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• 60.10 Logic Misc Notes

• 60.10.2 Books

  • Books

  • Descartes' Error - Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain

  • Introduction to Logic

  • Logic for Lawyers - A Guide to Clear Legal Thinking

  • Notes

    • Asking the Right Questions by M. Neil Browne
    • Being Logical by DQ McInerny
    • Crimes Against Logic by Jamie Whyte
    • Don't Believe Everything You Think by Thomas Kida
    • Mistakes Were Made by Carol Tavris

  • The Predictioneer's Game - Using the Logic of Brazen Self-Interest to See and Shape the Future

• Aesthetic vs Function

• Bayes’ theorem

• Deductive & Inductive Reasoning

• Deontic logic

• Laws of Logic

• Logic - Peterson Academy

• Logic & Reasoning (MOC)

• Logic without God

• Logical Consequence - Entailment

• Natural Deduction

• Proposition

• Propositional Logic

• Slides

• Syllogisms and Venn-Diagram Validity Testing

• Syllogisms and Venn-Diagram Validity Testing

• Syllogisms and Venn-Diagram Validity Testing

• Truth-Apt Statement

logic.base.base (file not included in this release)

Think - Simon Blackburn

Chapter Six — “Reasoning”

Logic MOC

Overview of the Main Idea and Themes

Blackburn surveys how we reason well: what validity is, how formal logic works, why induction is philosophically problematic, how to think about probability (including Bayes’s theorem and the base-rate fallacy), and how scientific explanation and modeling operate. He contrasts logic’s strict standards (validity/contradiction) with everyday plausible reasoning, then addresses Hume’s challenge to a priori causation and to the rational credentials of projecting past regularities into the future. He closes by sketching the role of paradigms in science (Kuhn) without collapsing into relativism.

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Key Arguments, Facts, and Developments (in sequence)

1) A little logic: premises, conclusions, and validity

• An argument can be faulted either because a premise is untrue or because the inference is invalid; these are distinct faults. Logic’s question: is there no way the premises could be true while the conclusion is false? If not, the argument is valid.

2) Truth-functions and truth-tables

• Classical assumptions: each proposition is true or false (two-valued); connectives like not, and, or, and if…thencan be characterized by what they do to truth-values.
• Truth-tables show, e.g., modus ponens is a valid form; they also define contradiction (always false) and tautology (always true).
• Scope and bracketing matter: misplacing scope (e.g., of a negation) changes logical force and can create fallacies; reductio ad absurdum tests validity by deriving contradiction from premises plus the negation of the conclusion.

3) Beyond propositions: quantifiers (Frege’s breakthrough)

• Pre-Frege confusions (e.g., “everyone has a mother, therefore someone is everyone’s mother”) stem from not distinguishing quantificational structure.
• With predicates and variables, we can represent existential (∃) and universal (∀) claims and show why
  • ∀y∃x xMy (“everyone has a mother”) ≠ ∃x∀y xMy (“someone is everyone’s mother”).
• Quantificational clarity also illuminates ordinary ambiguities, e.g., “All the nice girls love a sailor” (which scoping?), and even constitutional wording (who bears arms: each person or the people collectively?).

4) Language vs. logic: semantics, pragmatics, implicature

• “Poor but honest” asserts only p & q but implicates surprise; word choice and order generate implicatures without changing truth-conditions.
• “Have you stopped beating your wife?” analyzed as (once did Y) & (now not-Y); a bare “No” underdetermines which conjunct fails.
• Natural‐language if…then often does more than the material conditional; still, material implication captures a core, with the rest handled semantically/pragmatically.

5) From validity to plausibility

• Much real-life reasoning is not watertight deduction but plausible inference over a space of possibilities (e.g., roulette). Logic helps, but we also need probability to capture “most ways the world could be” given our evidence.

6) Hume’s problem of induction (and the “Golden Harp” lottery)

• Experience gives certain information only about the past/present; projecting to the future requires a step that needs justification.
• Blackburn’s “Heaven/Earth” thought experiment: tickets encode nine “acts” of sky color; Straightie (all blue) and Kinkie (blue then yellow) both match the first five acts, so neither gains rational advantage just from that track record.
• Moral: the uniformity of nature cannot be proved from experience without circularity; reason seems silentbetween rival continuations that fit past data equally well.

