the best system, alongside 51% supporting a strong leader and 68% saying the system matters less than solving economic problems. Positive evaluations of American democracy declined 57%→42%, and German democracy 56%→42%, versus the previous wave.²⁸

Population caution: most governance questions excluded Gaza. Treat these as West Bank-module evidence; exact item-by-item territorial routing is not reproduced.

Democratic preference and prioritizing order can coexist. Neither answer establishes views on every liberal right or democratic institution. Democracy is not an exclusively Western value.

Migration destinations: attraction without political approval

Arab Barometer VIII’s migration report, based on the largely pre-October 7 2023 wave, found 25% considering emigration—31% Gaza / 21% West Bank. Among those considering departure, preferred destinations included Turkey 19%, Germany 13%, Canada 11%, U.S. 10%, Qatar 9%. For the U.S., the breakdown was 17% West Bank / 3% Gaza.²⁹

Those are shares of prospective emigrants, not all Palestinians or actual migration flows. Economic opportunity, safety, education, political approval, and cultural preference need not align. The data do not justify treating prospective migrants’ intentions as either an endorsement of every Western value or proof of hypocrisy.

More American aid is compatible with opposition to American arms for Israel

The contrasting military-aid and humanitarian-aid answers in More recent evidence, 2025–2026 concern different recipients and purposes. They should not be compressed into an undifferentiated claim that Palestinians either “want America involved” or “reject America.”

Violence and extremism

Pew’s 2013 survey found 62% of Palestinian Muslim respondents saying suicide bombing or other violence against civilians could often/sometimes be justified to defend Islam—64% Gaza / 60% West Bank. In 2014, this fell to 46%, with 62% Gaza / 36% West Bank.³⁰³¹

These are serious findings on willingness to justify civilian-directed violence. However, the question did not identify Americans, Europeans, a specific attack, or every circumstance. It cannot be cited as the proportion approving attacks on Western civilians, 9/11, or October 7.

Pew’s 2011 extremism chapter also found 78% of Palestinian Muslims concerned about Islamic extremism. This was a concern measure, not agreement with any specific counterterrorism strategy.³²

March 2006: a direct question about attacks on American and British nationals

A few days before PCPSR Poll 19 (March 16–18, 2006, n=1,270), Israeli forces raided the Jericho jail and arrested PFLP leader Ahmad Sa’adat and his colleagues, in PCPSR’s description. The poll asked whether the U.S. and UK were implicated and how respondents would react:³³

• 93% said the U.S. and UK were implicated in the operation.
• Those respondents were then offered a ladder of reactions, each including the ones before:

So 46% approved at least attacks on facilities, 37% at least kidnapping, and 25% armed attacks on American and British nationals. PCPSR’s own summary reads the last figure as “25%” of respondents.

Base caveat: the questionnaire routes those who did not see the U.S. and UK as implicated past this item. If the shares are of the 93% who were asked, the armed-attacks figure is about 24% of all respondents.

This is the only representative item found in this research that asks directly about violence against Western nationals. It is also tied to one incident, asked within days of it, and twenty years old.

December 2001: terrorism “for political goals”

In the same December 2001 poll covered above, 37% said terrorism could be justified in some circumstances to achieve political goals and 53% said not.¹⁴ The question named no target, so it is closer to Pew’s civilian-violence item than to a measure of approval of attacks on Westerners.

No current, directly verified representative percentage approving attacks on American or European civilians is established by this dossier. The 2006 item above is the closest historical measure. News footage of celebrations and leaders’ praise cannot supply that missing denominator. Likewise, descriptions of what international law permits are not identical to respondents’ personal approval of an act.

Hamas — documents and negative leadership quotations

How to read the quotations: names and roles refer to the time of the statement. Most English wording is a published translation from Arabic, not an independently checked translation made for this note. Short extracts retain the source’s wording; context identifies the target and the strength of the claim.

Founding covenant, August 18, 1988

“The colonial forces in the capitalist West and the Communist East support the enemy with all the strength they possess”

Speaker/source: Hamas’s founding covenant, Article 22; paired Arabic text and English translation reproduced by Middle East Forum.³⁴

Context: the document portrays the conflict as part of a much broader confrontation, not simply a disagreement with one U.S. administration. The same article advances antisemitic conspiracy claims concerning revolutions, world wars, media, and colonial powers. Those are the covenant’s claims, not historical findings endorsed here. Notice that the Communist East is included: this is not a consistent alignment with every non-Western power.

Khaled Meshaal, February 3, 2006 — defeat of the West and America

“We say to this West” … “By Allah, you will be defeated.” … “America will be defeated in Iraq.”

Role: Hamas political bureau chief. Setting: a Damascus mosque address broadcast by Al Jazeera. Provenance: Counter Extremism Project reproduces the quotation and cites MEMRI clip 1024.³⁵

What it establishes: explicit adversarial language directed at the West and the U.S., within an Islamist victory narrative extending beyond Palestine.