7) Probability done right: base rates and Bayes’s theorem

• Medical-test case: a rare disease (1/1000) with a test “>99% reliable” yields a positive; still, the chance of truly having the disease is ~1/11, not ~99%—because false positives against a tiny base rate dominate. This is the base-rate fallacy.
• Bayes’s theorem: Posterior Prob(h|e) depends on
  1. Prior Prob(h),
  2. Fit Prob(e|h), and
  3. Overall likelihood Prob(e) (how easily the evidence could arise otherwise).
• Mandy Rice-Davies’s quip (“He would, wouldn’t he?”) illustrates a high Prob(e) regardless of h, which undercuts evidential force.
• Applying Bayes to the Golden Harp shows Straightie and Kinkie remain tied: same prior for their complete patterns, perfect fit with the observed five blues, and the same likelihood of that partial evidence.

8) P-values and chance: why “improbable” ≠ “non-chance”

• Merely showing a result is rare under chance (p<0.05) need not support a non-chance cause; if alternative hypotheses have very low priors, even striking data may not overcome them. Chance routinely produces highly specific improbable sequences (e.g., Scrabble letters); improbability alone is not evidence of design.

9) Explanation, models, and paradigms

• Empirical laws (Boyle’s law) record reliable relations; mechanistic models (kinetic theory) explain them by fewer, deeper assumptions.
• This does not dissolve induction but reduces independent assumptions, yielding understanding.
• Against a priori constraints on causation: Hume denies we can see by reason alone what must cause what; even Newton could only state what gravity does, not its inner nature.
• Kuhn: science advances through normal periods and paradigm shifts; yet this need not imply “anything goes.” Scientific practice contains self-correcting mechanisms that filter out bad models over time.

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Notable Quotes (brief, representative)

• Logic’s aim: to ensure “there is no way that the premises could be true without the conclusion being true.”
• On quantifiers: the difference between “everyone has a mother” (∀y∃x xMy) and “someone is everyone’s mother” (∃x∀y xMy) is “entirely different” information.
• Hume on induction: extending experience beyond its bounds is a “process of thought, and an inference, which wants to be explained.”
• On Bayes: the value of evidence depends not only on its fit with a hypothesis but also on how easily it could have arisen anyway.
• Hume on causes: knowledge of causal relations is “not… attained by reasonings a priori; but arises entirely from experience.”

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Connection to the Whole Book

The chapter equips the reader with core tools—validity, quantification, semantic/pragmatic distinctions, probability, Bayes—that clarify earlier debates (knowledge, mind, God) and prepare for later topics. It reinforces Blackburn’s method: conceptual engineering joined to evidence-sensitive reasoning, skeptical of a priori guarantees yet confident in science’s self-corrective practice.

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Concise Takeaway

Good reasoning has layers. Logic secures validity and exposes contradiction; quantifiers reveal structure hidden by ordinary language; pragmatics explains what is suggested beyond what is said. In the uncertain world, we need probability and Bayes to weigh evidence properly (avoid base-rate errors). Yet Hume shows that the leap from past to future lacks a non-circular proof; at best we manage risk and build explanatory models that survive testing. Science progresses not by a priori insight into necessity but by stable patterns, better models, and correction over time.

Explain like High Schooler

The Big Idea

This chapter is about how we think clearly and justify our beliefs. Blackburn explores what makes reasoning valid, why induction (learning from experience) is tricky, and how probability and science help us manage uncertainty.
It’s a mix of logic, critical thinking, and philosophy of science.

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1. Logic — The Rules of Good Thinking

Logic asks: when do our reasons actually guarantee our conclusions?

• An argument is valid when it’s impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion false.
  • Example:
    • All humans are mortal.
    • Socrates is human.
    • Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
      That’s a valid argument because if both premises are true, the conclusion must be.
• Logic uses truth tables (for “and,” “or,” “not,” and “if…then”) to show when statements line up or contradict.
• A contradiction can’t ever be true (“I’m both alive and not alive”).
• A tautology is always true (“Either it’s raining or it’s not”).
  Blackburn’s point: logic is a tool — it helps you avoid bad inferences, but it doesn’t tell you what’s true about the world.

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2. Quantifiers — “All,” “Some,” and “Someone”

Before modern logic, philosophers often made messy arguments using “all” and “some.”
Example:

• “Everyone has a mother, therefore someone is everyone’s mother.”
  → Wrong!
  Modern logic (thanks to Frege) fixed this with symbols:
• “Everyone has a mother” = ∀y∃x (x is y’s mother).
• “Someone is everyone’s mother” = ∃x∀y (x is mother of y).
  By formalizing language, logic helps prevent confusion caused by ambiguous phrasing in everyday speech.

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3. Beyond Deduction — Reasoning in the Real World

Most of our thinking isn’t strict logic — it’s inductive or probabilistic reasoning:

• You see the sun rise every day and infer it will rise tomorrow.
• You hear thunder after lightning and infer a pattern.
  That’s induction: learning from patterns in experience.
  The problem (Hume’s problem of induction):
• We can’t prove that the future will resemble the past.
• The fact that the sun has risen every day doesn’t guarantee it will tomorrow.
• Yet we can’t live without trusting patterns — it’s how science works.
  Hume’s insight: reason alone can’t justify induction; it’s a habit of mind, not a logical certainty.

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4. Probability and Bayes’ Theorem

Since certainty is rare, we use probability to weigh evidence.

The Base-Rate Fallacy:

Suppose:

• A disease affects 1 in 1000 people.
• A test detects it 99% of the time (but gives 1% false positives).
  If you test positive, what’s the chance you really have it?
  It’s not 99%. It’s only about 1 in 11 — because so many healthy people test positive by accident.
  That’s why base rates (how common something is) matter in reasoning — we often ignore them.

Bayes’ Theorem:

Bayes’ Rule helps us update beliefs when we get new evidence.
It combines:

• How likely something was before (the prior)
• How well the evidence fits that thing (likelihood)
• How likely the evidence was overall
  Blackburn gives examples like Mandy Rice-Davies’ famous line: “He would, wouldn’t he?” — showing how _expected_evidence weakens its power.

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5. Explanation and Science

Science works by explaining patterns, not just listing them.

• A law (like Boyle’s Law) describes what happens.
• A theory (like kinetic theory) explains why it happens by showing deeper mechanisms.
  This makes science powerful, even though it still relies on induction.
  Blackburn brings up Newton’s gravity: we know how it works, but not what gravity “is.” That’s fine — good science predicts and connects observations, even without metaphysical certainty.

---

6. Thomas Kuhn and Paradigm Shifts

Blackburn briefly discusses Thomas Kuhn’s idea that science doesn’t always move smoothly; sometimes it revolutionizes.

• Old “paradigms” (frameworks for understanding) can be replaced when anomalies pile up.
• But that doesn’t mean “anything goes” — scientific progress still aims for better fit with evidence and wider explanatory power.

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7. The Lesson

• Pure logic = certainty, but little content.
• Induction = content, but never certainty.
• Probability = how we manage uncertainty intelligently.
• Science = our best example of disciplined reasoning despite uncertainty.

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In Short

Blackburn wants you to see that:

• Logic keeps our reasoning tight.
• Probability helps us stay realistic.
• Induction is an unavoidable leap of faith.
• Science succeeds not because it’s perfect, but because it’s self-correcting — it builds models that keep surviving tests.
  his with a study guide version — key terms and definitions (like “deduction,” “induction,” “Bayesian reasoning,” etc.) formatted for quick review?