Verification limit: the original MEMRI clip/transcript endpoint returned an access error during this research. The extract is verified to CEP’s published reproduction, not independently to the Arabic broadcast. It is a weaker quotation record than the directly accessible documents and broadcaster transcript below.

Ismail Haniyeh, May 2, 2011 — condemnation of bin Laden’s killing

“a continuation of the American policy based on oppression and the shedding of Muslim and Arab blood”

Role: head of the Hamas administration in Gaza. Speaking after the U.S. operation that killed Osama bin Laden, Haniyeh also described him as an “Arab holy warrior.” Reuters reported the remarks contemporaneously.³⁶

This combines denunciation of U.S. policy with praise for bin Laden’s religious-militant standing. It does not, by itself, establish Hamas–al-Qaeda operational coordination or the percentage of Palestinians sharing the sentiment. A contrasting PA response appears below.

Fawzi Barhoum, December 2017 — Jerusalem recognition

“an attack on the Arab and Muslim nations”

Role: Hamas spokesman. Context: response to Trump’s recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. Anadolu reported his Al-Aqsa TV remarks on December 7, updated December 8.³⁷

The target was a specific American decision, presented as an assault on a wider Arab and Muslim constituency. This is broader framing than a narrow bilateral diplomatic objection, but is not a direct instruction to attack Western civilians.

Ali Baraka, November 2, 2023 — America’s enemies and possible strikes

“turn America into a thing of the past”

Role: senior Hamas official. Setting: Lebanon’s Spot Shot interview. RFA reported it November 7, citing MEMRI’s translation. Baraka imagined America’s adversaries uniting and North Korea striking the U.S.³⁸

What it establishes: approval of a geopolitical alignment hostile to America and speculation about attacks beyond Israel.

Limit: this does not establish an actual alliance, promise of intervention, or Hamas capability. RFA reported expert skepticism. The original MEMRI endpoint was inaccessible; attribution is through RFA.

Sami Abu Zuhri, February 5, 2025 — Trump’s Gaza takeover proposal

“Trump’s remarks about his desire to control Gaza are ridiculous and absurd”

Role: senior Hamas official. Reuters reported his response after Trump proposed a U.S. takeover of Gaza with Palestinians relocated elsewhere.³⁹

This is strong criticism of a particular proposal. It should not automatically be classified as opposition to all Americans or to all Western political values. The same Reuters reporting also recorded Mousa Abu Marzouk’s willingness to hold talks with the Trump administration.

Organizational statement, October 9, 2026 — ICC sanctions

Palestinian Information Center attributed to Hamas a denunciation of Trump’s ICC sanctions as an assault on international justice and an effort to protect Israeli leaders from accountability. It reported Hamas urging other states to support the court.⁴⁰

Evidence status: an organizational position reported by a Hamas-aligned outlet, not a named leader’s independently checked verbatim quotation. Its legal allegations remain attributed claims. This statement illustrates Hamas’s use of international-law language against Washington; it does not establish the merits of every allegation or every background assertion in the article.

The 2017 document: an important qualification

Hamas’s May 1, 2017 Document of General Principles and Policies states that its conflict concerns Zionism rather than Jews because of their religion. It rejects the Balfour Declaration and legitimacy of Israel, while treating a Palestinian state on the 1967 lines as a shared national-consensus formula without recognition of Israel. Its final sections endorse relations with other countries, welcome foreign supporters of Palestinian rights, and oppose domination and colonialism.⁴¹

Interpretation: the document offers a political vocabulary for selective international cooperation alongside continued rejection of Israel. It should not be presented as a declaration of universal war on Western people, nor as proof that earlier rhetoric or subsequent conduct ceased to matter. Assess the statement’s language and the organization’s behavior separately.

The Palestinian Authority, Fatah, and PLO

These are related institutions, not synonyms. The PA is a governing authority; Fatah a political movement; the PLO an umbrella national organization. Mahmoud Abbas has headed all three, but a presidential statement is not a representative public-opinion survey.

Presidency, November 2, 2017 — Britain and Balfour

“bear the primary responsibility for the displacement and suffering of the Palestinian people.”

Source: official presidency statement, carried by WAFA, assigning responsibility to the British government and its successors. It demanded an apology, compensation, recognition of Palestine, and an end to occupation. It also praised British figures supporting Palestinian statehood.⁴²

This documents a sustained anti-colonial grievance against Britain while distinguishing the government from sympathetic British people. The statement’s historical attribution of primary responsibility is its political argument, not a complete causal account of 1948.

Mahmoud Abbas, January 14, 2018 — a personal insult toward Trump

“May God demolish your house.”

Context: Abbas’s speech following U.S. recognition of Jerusalem and threats concerning aid. A contemporary Times of Israel account later that month recounts the January 14 remarks in this translation.⁴³

Other English reports translate the Arabic curse differently. Treat it as an idiomatic insult in context, not evidence of a literal operational threat against Trump’s home. Do not mix translation variants into one supposedly verbatim sentence.

Mahmoud Abbas, March 19, 2018 — David Friedman

“You son of a dog.”

Target: U.S. ambassador to Israel David Friedman, during an attack on his position on Israeli settlements. Reuters/Ynet reported the speech contemporaneously.⁴⁴

This is a personal insult directed at a U.S. official. It is stronger evidence of abusive diplomatic rhetoric than of a distinct population-wide attitude toward Americans. Descriptions of the insult’s antisemitic implications are assessments that should be attributed, rather than silently substituted for the actual words.

Mohammad Shtayyeh, October 21, 2023 — U.S. support as permission to kill

“The support of Israel blindly is a license for killing.”

Role: PA prime minister. Source: CNN’s English-language interview transcript, broadcast October 21, 2023. Shtayyeh was answering a question about American support for Israel and argued Washington should seek an end to attacks and a political solution.⁴⁵

The wording targets perceived unconditional backing. It does not say all Americans endorse killing. CNN labels the document a rush transcript, which is relevant when quoting its unusual grammar. Other disputed factual assertions elsewhere in the interview are not adopted here.

Mahmoud Abbas, April 20, 2024 — relations with Washington

“The United States has violated all international laws and abandoned all promises regarding the two-state solution and achieving peace in the region.”

Source: Abbas’s interview with official Palestinian news agency WAFA after the U.S. blocked Palestinian full UN membership. He threatened to reconsider bilateral relations, accused Washington of arming Israel while failing to protect Palestinians, and denounced double standards.⁴⁶

This is a sweeping accusation against the U.S. administration. The phrase about violating all international laws is rhetoric rather than a specific legal finding; the quotation records Abbas’s claim, not an adjudicated conclusion.

Nabil Abu Rudeineh, April 20, 2024 — military aid

“constitutes a dangerous escalation and aggression against the Palestinian people”

Role: spokesman for President Abbas. The phrase described U.S. security aid to Israel after a House aid vote. WAFA’s report also attributes to him the argument that American policy endangers wider regional stability.⁴⁷

This is an official allegation about the consequences of U.S. policy. It should not be recast as a measured finding that American society itself wants regional war.

Mahmoud Abbas, September 26, 2024 — UN General Assembly

“Stop sending weapons to Israel”

Abbas criticized U.S. arms shipments and vetoes of ceasefire resolutions. VOA reported the UN address and his attribution of responsibility to Washington. He also said he had condemned civilian killing regardless of identity and called for releases by both sides.⁴⁸

The same speech combines condemnation of U.S. conduct with a stated universal principle concerning civilian lives. Neither part establishes that every policy or practice of the PA meets that principle.

Counterevidence: PA positions are not identical to Hamas’s

• Bin Laden’s death, May 2011: PA spokesman Ghassan Khatib welcomed it and emphasized overcoming the violent methods associated with bin Laden. ABC’s contemporary report and interview transcript record this response.⁴⁹
• Trump’s election, November 2024: Abbas congratulated him and expressed willingness to cooperate on peace. Reuters reported Hamas’s call for an end to unconditional U.S. support for Israel alongside the PA’s more explicitly cooperative message.⁵⁰

Interpretation: the PA leadership has combined denunciation, diplomatic pressure, and attempts to obtain Western engagement. Its reliance on or dealings with Western institutions do not negate hostile statements; hostile statements do not establish a permanent refusal of diplomatic cooperation.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Daoud Shehab, December 2017 — the U.S. as a source of terrorism

“promotes terrorism across the Middle East”

Role: Palestinian Islamic Jihad spokesman. Anadolu attributed this description of the U.S. to his statement rejecting Trump’s Jerusalem decision. He accused Washington of inciting religious conflict and rejected its role as a stabilizing actor.³⁷

This establishes a named PIJ official’s hostile framing of America. It does not establish the legal classification of every American action or the share of Palestinians endorsing his position.

PIJ should not be merged with Hamas merely because both are Palestinian Islamist armed movements. Nor should attitudes toward their wartime roles be treated as consent to every ideological proposition they advance.

Hezbollah — a separate Lebanese actor

Hezbollah is included because its leadership, ideology, and Palestinian assessments of its wartime role are relevant to the question. Its rhetoric is not Palestinian public opinion, and it is not the opinion of all Lebanese people. Its Shiite Islamist identity also differs from Hamas and PIJ.

Open Letter, February 16, 1985

“the first root of vice is America”

Source: Hezbollah’s founding Open Letter, in a partial U.S. government/FBIS translation reproduced with provenance by Middle East Forum. The document identifies confrontation with America as central and seeks the departure of American and French forces and their allies from Lebanon.⁵¹

This is foundational ideological hostility extending beyond a dispute with a particular president. The historical translation contains gaps, marked in the reproduction; the quoted phrase is readable rather than reconstructed from a missing passage.