Link to original

Sources and reading material

• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Bibliography of Logic and Philosophy of Logic at PhilPapers
• Metamath Proof Explorer
• Open Logic Project
• A Logic Calculator

Introductions to logic

• Agazzi, E. (Ed.): Modern Logic - A Survey. Historical, Philosophical and Mathematical Aspects of Modern Logic and Its Applications (Synthese Library 149), Dordrecht-Boston-London 1981.
• Ajdukiewicz, K.: Abriß der Logik, Berlin 1958.
• Asser, G.: Einführung in die mathematische Logik I-III, Leipzig and Frankfurt. a. M-1981.
• Barlingay, S. S.: A Modern Introduction to Indian Logic, New Delhi 1965, 2.ed.
• Becker, O.: Einführung in die Logistik, vorzüglich in den Modalkalkül, Meisenheim 1951.
• Beckermann, A.: Einführung in die Logik, Berlin 1997, 2. ed. 2003.
• Beth, E. W.: Symbolische Logik und Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften, Bern 1948.
• Beth, E. W.: Aspects of Modern Logik, Dordrecht 1970.
• Blanché, R.: Introduction à la logique contemporaine, Paris 1957.
• Bochenski, I. M.: Grundriß der Logistik, aus dem Französischen übersetzt, neu bearbeitet und erweitert von A. Menne, Paderborn 1954.
• Bonevac, D.: Deduction. Introductory Symbolic Logic, 1955, 2. enlarged ed. Oxford 2003.
• Borkowski, L.: Formale Logik. Logische Systeme - Einführung in die Metalogik (transl. from Polish 1968), Berlin 1976, 2. ed. München 1977.
• Bucher, Th. G.: Einführung in die angewandte Logik, Berlin 1987.
• Bühler, A.: Einführung in die Logik. Argumentation und Folgerung, Freiburg-München 1992, 2. Ed. 1997.
• Carnap, R.: Einführung in die symbolische Logik mit besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Anwendungen, Wien 1954, 3.ed. 1968, Repr. 1973. Engl.: Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications, New York 1958.
• Chauvineau, J.: La logique moderne, Paris 1974.
• Church, A.: Introduction to Mathematical Logic I, Princeton N. J., 2. ed.. 1956, Repr. 1958.
• Cohen, M. and E. Nagel: An Introdction to Logic, 2. ed. by J. Corcoran, Indianapolis 1993.
• Copi, I. M.: Introduction to Logic, New York-London 1972.
• Dopp, J. : Notions de Logique formelle, Paris 1965, German transl.: Formale Logik, Einsiedeln-Zürich- Köln 1969.
• Dubarle, P.: Initiation à la logique, Paris-Löwen 1957.
• Eaton, R.: General Logic. An Introductory Survey, New York 1931, 2. ed. 1959.
• Ebbinghaus, H.-D., J. Flum and W. Thomas, Einführung in die mathematische Logik, 4. ed. Heidelberg- Berlin 1996.
• Elsenhans, Th.: Psychologie und Logik zur Einführung in die Philosophie, 4. ed. Leipzig 1907.
• Enderton, H. B.: A Mathematical Introduction to Logic, New York-London 1972, 2. ed. 2000.
• Essler, W. K.: Einführung in die Logik, Stuttgart 1966, 2. ed. 1969.
• Fitch, F. B.: Symbolic Logic. An Introduction, New York 1952.
• Freudenthal, H.: Einführung in die Sprache der Logik, München-Wien 1965.
• Grzegorczyk, A.: An Outline of Mathematical Logic, Dordrecht 1974.
• Grize, J. B.: Logique moderne, Paris 1972.
• Haas, G. : Konstruktive Einführung in die formale Logik, Mannheim 1984.
• Halmos, P. R.: Algebraic Logic, New York 1962.
• Hallpike, C.: Die Grundlagen primitiven Denkens, München 1990.
• Hasenjäger, G.: Introduction to the Basic Concepts and Problems of Modern Logic, transl. from German by E. C. M. Mays, Dordrecht 1971.