Political Document, November 30, 2009

“American terrorism is the origin of all terrorism in the world”

Source: Hezbollah’s political document, reproduced in Arabic and English by Middle East Forum. It depicts U.S. global power, capitalism, and military intervention as a destructive system. Its Europe section criticizes European subordination to Washington while calling for a more independent European approach and invoking European histories of resistance.⁵²

This is broad anti-American ideology expressed through anti-imperialist arguments. Yet even this document differentiates Europe from America and envisages cooperation under different policies. The claim about the origin of all terrorism is the organization’s polemic, not a historical finding.

Hassan Nasrallah, November 3, 2023 — assigning responsibility for Gaza

“You, the Americans, can stop the aggression against Gaza because it is your aggression.”

Role: Hezbollah secretary-general. Reuters reported his first major address after October 7. He assigned responsibility to the U.S., warned of regional escalation, and referred threateningly to American warships.⁵³

The claim that Washington could stop the war and the threat of escalation should be distinguished. Neither establishes that the U.S. commanded every Israeli action or that escalation would necessarily occur as predicted.

Naim Qassem, December 5, 2025 — U.S. policy toward Lebanon

“Israel and America want to keep Lebanon under fire.”

Role: Hezbollah chief. Naharnet reported the remarks in criticism of the ceasefire-monitoring negotiations. The report also records his support for the Lebanese state continuing diplomacy to end attacks.⁵⁴

This combines an accusation of hostile intent with acceptance of a particular diplomatic route. It is not a representative finding about what Lebanese people think.

Naim Qassem, January 26, 2026 — U.S. threats against Iran

“we are not neutral”

Reuters reported Qassem addressing U.S. threats against Iran and Ali Khamenei; intervention remained a decision for later.⁵⁵

This establishes alignment with Iran, not an order for a particular attack or a declaration that Western civilians were targets.

Palestinian approval of Hezbollah’s role is another question

The PCPSR actor-performance findings in More recent evidence, 2025–2026 measure satisfaction with Hezbollah’s wartime role, not acceptance of every passage in its foundational documents. The distinction matters particularly when comparing a Lebanese organization’s ideology with Palestinian public attitudes.

Interpretation and competing explanations

What can be stated confidently

• Anti-American sentiment is substantial and historically persistent across different measures and administrations. The historical public-opinion data cannot be explained entirely as an immediate reaction to the post-October 7 war.
• The evidence extends beyond policy disapproval. Older direct questions about Americans and Westerners document negative social attitudes and stereotypes. They should not be replaced with a reassuring assumption that the public dislikes only governments.
• Different dimensions remain separable. Technological admiration, interest in migration, valuing diplomatic relations, disliking popular culture, and denouncing military aid can coexist without being the same underlying opinion.
• Leadership rhetoric ranges in intensity. Criticism of military aid, an insult to an ambassador, a claim of American imperialism, praise for bin Laden, and speculation about destroying America are not equivalent statements.
• Attitudes are heterogeneous. Gaza/West Bank differences, changes between waves, varying views of European states, and neutral or uncertain responses all matter.
• Society and policy were rated differently when both were asked. In 2003, majorities approved of American science, education, gender equality, and the economy while rejecting its foreign policy. In 2016, the American people drew about three times the favorability of U.S. foreign policy (35% versus 12%), though still a majority unfavorable.
• Rejection has a long record. 2001 disbelief in al-Qaeda’s responsibility, near-unanimous opposition to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, and the 2020 plan’s 94% rejection all predate the current war.

The strongest policy-centered explanation

American military backing for Israel, perceptions of diplomatic bias, Jerusalem policy, and judgments about civilian protection provide a coherent explanation for much of the recorded distrust. Questions that explicitly ask about motives and policy, as well as the leaders’ own accounts, support examining those mechanisms. Interest in useful American ties and different ratings of Western countries also suggest that policy choices can matter.

Limit: a plausible mechanism is not proof that it accounts for every individual’s hostility. A survey cannot isolate all influences of religion, education, media, personal experience, identity, or prior ideology.

The strongest ideological and cultural explanation

The direct questions about Westerners, dislike of cultural exports, Hamas’s earlier ideological language, and Hezbollah’s system-wide hostility show why analysis should not stop at a single Israeli–American policy dispute. Some rhetoric frames America and the West as adversaries of an Islamic community or as part of a wider structure of domination.

Limit: a charter or speech does not establish how fully ordinary people absorb that worldview. Cultural conservatism also does not automatically imply support for attacking outsiders or rejection of every democratic institution.

Accommodation and counterevidence

There is also explicit evidence against a uniform, timeless hostility thesis:

• The PA and Hamas responded differently to bin Laden’s death.
• In January 2015, Hamas publicly condemned the Paris attacks and rejected killing innocent people because of differences of opinion; Reuters also reported Nasrallah condemning the attacks’ damage to Islam.⁵⁶
• Hamas’s 2017 document contains language supporting international relationships and cooperation.
• Hamas officials’ willingness to talk to Washington and the PA’s congratulatory message to Trump sit alongside denunciations.
• Some surveys find large groups valuing American ties or requesting more humanitarian engagement.

These positions do not resolve contradictions with other statements or conduct. They establish that ideological hostility, selective alliances, pragmatic bargaining, and distinctions between governments and civilians all belong in the account.

What this research cannot establish

It cannot establish that Palestinians universally hate Americans, that a majority currently endorses attacking Western civilians, that all anti-American sentiment is justified or unjustified, or that criticism of a particular Western policy is necessarily hostility to Western people. It also cannot establish that leaders’ legal accusations are judicial findings or that prospective migrants adopt every value of their destination society.

Methods, limits, and research gaps

Reading the polling correctly

1. Population: West Bank/East Jerusalem surveys exclude Gaza unless the source states otherwise. Palestinian Muslim subsamples exclude Christians. None of these samples represents every Palestinian in the diaspora.
2. Measure: keep country favorability, leader approval, perceived bias, friendship/enmity, preferred cooperation, wartime performance, and civilian-targeting questions separate.
3. Date: fieldwork date matters more than a later publication date. Arab Barometer’s 2023 wave ran September 28–October 8 and is largely prewar; its 2025 wave was published in 2026. Neither should be called a November 2026 survey.
4. Wartime coverage: displacement, inaccessible areas, shelter sampling, incomplete population counts, and fear can affect coverage and response. A quoted sampling margin does not capture every such error.
5. Question wording: prompted stereotypes and offered explanations are not spontaneous answers. Agreement with multiple supplied motives does not imply that respondents ranked them in that order.
6. Rounding: categories can total slightly above or below 100%. Do not classify every non-favorable or unsure respondent as hostile. Percentages marked as combined categories in this note are explicit sums.
7. Causation: differences between cross-sectional waves do not show the same individuals changing their minds or isolate what caused the change.
8. Source independence: PCPSR conducts Palestinian fieldwork for Arab Barometer. Their reports are not always independent replications. Washington Institute polling uses PCPO fieldwork; the sponsor and fieldwork organization should both be identified.
9. Regional aggregates: Arab Opinion Index and Arab Center figures for the Arab region are not Palestinian figures unless a Palestinian result is specifically reported.

For the broader archive and its existing methodological discussion, see Polls — reliability and methodological caveats.

Reading the quotations correctly

• Primary evidence: an organizational document establishes what the organization published; a broadcaster’s transcript establishes its recorded account of an interview. WAFA is useful primary evidence of the PA presidency’s public position, not independent verification of its accusations. The same principle applies to Hamas-aligned Palestinian Information Center.
• Reported speech: Reuters and other contemporary reports provide stronger attribution than unattributed quotation lists. Preserve the role, date, occasion, target, and translation provenance.
• Reproductions: Meshaal’s 2006 extract is verified to CEP’s reproduction of a MEMRI translation. Baraka’s 2023 extract is attributed through RFA’s report citing MEMRI. Original clip endpoints were inaccessible here. Do not describe either as independently verified from the Arabic video.
• Translation: English renditions of idioms can differ materially. Keep each quotation tied to its published wording. Arabic originals beside MEF translations are valuable for later checking; this research did not independently audit every Arabic translation.
• Selection: the negative quotation collection was intentionally assembled to answer this request. Its existence establishes documented examples, not the frequency of hostile language relative to all the leaders’ statements. The accommodation section helps prevent that selection from becoming a misleading population claim.

Source discrepancies and remaining gaps

• PCPSR Poll 97’s page contains a stray September 2025 date caption, while its dated release, narrative, and methodology specify August 5–8, 2026. This note uses the latter and flags the inconsistency.
• The AB8 international-relations report contains inconsistent prose about some changes from 2021. This note relies on its explicit 2023 result table rather than treating those conflicting trend sentences as a clean time series.
• The AB9 governance report limits most governance questions to the West Bank but does not reproduce all territorial routing. Its democracy findings are not generalized here to Gaza.
• The An-Najah Poll 52 webpage linked in the existing vault note returned 404. It was not used to establish a new numerical finding. Birzeit’s 2001 page was located but could not be retrieved reliably; no 9/11 approval percentage was taken from it.
• A current direct, representative measure of attitudes toward American people, rather than the U.S. government, remains a gap. The latest found is PCPSR’s February 2016 poll (35% favorable); the 2013 Pew and 2016 PCPSR observations should not be casually updated to the present.
• Second-pass discrepancies:
  • Arab Barometer VII: the report labels Biden-versus-Trump “same or worse” as 71%, but its components (56% same, 31% worse) sum to 87%. The components are used.
  • PCPSR Poll 7 (2003): the archived war-support table has misaligned answer labels; PCPSR’s summary figure of 99% opposed is used.
  • PCPSR Poll 19 (2006): the base of the attacks-on-nationals item is ambiguous; it is flagged in the text.
  • Gallup 2010: the Palestinian fieldwork year for its items is not given in the extracted text.
• Not used: the Gaza respondents’ willingness to emigrate after Trump’s 2025 displacement remarks (PCPSR Poll 95) concerns emigration, not views of the U.S., so it was not added.
• Third-pass exclusions and limits:
  • PCPO Poll 219: about 68% saw the Trump administration as supportive of or closer to Israel on Gaza, but the archived release gives no fieldwork dates or sample size, so it is not used.
  • Pew 2003 report: the archived PDF’s text layer is garbled; Pew’s 2003 Palestinian figures are taken from its 2009 retrospective instead.
  • JMCC 2008 vs 2026: the two waves use different questions, so the comparison is a ranking, not a trend line.
  • Layout: JMCC 105’s two-column layout interleaves its tables. Totals were matched by column and each set sums to 100%.
• This is a broad, dated research dossier, not an exhaustive collection of every poll, speech, social-media statement, or Palestinian diaspora community. No pooled “anti-Western percentage” has been calculated from incompatible questions.