• Hasenjäger, G.: Grundzüge der mathematischen Logik, Berlin 1961.
• Hermes, H.: Einführung in die mathematische Logik. Klassische Prädikatenlogik, Stuttgart 1963, 5. ed. 1991.
• Hilbert, D. and W. Ackermann: Grundzüge der theoretischen Logik (Principles of Mathematical Logic), Berlin 1928, 6. ed. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York 1972.
• Hinst, P.: Logische Propädeutik, München 1974.
• Honecker, M.: Logik. Eine Systematik der logischen Probleme, Berlin-Bonn 1927.
• Hughes and Cresswell, New Introduction to Modal Logic
• Hurley, Patrick, A Concise Introduction to Logic
• Janich, P.: Logisch-pragmatische Propädeutik, 2001.
• Jeffrey, R. C.: Formal Logic. Its Scope and Limits, 1967, 3. ed. New York 1991.
• Jörgensen, J.: A Treatise of Formal Logic. Its Evolution and Main Branches, with Its Relations to Mathematics and Philosophy, 3 vols, Kopenhagen-London 1931, 2. ed. 1962.
• Kalish, D., R. Montague and G. Mar: Logic. Techniques of Formal Reasoning, 1964, 2. ed. New York 1980.
• Kamlah, W. and P. Lorenzen: Logische Präpädeutik oder Vorschule des vernünftigen Redens, Mannheim 1967, 2. rev. ed.. 1973, 3. ed. Stuttgart-Weimar 1996.
• Klaus, G.: Einführung in die formale Logik, Berlin 1958, 2. ed.: Moderne Logik. Abriß der formalen Logik, 1964, 7. ed. 1973.
• Kleene, S. C. Introduction to Metamathematics, Amsterdam-Groningen 1952.
• Kleene, S. C.: Mathematical Logic, New York 1967.
• Kneebone, G. T.: Mathematical Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics. An Introductory Survey, New York-Toronto-Princeton 1965.
• Kreisel, G. and J. L. Krivine: Élements de logique mathématique. Théorie des modèles, Paris 1967. German transl.: Modelltheorie. Eine Einführung in die mathematische Logik und Grundlagentheorie, Berlin 1972.
• Leblanc, L.: Introduction à la logique algébrique, Montréal 1963.
• Leonhard, H. S. : Principles of Reasoning. An Introduction to Logic, Methodology, and the Theory of Signs, New York 1967.
• Levi-Bruhl, L.: La mentalité primitive, Paris 1921.
• Lewis, C. I.: A Survey of Symbolic Logic. The Classic Algebra of Logic, New York 1918, 2. ed. 1960.
• Lorenzen, P.: Formale Logik, Berlin 1958, 4. ed. 1970, Engl.: Formal Logic, 1965 Dordrecht.
• Lorenzen, P.: Einführung in die operative Logik und Mathematik, Berlin-Göttingen-Heidelberg 1955, 2. ed. 1969.
• Lorenzen, P.: Methodisches Denken, Frankfurt a. M. 1968.
• Mates, Benson.: Elementary Logic, New York 1965, 3. ed. German transl.: Elementare Logik. Prädikatenlogik der ersten Stufe, Göttingen 1969, 2. ed. 1978.
• Mendelson, E.: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, London 1964.
• Menne, A.: Einführung in die Logik, München 1966, 2. ed. 1973.
• Menne, A.: Einführung in die formale Logik, Darmstadt 1985.
• Martin, R.: Logique contemporaine et formalisation, Paris 1962.
• Mates, E.: Elementary Logic, New York 1965, 3. ed. 1978. German: Elementare Logik. Prädikatenlogik der ersten Stufe, Göttingen 1969, 2. ed. 1978, Repr.. 1997.
• Mendelson, E.: Introduction to Mathematical Logic, Princeton 1964, 2. ed. New York 1979.
• Newton-Smith, W. H.: Logic. An Introductory Course, London 1985.
• Novikov, P. S. Introduction à la logique mathématique, Paris 1964.
• Paris, J. B. : The Uncertain Reasoner’s Companion. A Mathematical Perspective, Cambridge 1994.
• Pasquinelli, A.: Introduzione alla logica simbolica, Turin 1957.
• Prior, A. N.: Formal Logic, Oxford 1962.
• Purtill, R. I.: Logic for Philosophers, New York-London 1971.
• Quine, W. V. O.: Mathematical Logic, New York 1940, 2. ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1951.
• Quine, W. V. O.: Methods of Logic, New York 1950, 3. ed. 1962. German: Grundzüge der Logik, Frankfurt a. M. 1969, 2. ed. 1974, 6. ed. 1988.
• Read, St.: Philosophie der Logik. Eine Einführung, Reinbek 1992.
• Reichenbach, H.: Elements of Symbolic Logic, New York 1947, 2. ed. 1980.
• Sainsbury, M.: Logical Forms, Oxford 1991.
• Salmon, W. C.: Logic, Englewood Cliffs, N. H. 1973. German transl.: Logik, Stuttgart 1983.
• Schmidt, H. A.: Mathematische Gesetze der Logik, Berlin-Göttingen-Heidelberg 1960.
• Schröder, E.: Vorlesungen über die Algebra der Logik (exakte Logik), vol. 2, part 2, Leipzig 1905.
• Sinclair, W. A.: The Traditional Formal Logic, 5. ed. 1951.
• Sinovjew, A. and H. Wessel: Logische Sprachregeln. Eine Einführung in die Logik, München-Salzburg 1975.
• Smulyan, R.M.: First-Order Logic, New York 1995.
• Söder, K.: Grundriß der elementaren Logik. Eine Einführung für Juristen, 1968.
• Stebbing,, L. S.: A Modern Elementary Logic, London 1957.
• Strawson, P. F.: Introduction to Logical Theory, London 1952. 6. ed. 1985
• Strohbach, N.: Einführung in die Logik, Darmstadt 2005.
• Stuhlmann-Laiesz, R.: Philosophische Logik. Eine Einführung mit Anwendungen, Paderborn 2002.
• Suppes, P. C.: Introduction to Logic, Toronto-New York-London 1957, Repr. 1969.
• Tarski, A.: Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, 9. ed. New York 1961.
• Tarski, A.: Einführung in die mathematische Logik und in die Methodologie der Mathematik, Wien 1937, 2. ed.. Einführung in die mathematische Logik, Göttingen 1966, 5. ed. 1977.
• Trimi-Kaleri, K.: _Einige Gedanken zur Logik und ihrer Vermittlung aus gegebenem Anlaß. In: Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie / Journal for General Philosophy of Science_17, 1986, p. 353- 360.
• Urchs, M.: Klassische Logik. Eine Einführung, Berlin 1993.
• Varga, T.: Eléments de logique mathématique, Paris 1973.
• Virieux-Reymond, A.: La logique formelle, Paris 1962.
• von Freytag-Löringhoff, Br.: Logik I. Ihr System und ihr Verhältnis zur Logistik, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln- Mainz 1955, 4. ed. 1966. 5. ed. as: Das System der reinen Logik und ihr Verhältnis zur Logistik, 1972.
• von Freytag-Löringhoff, Br.: Logik II. Definitionstheorie und Methodologie des Kalkülwechsels, Stuttgart 1967.
• von Freytag-Löringhoff, Br.: Neues System der Logik. Symbolisch-symmetrische Rekonstruktion und operative Anwendung des aristotelischen Ansatzes, Hamburg 1985.
• von Kutschera, F.: Elementare Logik, Wien-New York 1967.
• von Kutschera, F. and A. Breitkopf: Einführung in die moderne Logik, Freiburg-München 1970.
• Wald, H.: Introduction to Dialectical Logic, Bukarest 1975.
• Wessel, H.: Logik (Logische Philosophie 2), Berlin 2000.
• Wolff, M.: Einführung in die Logik, München 2006.
• Zoglauer, Th.: Einführung in die formale Logik für Philosophen, Göttingen 1997.