Connections in the vault

• Polls — parent source map, long-run polling, and archives.
• Hamas · Hamas in Its Own Words — organizational history and a wider rhetoric collection.
• Israel–United States relations · United States Supporting Israel — policies about which respondents and leaders express views.
• Lebanon, Israel, and Hezbollah — the separate Lebanese context.
• Cross-vault → Blowback — causation, responsibility, and limits — distinguish explanations of hostility from moral or causal overclaims.
• Cross-vault → September 11 attacks · Osama bin Laden · Iraq War — the events behind the 2001–2011 polling.
• Cross-vault → Pinker on Muslim opinion and Western values — Gallup’s cross-national evidence that distrust of U.S. policy coexisted with support for democratic values; useful for comparison, not a Palestinian-specific source.

Further reading — scholarship on anti-Americanism

These works explain why anti-American opinion varies, which the polls above cannot do on their own. None was read in full for this note. Details were confirmed from publisher, journal, or repository listings, and the summaries come from those abstracts. Check whether each includes Palestinian respondents before citing it about Palestinians specifically.

• Peter J. Katzenstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Anti-Americanisms in World Politics (Cornell University Press, 2007). Distinguishes liberal, social, sovereign-nationalist, and radical anti-Americanisms; chapter 7 is Marc Lynch, “Anti-Americanisms in the Arab World.” The plural is the point: the typology fits this note’s split between policy, society, and ideology. Project MUSE
• Lisa Blaydes and Drew A. Linzer, “Elite Competition, Religiosity, and Anti-Americanism in the Islamic World,” American Political Science Review 106, no. 2 (2012): 225–243. Using nearly 13,000 Muslim respondents in 21 countries, they argue that anti-Americanism rises where Islamist and secular-nationalist elites compete for support, not simply where publics are most religious. Cambridge
• Mark Tessler and Michael D. H. Robbins, “What Leads Some Ordinary Arab Men and Women to Approve of Terrorist Acts Against the United States?” Journal of Conflict Resolution 51, no. 2 (2007): 305–328. Surveys in Algeria and Jordan, not Palestine. They find that judgments of Western culture, religiosity, and economic circumstances did not explain approval; negative views of the actors seen as responsible for the political status quo did. RePEc
• Amaney A. Jamal, Robert O. Keohane, David Romney, and Dustin Tingley, “Anti-Americanism and Anti-Interventionism in Arabic Twitter Discourses,” Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 1 (2015): 55–73. Arabic tweets from 2012–2013. Hostility focused more on U.S. intervention than on American society, and discourse about Iran was at least as negative. The authors caution that Twitter users are not a representative public. Cambridge
• Amaney A. Jamal, Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All? (Princeton University Press, 2012). Palestine is one of five cases. The argument is that U.S. strategic priorities shape how Arab citizens weigh democratic change against the status quo. Relevant to the Arab Barometer democracy findings above. Review listing
• Giacomo Chiozza, Anti-Americanism and the American World Order (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009). Global survey data, read as showing that most anti-Americanism is shallow and that deep ideological opposition is a minority position. Project MUSE

How they bear on the debate:

• Tessler and Robbins, and Jamal et al., support a policy-centered reading.
• Blaydes and Linzer add a domestic-politics mechanism that neither the policy nor the culture explanation captures.
• Chiozza cautions against treating survey hostility as deep ideological commitment.

Sources

Sources accessed November 1, 2026. Links are ordinary Markdown for reuse. Polling sources are the pollsters’ own releases or tables. Documentary translations and organizational media are identified as such. Publication dates are distinguished from fieldwork in the body.