Journals

• Acta Philosophica Fennica, Helsinki 1935 ff.
• Annals of Mathematical Logic, Vols 1 –23, 1970-1982.
• Annals of Pure and Applied Logic, 1983 ff. (= Successor of the Annals of Mathematical Logic).
• Annals of the Japan Association for the Philosophy of Science, Tokyo 1956/1957 ff.
• Analysis, Oxford 1933/34 ff.
• Archiv für mathematische Logik und Grundlagenforschung, vols 1- 26, Stuttgart-Berlin-Köln 1950 - 1987.
• Archive for Mathematical Logic, Berlin-Heidelberg 1988 ff. vol. 27 ff. (Sucessor of the former).
• Argumentation. An International Journal on Reasoning, Dordrecht 1987ff.
• Australasian Journal of Logic, Melburne 2003 ff. Electronic Edition.
• Dialectica. International Review of Philosophy of Knowledge/Revue Internationale de Philosophie de la
• Connaissance/Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Erkenntnis, Neuchâtel-Paris 1947 ff., Vols. 20 ff. Lausanne.
• Forschungen zur Logistik und zur Grundlegung der exakten Wissenschaften, Leipzig 1934-1943, Repr. in 1 vol. Hildesheim 1970.
• History and Philosophy of Logic, London 1979 ff.
• Inquiry. An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy, London 1958 ff.
• Informal Logic. Reasoning and Argumentation in Theory and Practice, 1990 ff
• International Logic Review, Bologna 1970 ff.
• Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, 1991 ff.
• Journal of Logic and Computation, Oxford 1990 ff.
• Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1992 ff.
• Journal of Logic Programming, (Elsevir Publ.) 1984 – 2000. Continued by Theory and Practice of Logic Programming and The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming.
• Journal of Mathematical Logic, 2001 ff.
• Journal of Non-Classical Logic, 1982-1991.
• Journal of Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing, 1994 ff.
• Journal of Philosophical Logic, Toronto- Dordrecht 1972 ff.
• Journal of Symbolic Logic, Providence, Rhode Island 1936 ff.
• Logic Journal of the IGPL, Oxford 1993 ff.
• Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy / Philosophiegeschichte und Logische Analyse, Bonn 1998 ff.
• Logique et Analyse, Nouvelle Serie, Löwen-Paris 1958 ff.
• Mathematical Logic Quarterly, Weinheim 1993 ff. (Successor of Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik vols 1 –38, 1955-1992).
• Methodos. Rivista trimestriale de Metodologia e di Logica Simbolica, Milano 1949 ff.
• Modern Logic, vols 1 – 7, 1990-1997.
• Multiple-Valued Logic. An International Journal, 1996 ff.
• Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, Notre Dame, Ind., USA 1960 ff.
• Philosophia Mathematica. An International Journal for Philosophy of Modern Mathematics, Hauppauge, N. Y. 1964 – 1980/1981. 2nd Series 1986 –1991 (6 vols). 3rd Series Oxford 1993 ff.
• Prace z Logiki, Kracow 1965 ff.
• Philosophiegeschichte und logische Analyse / Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, Paderborn 1998 ff.
• Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, London 1900 ff.
• Quality and Quantity. European Journal of Methodology, Bologna 1967 ff.
• Rassegna Internazionale di Logica / International Logic Review, Bologna 1970 ff.
• Rechtstheorie. Zeitschrift für Logik, Methodenlehre, Kybernetik und Soziologie des Rechts, Berlin- München 1970 ff.
• Revue d’historie des mathématiques, Marseille 1995 ff.
• Scripta Mathematica. A Quarterly Journal devoted to the Philosophy, History and Expository Treatment of Mathematics, New York 1932 ff.
• Studia Logica, Warszawa 1953 ff. Since vol. 54, Studia Logica. An International Journal for Symbolic Logic, Dordrecht 1995 ff.
• Studia Logica, Prague 1974 and 1975 (only 2 vols).
• Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Amsterdam 1951 ff.
• Synthese. An International Journal for Epistemology, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Bussum 1936; Vol. 11, 1959ff. Dordrecht .
• Teorema, Valencia 1971 ff.
• The Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, Champeigne, Ill. 1995 ff. (Electronic Journal of the Cornell University Library).
• The Journal of Logic and Algebraic Programming, 2001 ff.
• The Journal of Symbolic Logic, 1936 ff.
• The Quarterly Journal of Mathematics, Oxford 1930 – vol. 20, 1949. 2nd Series 1950 ff.
• Theoria. Revista de Teoria, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia, San Sebastian 1962 ff.
• Theory and Decision. An International Journal for Philosophy and Methodology of the Social Sciences, Dordrecht 1970 ff.
• Theory and Practice of Logic Programming, 2001 ff.
• Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Wiesbaden 1970 ff, Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, Vol 21 ff, Dordrecht 1990 ff
• Zeitschrift für mathematische Logik und Grundlagen der Mathematik, vols. 1 –38, Leipzig 1955 – 1992. Continued as Mathematical Logic Quarterly, vol. 39 ff, 1993 ff..

Common logical symbols

Resources

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