Footnotes

1. Pew Research Center, July 23, 2009, Chapter 1: Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy. Includes the earlier Palestinian favorability observations. ↩

2. Pew Research Center, July 14, 2014, Chapter 1: The American Brand. Country favorability, including the 2013 comparison. ↩

3. Jay Loschky, Gallup, October 3, 2024, Palestinians See U.S. Response to Gaza as Failure. Historical leadership trend and July–August 2024 policy questions; West Bank/EJ. ↩ ↩²

4. JMCC/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2011, Poll 74 — Governance and politics. Bias and Obama speech: pp. 1–2; methodology follows. ↩

5. JMCC/Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, February 2017, Poll 89 — Gender, Equality and Politics. Trump/Obama comparisons and embassy responses; fieldwork February 17–21. ↩

6. Khalil Shikaki/PCPSR, Arab Barometer VIII, February 2024, Palestinian perception of international actors and international relations. Fieldwork September 28–October 8, 2023. U.S. result table: printed p. 17; Ukraine pp. 16, 29. ↩ ↩²

7. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 90, fieldwork November 22–December 2, 2023. Blame and U.S.-involved postwar discussions; methodology in release. ↩

8. AWRAD, November 2023 poll, results tables. Locate role, motives, hope, and conflict items by question text; numbering differs from contents. ↩ ↩²

9. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 96, fieldwork October 22–25, 2025, section 6: satisfaction with selected actors. ↩

10. Pew Research Center, September 15, 2026, Views of the U.S. providing military assistance to Israel and humanitarian aid to Gaza. Palestinian fieldwork March 30–April 28, 2026; excludes Gaza. ↩

11. PCPSR, August 12, 2026, Public Opinion Poll 97. Fieldwork August 5–8, 2026; section 5: U.S.–Iran war. Date-caption inconsistency flagged above. ↩

12. PCPSR wartime polls in the vault archive. U.S. satisfaction: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). Blame: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). Western response and two-state talk: Attachment (file not included in this release). Campus protests: Attachment (file not included in this release).
    psr96pdf: PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 96, fieldwork October 22–25, 2025: Attachment (file not included in this release). The same poll’s web release is cited for the satisfaction figures above.
    psr75: PCPSR, February 11, 2020, Public Opinion Poll No (75) Press Release, fieldwork February 5–8, 2020, with the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung; section 1.
    ab5: Arab Barometer Wave V, Palestine Country Report (2019), fieldwork October 5–24, 2018, conducted by PCPSR: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    ab7: Khalil Shikaki/PCPSR, Arab Barometer VII Palestine Report, fieldwork October 14–23, 2021, about 1,800 interviews: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    pew11bl: Pew Research Center, May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden Largely Discredited Among Muslim Publics in Recent Years. Palestinian Muslim respondents; the 2003 level is derived from Pew’s stated 38-point decline.
    gallup10: Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, November 28, 2010, Measuring the State of Muslim-West Relations: Assessing the “New Beginning”: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmccbias: JMCC releases in the vault archive: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) (West Bank April 5–7, Gaza April 10–12) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmccpres: JMCC releases: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) and Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release), fieldwork Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmcc08: JMCC, Poll 66, fieldwork November 20–23, 2008, n=1,200: Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmcc105: JMCC with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Poll 105, fieldwork August 20–25, 2026, n=1,200 (715 West Bank including East Jerusalem, 485 Gaza): Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmcc101: JMCC, Poll 101, fieldwork October 21–23, 2023, West Bank only, n=715: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release).
    jmcc104: JMCC with the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Poll 104, fieldwork September 4–8, 2025, West Bank only, n=715: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

13. PCPSR/Arab Barometer IX, March 2026, Report II, printed pp. 13–15, 20–21. ↩ ↩² ↩³ ↩⁴

14. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 3, fieldwork December 19–24, 2001, n=1,357, archived in the vault: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). Combined categories are summed here from the tables. ↩ ↩² ↩³

15. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 7, fieldwork April 3–7, 2003, n=1,315: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). Q17’s answer labels are misaligned in the PDF. ↩

16. Pew Research Center, July 18, 2013, Comparative topline, Q9b, printed p. 72 / PDF p. 10. Original table visually checked for the Palestinian row. ↩

17. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 9, fieldwork October 7–14, 2003, n=1,318: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). ↩ ↩²

18. PCPSR with the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Palestinian Perception of Germany and its Policy on the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict, second round, fieldwork February 10–14, 2016, n=1,270, released March 7, 2016: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). ↩ ↩²

19. Pew Research Center, July 18, 2013, Chapter 1: Attitudes toward the United States. U.S. as partner/enemy. ↩

20. Pew Research Center, July 21, 2011, Chapter 2: How Muslims and Westerners View Each Other. Palestinian Muslim subsample; prompted traits. ↩

21. Pew Research Center, July 21, 2011, Chapter 1: The Rift Between Muslims and the West. Relations, perceived hostility, and economic explanations. ↩

22. Pew Research Center, June 27, 2007, Views of the U.S. and American Foreign Policy, science/technology and popular-culture sections. ↩

23. Arab Center Washington DC/ACRPS, Arab Opinion Index 2022 — Executive Summary, section 7. The body distinguishes Palestinian results from regional averages. ↩

24. Arab Center Washington DC/ACRPS, Arab Opinion Index 2025, international-policy and U.S. sections. Figures used here are regional aggregates. ↩

25. Arab Center Washington DC/ACRPS, Arab Public Opinion about Israel’s War on Gaza, methodology and section 4; December 2023–January 2024. ↩

26. Frances McDonough, Washington Institute, August 23, 2023, Palestinians More Positive on Abraham Accords and Open to Vying Powers Than Arab Neighbors. PCPO fieldwork July 8–27, 2023. ↩

27. Catherine Cleveland, Washington Institute, June 30, 2022, New Poll in West Bank Shows Shift from Maximalist Views of 2020. U.S. involvement, desired pressure, and relations. ↩

28. PCPSR, January 26, 2026, Arab Barometer IX — Governance and the Domestic Balance of Power, methodology and section 4. Most governance questions excluded Gaza; routing caveat above. ↩

29. PCPSR/Arab Barometer, June 2024, Palestinian Perception of Migration, destination table printed p. 9; fieldwork September–October 2023. ↩

30. Pew Research Center, September 10, 2013, Muslim Publics Share Concerns about Extremist Groups, civilian-targeting item and territorial breakdown. ↩

31. Pew Research Center, July 1, 2014, Concerns about Islamic Extremism on the Rise in Middle East, corresponding item; Palestinian Muslim respondents. ↩

32. Pew Research Center, July 21, 2011, Chapter 3: Islamic Extremism. Concern about extremism; not an approval question. ↩

33. PCPSR, Public Opinion Poll 19, fieldwork March 16–18, 2006, n=1,270: Attachment (file not included in this release) · Attachment (file not included in this release). ↩

34. Hamas, August 18, 1988, Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, Article 22. Middle East Forum reproduction/translation with Arabic exhibit scans. ↩

35. Counter Extremism Project, Khaled Meshaal — February 3, 2006. Reproduces MEMRI’s translated Damascus-mosque address; original endpoint inaccessible here. ↩

36. Reuters, May 2, 2011, Report carried by Ynet, Haniyeh’s response to bin Laden’s killing. ↩

37. Ali Abo Rezeg, Anadolu, December 7–8, 2017, Palestinian resistance groups decry US Jerusalem move. Barhoum and Shehab statements. ↩ ↩²

38. Cho Jinwoo, Radio Free Asia, November 7, 2023, Hamas official says North Korea could attack US over Gaza war. November 2 interview; quotes attributed via MEMRI, with skeptical expert responses. ↩

39. Reuters/Times of Israel, February 5, 2025, Live reporting on Hamas’s response and willingness to hold U.S. talks. Abu Zuhri quotation and Abu Marzouk position. ↩

40. Palestinian Information Center, October 9, 2026, Hamas: Trump’s ICC sanctions are grave assault on justice. Hamas-aligned outlet reporting an organizational statement; allegations attributed. ↩

41. Hamas, May 1, 2017, A Document of General Principles and Policies, particularly paragraphs 16–20 and 37–42. Middle East Forum paired Arabic/English reproduction. ↩

42. WAFA, November 2, 2017, Presidency demands apology from Britain for Palestinian suffering. Official presidential statement. ↩

43. Times of Israel, January 25, 2018, Contemporary account recounting Abbas’s January 14 speech. Published translation used in the body. ↩

44. Reuters and Itamar Eichner/Ynet, March 19, 2018, Report on Abbas’s insult to Friedman. ↩

45. CNN, Newsroom transcript, October 21, 2023, 12–1 p.m. ET. Shtayyeh interview with Becky Anderson; rush transcript. ↩

46. WAFA, April 20, 2024, President Abbas: Palestinian leadership to reconsider bilateral relations with the United States. Official interview. ↩

47. WAFA, April 20, 2024, Presidency: US military aid to Israel translates into thousands of Palestinian victims. Official spokesman’s position, not an independently established casualty forecast. ↩

48. VOA, September 26, 2024, Palestinian leader Abbas calls for US to end arms shipments to Israel. Contemporary reporting on the UN address. ↩

49. ABC, May 2–3, 2011, Arab world divided on bin Laden’s demise and interview transcript. PA spokesman Ghassan Khatib’s response. ↩

50. Reuters, November 6, 2024, Palestinians dismayed by Trump’s win, their leaders urge peace. Wire text retrieved in indexed reporting; the host subsequently displayed a browser check. ↩

51. Hezbollah, February 16, 1985, Open Letter Addressed to the Downtrodden in Lebanon and the World. Partial FBIS/U.S. government translation reproduced by Middle East Forum. ↩

52. Hezbollah, November 30, 2009, The Political Document of Hezbollah. Paired Arabic/English reproduction, especially global/U.S. hegemony and Europe sections. ↩

53. Reuters, November 3, 2023, Hezbollah tells U.S. to halt Israel’s Gaza attack to prevent regional war. Also contemporary Reuters reproduction. Indexed wire text was available; ThePrint’s direct page later displayed a browser check. ↩

54. Naharnet, December 5, 2025, Qassem backs diplomacy but slams adding civilian to negotiations committee. ↩

55. Reuters, January 26, 2026, Lebanon’s Hezbollah chief says group concerned with confronting US threat against Iran. ↩

56. Reuters/Irish Times, January 10, 2015, Hamas condemns Paris attacks as having no justification. Includes Nasrallah’s contemporaneous criticism of the attacks. ↩